

Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and Ethnocultural Conflict in the Andes

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Table 1: Conflict Statistics

Violence Facts		1980 - 2000	2000+
Conflict	State of Conflict	Active	Active ¹
	Index of Conflict	High (1980-1995) Low (1995-2000)	Low
Armed Militants	Shining Path	10,000 (estimated)	900 ² (estimated)
Victims	Displaced	>600,000 ³	unknown
	Fatalities	61,007-77,552 ⁴	unknown
	Disappeared	>4,000 ⁵	unknown
	Demography	75% Indigenous Peasants ⁶	unknown
Perpetrator	Shining Path	46-54% ⁷	unknown
	The State	30-44.5% ⁸	unknown
	Indigenous Self-Defense Committees (<i>Rondas Campesinas</i>)	<23% ⁹	unknown
Resolution		Decline in Violence	Medium

¹ Hyland, F. (2007). "Peru's Shining Path Gaining Ground?" *Terrorism Focus* 4(28).

² Husté, J.P. (2009). "Peru: Causes for Concern." European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center Analysis.

³ Bridges, T. (2003) "69,000 Died in Strife, Peru Says." *The Miami Herald*.

⁴ Ball, P., Asher, J., Sulmont, D. and Manrique, D. (2003). Anexo 2: ¿Cuántos Peruanos Murieron? Estimación del total de víctimas causadas por el conflicto armado interno entre 1980 y el 2000. *Informe del Grupo de Análisis de Datos sobre Derechos Humanos de la American Association for the Advancement of Science para la Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación. (CVR)*.

⁵ Bridges, T. (2003) "69,000 Died in Strife, Peru Says." *The Miami Herald*.

⁶ CVR (2003). General Conclusions. *Reporte de la Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación*.

⁷ Ball, P., Asher, J., Sulmont, D. and Manrique, D. (2003). Anexo 2: ¿Cuántos Peruanos Murieron? Estimación del total de víctimas causadas por el conflicto armado interno entre 1980 y el 2000. *Informe del Grupo de Análisis de Datos sobre Derechos Humanos de la American Association for the Advancement of Science para la Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación. (CVR)*.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

Current Status

During the latter part of the twentieth century, the Peruvian highlands gave rise to one of the most brutal guerrilla organizations in the world, *El Partido Comunista de Peru por el Sendero Luminoso de Mariátegui* (PCP-SL), or the Communist Party of Peru on the Shining Path of Mariátegui (Starn, 1992; Pike, 2003). This revolutionary movement, consistent with its Maoist roots, promoted the idea that its insurgency would benefit the Peruvian peasantry, which is composed almost exclusively of indigenous peoples. Its recruitment strategies were particularly appealing to socially alienated urban-*mestizo* intellectuals (school teachers, university professors, and students) as well as indigenous peasants estranged from their communities. These intellectuals, regardless of ethnicity, were educated in the western tradition and trained to disdain the “backwardness” of indigenous culture (Mancilla, 1999; Portugal, 2008). Members of the Peruvian security forces operated under comparable ethnic biases. Thus, instilled with societal prejudices, members of both military forces readily engaged in the process of dehumanization, which in turn exacerbated interethnic tensions and facilitated high levels of brutality.

Initially, the PCP-SL’s discourse of social justice was highly appealing to the indigenous peasants. This appeal was further supported as *Senderistas* mimicked community justice by holding “popular trials” and harshly punishing thieves and cattle rustlers, the sworn enemies of the indigenous communities (Theidon, 2000). However, as the movement progressed, many indigenous supporters dramatically altered their opinion of the revolutionary movement as it became evident that the PCP-SL ideology of equality was not intended to achieve ethnocultural equality between *mestizos* and the indigenous peasantry. Instead, the PCP-SL leaders and foot soldiers came from different socio-cultural worlds: Its top and middle ranks were occupied by urban-*mestizos*, while the majority of rural-indigenous supporters served on the front line (Mancilla, 1999). Furthermore, many cadres belittled indigenous cultural values and imposed homogeny upon community members through subsistence level economies

(Theidon, 2000). For the rural peasantry, the state of affairs generated by PCP-SL militants began to feel like a familiar double standard, where *mestizos* had the power and used it to dictate how justice was distributed (Theidon, 2000).

As the double standard became more evident and the movement grew more violent, indigenous supporters regularly died or disappeared, were killed as traitors, or reabsorbed into highland communities after desertion. Fewer indigenous people voluntarily joined the movement and many rural communities rose up against the PCP-SL. In fact, by the end of the conflict, the militants detained by the Peruvian state suggested a different profile of *Sendero* militants than media representations had suggested. In spite of the high levels of suffering, poverty, and institutional disenfranchisement found in indigenous communities, only 24% of those detained for their role in the PCP-SL spoke the Quechua language (Aprodeh, 2004). The average militant was a young educated male, from an urban-*mestizo* background (Portugal, 2008). This portrait of PCP-SL militants suggested that the revolutionary organization was strikingly similar in ethnocultural composition to that of the Peruvian armed forces (Portugal, 2008).

Nevertheless, hostilities between *mestizo* and indigenous citizens were heightened by the government's brutal counter-insurgency war in which "indigenous peasant" became conflated with "terrorist." Unchecked ethnocultural hostility, cognitive bias, and ignorance aggravated and prolonged the brutal civil war. In addition, the indigenous peasantry became the chief victims of both the PCP-SL's rebellion and the Peruvian state's response. Hundreds of thousands of indigenous citizens were tortured, maimed, killed, raped, displaced, disappeared, or otherwise terrorized in a wave of near genocidal violence (CVR, 2003). In contrast, regions of the country that were predominantly inhabited by white and *mestizo* citizens remained conspicuously unaffected. The residents of these areas were indifferent to the suffering of the indigenous peoples (CVR, 2003).

Less than twenty years from the time the PCP-SL began its armed insurgency, the guerilla

organization ostensibly approached its demise. To many observers, the movement appeared to be defunct by the year 2000. Yet, deep ethnocultural divisions remained as did the social injustice and ethnic discrimination directed toward the indigenous peoples. Even as truth and reconciliation efforts called national awareness to the atrocities in the highlands, recurrent reports of resurgence spread from isolated, primarily indigenous, coca-producing regions – where guerrilla activity had not been eradicated. Many among Peru's elite reacted with indifference to the continuous reports of violent incidents, associated human rights abuses, narcotrafficking, and evidence of PCP-SL collaboration with a powerful Colombian guerilla movement (FARC), dismissing these activities as belonging to a minor force. Thus, while it remains unlikely that the PCP-SL will attain the same stature it held in the early 1990's, the preconditions of the conflict remain in place, awaiting only the appropriate spark to set the country afire once again.

Demographic Characteristics

From the time the Spanish conquistadors arrived in Peru, during the 16th century, ethnocultural conflict has prevailed. People of European descent composed the ruling classes and perceived indigenous peoples as inferior, even subhuman, in order to justify the preferential treatment given to Europeans. To manage the offspring of Spanish-indigenous unions, a complicated caste system evolved. At the top of the hierarchy were whites and *criollos* (of mostly European descent), followed by *mestizos* (1/2 indigenous), *cholos* (3/4 indigenous), and the indigenous. People who spoke Spanish and adopted European norms tended to be categorized as *mestizo*. Thus, to avoid paying tributes to the Spanish, and to obtain opportunities not otherwise available, many of the indigenous chose to leave their traditional communities and disguise their ancestry (Langer & Stearns, 2001). To preserve their higher rank, *mestizos* scorned those who preserved an indigenous lifestyle (Strong, 1992).

Within this context, success and social climbing required a rejection of everything indigenous, especially uncomfortable reminders of ethnic roots, such as darker skin tones or an appreciation for Andean handicrafts (Strong, 2005). Discrimination was inherent in interconnected dualisms of indigenous/non-indigenous, highland/coastal, rural/urban, traditional/modern, impoverished/affluent, and illiterate/educated (Palmer, 1992). Thus, today many of the indigenous have lower levels of education (and higher levels of illiteracy), are more impoverished, darker skinned, wear “folkloric” clothing, and live in the highlands. On the other hand, the ruling classes consist of people who are light-skinned, live in coastal areas, and adopt a culture that is western and Spanish in origin. As a result, it is common in Peru, as in much of Latin America, for ethnocultural, socio-economic, and even geographic categories to substantially overlap (Muñoz, Paredes, & Thorpe, 2006).

At present, Peru’s population of nearly 30 million includes 45% indigenous peoples, 37% *mestizos*, 15% whites (*criollo* or European), and 3% of other descent (African, Japanese, etc.) (CIA, 2009). While Peru has no legal system of discrimination, substantial racism and discrimination against those whose ethnocultural roots lie in indigenous communities permeates society (Kirk, 1991). Spanish is spoken fluently by approximately 70% of the people, and Quechua and Aymara are commonly spoken in the southern highlands (Mariátegui, 1955/1989; Microsoft Encarta, 1997). Economically, 44.5% of Peruvians are below the poverty line (CIA, 2009). The top 10% of the population controls 41% of the wealth and the bottom 10% controls 1% of the wealth (World Bank, 2007). For Peruvians, the coast has come to represent an economic and politically powerful Hispanic and *mestizo* population, whereas the highlands represent an impoverished and oppressed indigenous culture (Comas-Díaz, Lykes, & Alarcon, 1998). These ethnocultural divisions contributed directly to the brutality of the violence which occurred during the latter part of the twentieth century.

History

Manuel Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, the enigmatic founder of the PCP-SL, completed his dissertations in both philosophy and law at *Universidad Nacional de San Agustín* in Arequipa in 1961. Shortly thereafter, he took a position as head of the philosophy department at the newly reopened *Universidad de San Cristóbal de Huamanga* in Ayacucho. This university was an example of concerted efforts by the communist party to create a center of development in one of the poorest regions of the country. Its high salaries and good organization attracted some of the best intellectuals from Peru and abroad (Gorriti, 2006). The Ayacucho region itself was one of the most heavily indigenous (as well as impoverished and neglected) regions of Peru, and a hotbed of grievance (Strong, 1992). Thus, it was here that the PCP-SL formed in the classes of the charismatic Abimael Guzmán, with a core group of supporters emerging as early as 1964 (Becker, 2006).

In 1965 and 1967, Abimael Guzmán visited the People's Republic of China, met Mao Tse Tung, received training, and became familiar with the beginnings of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (Gorriti, 1991). These firsthand experiences intensified his ideological extremism. They also inspired him with a vision of becoming the leader of a revolution that would benefit the oppressed peoples of Peru (Gorriti, 1991; Time, 1992). Accordingly, after a split with the *PCP-Bandera Roja* (PCP-Red Flag) in the 1970's, Guzmán founded the *PCP-Sendero Luminoso* and adopted the *nom de guerre* 'Comrade Gonzalo' (Strong, 1992). For the next 10 years, Guzmán proceeded in a slow, thoughtful, and disciplined fashion to successfully build a revolutionary movement (Manwaring 2004). Then, in 1979, after laying a sufficiently strong foundation for his organization, Abimael Guzmán retired from his position at the university and went underground.

Ideology and Structure

What was known about the ideology of *Sendero Luminoso* appeared simplistic and erroneous to outsiders, but liberating and inspiring to many who existed within the ethnocultural, economic, and regional complexities that defined Peruvian social classes (Palmer, 1992). The movements' leadership, or the *Comité Central* (Central Committee), framed their mission solely within international and class terms, largely neglecting the ethnocultural issues that beleaguered the highland peasantry (Strong, 1992). Ideological writings did not mention Peru's ethnic divisions and direct references to ethnicity were omitted from posters and other publications (McClintock, 2005). In fact, *Sendero*'s central creed, referred to as 'Gonzalo Thought,' was conspicuously indifferent to indigenous cultures, traditions, and issues (Degregori, 1990; Starn, 1995). These omissions may have been a function of blind faith in the primacy of class struggle or a strategic decision to avoid alienating the majority of *mestizos*. In practice, however, it was nearly impossible to separate ethnicity and economic class in the Peruvian highlands. As explained by an early PCP-SL website, the indigenous peoples "(Quechua, Aymara, etc.) voluntarily join the ranks of the revolution, keeping their class interests in mind. After centuries of exploitation, most of them are now peasants (mainly poor)..." (Quispe, 1998).

At the core of the revolutionary ideology was benevolent prejudice, a form of prejudice associated with superficial positive emotions and an underlying perception of the "other" as generally inferior and incompetent (Ramasubramanian & Oliver, 2007). Many members of the PCP-SL stereotyped the indigenous peoples as innately passive and helpless. In addition, the *Comité Central* saw themselves as the protectors of a 'primitive' and 'uncivilized' indigenous peasantry. Key documents clearly stated that "it is incumbent upon Communists to organize and lead [the indigenous peasantry]. [The indigenous] have concrete problems everywhere and we must worry about them and attend to them" (Comité Central,

1988). This seeming benevolence, and its associated feelings of protectiveness and pity, had the same impact as more hostile forms of prejudice (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986).

The paternalism of the relationship between *Sendero Luminoso* and the indigenous peoples resulted in a privileging of *mestizos* within the movement's systemic hierarchy. The *Comité Central* (1988) advised that it was the obligation of the *mestizo* proletariat, as representatives of the "leading class of all revolutions" and the "most conscious and best organized section of the masses" to propel the indigenous peasantry toward rebellion. Thus, the top echelons of the PCP-SL believed the indigenous peasantry was incapable of mobilizing without the aid of the *mestizo* middle class. They further disregarded the possibility that indigenous peasants might have valid strategic propositions regarding their own self-determination. Accordingly, the internal structure of *Sendero* replicated the ethnic stratification of Peru, with dark-skinned youths filling the lower ranks under a leadership of lighter-skinned elites (Starn, 1992). In line with research findings, indigenous peasants who passively accepted the imposed hierarchical power structure of the PCP-SL received better treatment from the guerrillas than those who rebelled (Ramasubramanian & Oliver, 2007). Those peasants who resisted the authoritarian system were met not only with direct hostility, but also with high levels of brutality.

The PCP-SL guerrilla movement operated under a secretive cell structure with little information made available to the general public (Becker 2006). Thus, as with any small tight-knit group, the cadres of the PCP-SL would have developed their own internal cultures. These cultures facilitated the indoctrination of other members into the principles of benevolence and hostility inherent in the ideology of *Sendero Luminoso*. Furthermore, as the organization grew in power, it became more messianic in nature and built a powerful cult of personality around its charismatic founder. For supporters of the PCP-SL, Abimael Guzmán ("Chairman Gonzalo") was considered the 'fourth sword' of communism after Marx, Lenin, and Mao (Arena & Arrigo, 2006). Militants further believed that only Guzmán could offer

the necessary interpretations of the complex interrelationships between humanity, history, politics, and destiny (Gorriti, 2006). This mythical image of Guzmán's leadership enhanced his followers' willingness to demand loyalty to the revolution over affective ties, traditional family relations, and daily life (Stern, 1998).

Recruitment

To lay the foundations for a successful struggle, the PCP-SL needed to organize and recruit a critical mass of supporters. Its leaders targeted specific segments of the population, using highly evolved propaganda campaigns. These campaigns focused primarily on educated young *mestizos*, who often felt disenfranchised by the higher echelons of the *criollo* elite (Kirk, 1991). Propaganda was also used to target indigenous peasants, who were viewed as the principal combatants and the people most in need of "protection and guidance" from *mestizo* leaders. Many recruitment efforts specifically targeted the indigenous youth (Comité Central, 1988).

The Intellectuals and Proletariat (Mestizos)

Residents of indigenous communities viewed teachers as both a blessing and a curse. The educators provided access to knowledge that had been controlled by the *mestizo* middle class and, thus, formerly unattainable to the indigenous peasantry (Primov, 1980). Parents sacrificed to educate their children and, in turn, children valued their studies: Schools and state universities were crammed day and night (Strong, 1992). Yet, because teachers possessed this fundamentally *mestizo* based knowledge, they were also perceived as agents of control (Primov, 1980; Wilson, 2007). In fact, regardless of their skin tone or ethnicity, teachers were viewed as 'white' by rural Quechua students (Wilson, 2007). Thus, although the majority of educators working in the highlands were urban-*mestizos*, teachers raised in rural indigenous communities also felt socially alienated. They were accepted by neither the indigenous

communities nor the urban-*mestizo* society, which harshly discriminated against them for the dark color of their skin and their indigenous accent (Zavala, 1989; Degregori, 1991). At this intersection of two cultures, many teachers felt socially isolated.

The teachers often held paternalistic attitudes and stereotypical views of the indigenous peasants they served. To them, the Quechua were unsophisticated simpletons, who were fearful, submissive, unmotivated, uncultured, and unable to fend for themselves (Wilson, 2007). In contrast, the teachers perceived themselves as enlightened individuals, whose responsibility was to tend to the poor and stand up for the mistreated peasants, while simultaneously engaging in the arduous work of ‘civilizing’ them (Wilson, 2007). They disdained the traditional cultural values of obedience, mysticism, and fatalism, condemning them as the culprits that allowed the ruling classes to exploit indigenous communities. As a result, teachers encouraged indigenous children to discard their ‘inferior’ cultural values and their supernatural and indigenous mysticism and to embrace the cultural norms of dominant *mestizo* society (Wilson, 2007).

Socially alienated teachers, seeking respect and companionship, formed the primary base from which *Sendero* drew support and recruits. For many teachers, the PCP-SL provided an opportunity for companionship from a like-minded community of other well-educated persons living between two cultures (McClintock 2005; Wilson, 2007). These teachers were also attracted to Guzmán’s argument that the revolutionary movement should not only alter the system, but also the psychology of the people (Gorriti, 2006). This logic offered a way to ‘protect’ indigenous students, while encouraging them to discard ‘backward’ indigenous superstitions and beliefs. Thus, the educators’ benevolent prejudices had found an ideological home.

At one point, *Sendero* supporters comprised as much as 15% of all Peruvian teachers (30,000) (McClintock, 1998; Wilson, 2007). With such a strong appeal among those representative of the urban,

educated, and *mestizo* middle class, the PCP-SL adopted external and paternalistic attitudes similar to those of the urban-*mestizo* teacher. The followers of the PCP-SL were perceived in terms of students from the rural-indigenous realm (Becker, 2006). Even in iconography, Abimael Guzmán (“Comrade Gonzalo” or “Chairman Gonzalo”) was depicted in the role of the teacher, wearing glasses and carrying a book (Wilson, 2007). By teaching their indigenous students the ideology of the PCP-SL, militant teachers felt they could rouse the indigenous people, shape their interpretation of past exploitation, channel their future aspirations, and protect their community.

The Indigenous Peasantry

Despite its leadership’s belief in the superiority of the *mestizo* social classes, the PCP-SL needed to recruit heavily among the indigenous to achieve its political ends. As such, members of the *Comité Central* seemed to take advice from the writings of Héctor Béjar, who had been involved with an earlier communist guerilla movement based in the Ayacucho region (Ash, 1985; Loveman & Davies, 1997). Béjar argued that, in Peru, a successful guerilla insurgency depended upon how well the movement related to the indigenous peasant’s fundamental cultural values and native language (Loveman & Davies, 1997). He believed that the indigenous peasant had a tendency to associate the Spanish language with the image of a feudal *patrón*. As such, he felt that language was a significant barrier between the rebels and local residents. “For the guerrillas to gain the trust of the peasantry they must be able to speak Quechua, and not just any Quechua, but the Quechua of the zone where they are operating...” (Loveman & Davies, 1997, pp. 289).

Accordingly, Abimael Guzmán, encouraged by Efraín Morote, the rector of the University, studied Quechua in his quest to reach and recruit from Ayacucho’s half-million peasants (Gelles, 2002). In addition, Guzmán fostered trust among indigenous families and students by frequently visiting homes

in the poorer districts of Ayacucho (Strong, 1992). He urged top leaders, as well as PCP-SL recruits, to fan out into the countryside to study Quechua and learn highland customs (Ash, 1985; Marks, 1996). Furthermore, Quechua-speaking leaders were strategically placed among the central cadre of the PCP-SL in order to create tactical ties to the indigenous peasantry. Guzmán merged the revolutionary movement with Andean culture, making the indigenous communities the foundation of the revolution (DeQuine, 1984). Thus, at the outset of the movement, many supporters of *Sendero Luminoso* were individuals from an indigenous background (Gelles, 2002).

Guerilla leaders associated the movement with Andean legends (Strong, 1992). They evoked images of key figures in indigenous lore, such as the *pishtaco* (or *ñakaq* in Quechua), in order to justify tremendous brutality (Loveman & Davies, 1997). The *pishtaco* is a bogeyman, who travels through rural areas raping, mutilating, and disemboweling his human prey as he steals the fat from their bodies (Stimpson, 2001). At the core of this representation is a white male invader (often a businessman, government representative, or landowner), who destroys and profits from his indigenous victims (Strong, 1992; Stimpson, 2001). Each generation re-interprets the figure of the *pishtaco* to symbolically personify current fears and sufferings (Fumerton, 2002).

In Ayacucho, during the early 1980's, the indigenous peoples readily associated the Peruvian security forces with the *pishtacos* (Strong, 1992). This association between governmental agents and the *pishtacos* helped to reinforce mystical beliefs and generate confidence that the PCP-SL was acting to eradicate evil. Brutal killing and savage ritualistic treatment of early victims was associated with efforts to prevent retaliation from the victim in the afterlife. These acts included gauging out eyes to prevent the victim from recognizing the killers; severing the tongue so he could not verbally betray them; and breaking the ankles so the victim could not return to hassle the perpetrators (Strong, 1992).

Guerrilla leaders also used other local beliefs to gain the loyalty of the peasants. The Andean

perception of time is construed as a series of epochs. During each epoch, an Inka (sometimes referred to as a divine king or a messiah) emerges from the cyclical patterns of time to reorder the cosmos (Loveman & Davies, 1997). To foster the impression that he was that messianic figure, Guzmán carefully cultivated a mysterious persona, one in which he seemed both invisible and omnipresent (Time, 1992; Ross, 2009). The Inka is located at the center of the cycle of time and space, enabling him to transcend inevitable death (Ossio, 2002). Thus, several narrow escapes from government forces, reinforced the mythical, quasi-supernatural, status attributed to Abimael Guzmán: “In jungle areas the Indians reportedly say he escapes by transforming himself into a bird and flying out of harm’s way; or into a snake, which vanished into the bush. In the southern Andes he is said to fool his hunters by turning himself into a stone” (Strong, 1992, pp. 127). For many indigenous supporters, Guzmán was known as *Puka Inti* (Quechua for “Red Sun”), an appellation that directly associated him with a Quechua divinity (DeQuine, 1984; McClintock, 2005).

Mother Coca

Cocaine is the key alkaloid in coca leaves, and thus the leaves are critical to the manufacture of the drug. Yet, to the indigenous communities of Peru, coca leaves are imbued with spiritual, economic, medicinal, and social value, symbolizing both identity and status to their carrier (Strong, 1992). They are commonly used to dull physical pain, produce energy, and alleviate altitude sickness. Furthermore, the sacred leaves represent time and space. Chewing coca creates a social bond at rituals such as community building projects, meetings, and marriages (Ossio, 2002; Strong, 1992). “Mother Coca” is also commonly used in rituals of a religious nature, where it is an offering to native spirits, Christian deities, or used as a part of a Shamanic curing session (Ossio, 2002).

With the growth of the Colombian drug cartels in the 1980s, the coca leaf also became a valuable agricultural commodity, particularly in Peru where the quality of the coca leaf was higher than in

Colombia (Strong, 1992). Accordingly, remote valleys that had produced the coca plant for centuries became centers of the illegal activity associated with cocaine trafficking. Many of the estimated 580,000 indigenous coca farmers found it hard to fully grasp how their inherently useful and beloved plant could be misused to create a destructive drug (Gagnon, 1993; McClintock, 2005). Yet, the indigenous peasantry also became acutely aware that what had formerly been considered a business was now regarded as trafficking. The prohibitions placed on the sale of the legally grown leaf were perceived to be the result of discriminatory state practices (McClintock, 2005; Strong, 1992.) Thus, the class of cultures was again evident: To the indigenous, coca represented sacred aspects of cultural identity. To the government, coca represented drug trafficking and illegal activity. To the PCP-SL, coca represented support and profit.

The PCP-SL took root in the coca-growing regions of Peru, including the Upper Huallaga Valley (which at the time, was the largest coca-growing area in the world) and the Apurimac and Ene River Valleys (VRAE), during the early 1980's (Gagnon, 1993; McClintock, 2005). Through their strategic activities in these regions, the guerillas gained control over significant portions of the countryside, a continued base of operations, and significant funding (Fitz, Simmons, 1993). The guerrillas profited from both sides of the cocaine trade by charging traffickers for protection and shipment rights, and charging indigenous peasants for protection (Fitz-Simmons, 1993). By the late 1980's, their cocaine related activities yielded approximately \$20 to \$40 million (McClintock, 2005). The PCP-SL used approximately one third of these funds for salaries and material support for insurgents, with nearly 60% of militants receiving salaries. These salaries averaged between \$250-\$500 in the highlands and Lima (more than 5 times the salary of a Peruvian teacher) and up to \$1,000 a month in coca-producing areas (McClintock, 2005). Furthermore, about 35% of PCP-SL guerillas received rations, accommodations, or stipends for expenses associated with military activities (McClintock, 2005). In coca-growing areas the

guerillas also protected the indigenous peasants from both the drug traffickers and Peru's antidrug police and dispersed effective justice in the face of an expensive, slow, and corrupt judicial system (Fitz-Simmons, 1993; Strong, 1992). *Senderistas* further used the ties built from working with traffickers to obtain higher prices for the indigenous coca growers (Fitz-Simmons, 1993). However, when peasants failed to cooperate with the PCP-SL, the guerrillas coerced and blackmailed them into complying (García Sayan, 1989; Comas-Díaz et al. 1998). Thus, the PCP-SL was able to gain the loyalty, or at least cooperation, of hundreds of thousands of people in coca-growing regions (Fitz-Simmons, 1993).

Youth and Children

Indigenous youths found themselves caught between the traditional and semi-feudal environments of their parents and the semi-modern status of the Peruvian coast (Mancilla, 1999). Living in this state of limbo, in combination with an Andean tendency to perceive danger in uncertainty, produced high levels of psychological discomfort for many of the indigenous youths. *Sendero's* ideology offered them some reassurance in a world of insecurity and normalized violence. Thus, many rural youths found the simple explanations and rigid structure of the PCP-SL highly attractive (Mancilla, 1999).

At the same time, the PCP-SL valued its younger recruits because they were more idealistic, malleable and open to absorbing new ideology (Crenshaw, 1995; Granados, 1987). For *Sendero* leaders, the youths represented the hope and future of the party. Teenage militants who survived the ongoing armed conflict were likely to become tomorrow's commanders (Crenshaw, 1995). Moreover, in the case of a protracted war, children were counted as a human reserve to replace those who fell in combat (Del Pino, 1999). Accordingly, the leadership of the PCP-SL made a strategic decision to recruit an overwhelmingly young population of supporters and militants, often from targeted indigenous communities. Once they occupied a village, *Sendero* militants established a school to spread PCP-SL propaganda, selectively recruit new militants, and inculcate the indigenous peasantry with their own

mestizo views (Smith, 1995).

Recruitment was not only aimed at students in rural communities, but also at the more fair-skinned youth who had been chosen to study in towns or cities. Upon arrival, these youths quickly discovered that their urban peers and teachers viewed them with contempt because of their indigenous background (Wilson, 2007). As a result, these students felt hurt, resentful, marginalized, and socially isolated. The PCP-SL won their loyalty by framing their participation as a prestigious accomplishment and using imagery associating them being a hero and the proprietor of a mystic revolution. Militants also labeled their recruits as the best sons and daughters of the town (Aprodeh, 2004). In short, the PCP-SL offered the youths the possibility of another reality where, regardless of ethnic background, they could gain acceptance, authority, respect, a chance for change, and even an opportunity for ethnic revenge (Wilson, 2007). Some youths, often more educated than their parents, also saw membership in the PCP-SL as an opportunity to challenge their own elders, despite the hierarchical structure of the indigenous community (Aprodeh, 2004).

While the first generation of young PCP-SL cadres volunteered in a response to feelings of disenfranchisement, discrimination, and oppression, those recruited later often participated as a consequence of intimidation (Fumerton, 2002). In fact, the majority of the indigenous child recruits from the southern highlands joined because they were deceived, coerced, or threatened with violence (Aprodeh, 2004). Members of the PCP-SL entered schools to recruit the tallest, strongest, and most studious children, with the oldest being between the ages of 10 and 12. Teachers who opposed these kidnappings were assassinated (Aprodeh, 2004). Furthermore, when indigenous communities or families did not voluntarily deliver their children to fulfill *Sendero's* quota, the children were drafted against their will through threats of reprisal or actual assassinations of opponents. Family members who protested were given the choice to either give up their child or have the entire family killed (Aprodeh, 2004).

At one time, more than a 10th of the armed *Sendero* militants, or approximately 1,000 guerrillas, were under the age of 18 (Comas-Díaz et al. 1998). The youngest of these recruits, often between the ages of 5 and 10, formed the “Red Pioneers.” Although the kidnapped indigenous children did not initially trust their captors, members of the PCP-SL cared for and educated them. Consequently, *Sendero* militants became the reference group for these children, as well as the only reality they knew (Apródeh, 2004). The Red Pioneers performed a variety of tasks including surveillance, message delivery, spying, cleaning, and provision of food and other necessities. Other children were used as porters, transporting flags or ammunition. Upon turning 12, the children were taught to use guns, spears, and slings, as well as how to make bombs. They were also required to participate in armed conflict (Apródeh, 2004). Without any outside commitments or influences these children were fully indoctrinated into party philosophy and became completely committed to the PCP-SL (Crenshaw, 1995).

Indigenous youths and children were forcibly recruited by the Peruvian security forces (Apródeh, 2004). In fact, government forces obtained military recruits in two primary ways: One was by drafting impoverished coastal *mestizos* and the other was by abducting youths from indigenous communities (Starn, 1998; Fumerton, 2002). The forcible recruits were taken to the local military base, and then posted far from their home region. Months would elapse before families learned what had happened to their sons (Fumerton, 2002). By the latter stages of the conflict, many indigenous youths were faced with only one choice: for which military force they would fight?

Armed Conflict and Destabilizing Terror

Like many of the educators behind the PCP-SL movement, Abimael Guzmán was an urban-*mestizo* who had lived for many years in indigenous zones. He had seen the rise and fall of revolutionary movements and had gone to great lengths to become familiar with indigenous culture. Moreover,

Guzmán had been personally trained by Mao in China. In keeping with this Maoist instruction, the initial stages of the insurrection were planned in terms of strategic defense. Accordingly, the revolution was intended to give the initial appearance of being both disorganized and embryonic, and hence of little consequence to urban-*mestizos* (Gorriti, 2006). The danger of this tactic was that of appearing weak to potential supporters. Thus, the success of the movement depended upon its being perceived by urban-*mestizos* as destined to fail, but simultaneously strong to the indigenous peasantry, and well-thought out to its intellectual support base.

In 1980, the night before Peru's first presidential election in 17 years, a cadre of young militants launched the armed portion of the revolution by raiding the polling place and burning ballot boxes in the rural town of Chuschi (Becker, 2006). The PCP-SL also left mysterious messages such as "Teng Hsiao-ping, son of a bitch" wrapped around a dog which had been maimed, killed, and hung from a streetlamp. These tactics seemed convoluted and confusing to most urban-*mestizos* (Gorriti, 1991; Getgen, 2008). Literal interpretations from urban areas explained the dogs as being representative of the Chinese politicians the PCP-SL considered revisionist dogs (DeQuine, 1984). However, the revolutionary movement had been strategically organized for over a decade in a primarily indigenous region, had acquired numerous indigenous supporters, and was possessed of educated *mestizo* leaders with international training. Thus, it is highly unlikely that the "People's War" would have been launched with only a hurried expression of annoyance with "revisionism." In fact, aspects of Quechua lore which associate dogs with ethnic distrust and death were also implied by the prophetic symbolism of these acts. For the Quechua, a black dog helps souls to cross a river on its way to the last judgment, while a white dog is considered unhelpful. White is considered the color of white people, "who are unhelpful and who do not want to get dirty in the unclean waters of that river" (Ossio, 2002, pp. 210). Furthermore, to the Quechua, the hanging would have been interpreted as an omen that someone would die or be put to death

(Bennett, 1984; Ash, 1985). Thus, Guzmán was able to use the cultural divide between the urban coastal centers and the rural indigenous highlands to offer a different perspective of the PCP-SL to each segment of the population.

Peruvian Security Forces

For nearly two years after the PCP-SL initiated their armed insurgency, the Peruvian government treated the violence in indigenous communities as if it were nothing more consequential than criminal activity. Then, in 1983, faced with a quickly deteriorating situation, the Belaúnde administration declared Ayacucho an emergency zone, and sent in over 2,000 regular army soldiers in an effort to combat the PCP-SL (Loveland & Davies, 1997; McClintock, 2005). These military conscripts were ill prepared both physically and culturally for the highland environment. Their ranks were filled with disenfranchised *mestizo* draftees who worked almost exclusively for food and barracks (with little to no pay), lived in appalling conditions, suffered through short and brutal trainings, and endured forced labor and mistreatment at the hands of lighter-skinned officers (Strong, 2002; Fumerton, 2002). Wealthier *criollos* and *mestizos*, who could pay a bribe, avoided the military. Indeed, by the late 1980's nearly thirty to forty percent of troops stationed in the guerilla areas were believed to have deserted the Peruvian military. A significant number of these individuals abandoned ranks because they were enjoined to do so by *Senderistas* (Strong, 1992).

Those who remained often seemed unwilling or unable to distinguish between the enemy and the rest of the indigenous population (Crabtree, 1992). Members of the poorly trained and unmotivated security forces searched the homes of the indigenous peasantry and were responsible for arbitrary arrests, abductions, and disappearances, as well as summary executions (Fumerton, 2002). Soldiers frequently accused innocent indigenous civilians of collaborating with the PCP-SL. In one incident that illustrates

the high levels of prejudice and fear associated with the indigenous peasant, 60 community members were indiscriminately massacred in Accomarca in 1985 (Strong, 1992). When asked to explain the rationale for these killings, Sublieutenant Hurtado responded that the indigenous peasant had “an ideological tendency” and that “one cannot trust an [indigenous] woman, old man, or a child” (Strong, 1992, p. 133). As a result of the widespread nature of similar attitudes within the military ranks, the Peruvian military was implicated in the death, disappearance, and torture, of thousands of innocent peasants within just a few years of their deployment (Aprodeh, 2004; McClintock, 2005).

Escalation of Violence

As the guerrilla movement expanded its influence, its violence and brutality intensified. Unlike other Latin American revolutionary movements, the PCP-SL imposed an authoritarian and dogmatic ideology on the indigenous communities under its control, along with subsistence level economies (Becker, 2006). Militants denounced innocent peasants as bourgeois for owning a few extra livestock, or for hiring an occasional laborer (Fitz-Simmon, 1993; Gianotten et al. 1985; Wheat, 1990). They destroyed crops and farm equipment, closed regional markets, and tortured and killed community members who were reluctant to support these measures (Fitz-Simmons, 1993). As the armed insurgency continued, the *Comité Central* spent less time blending core Maoist doctrine with indigenous appeals. They also explicitly targeted resistant indigenous communities for destruction (Corntassel & Holder, 2008).

Asháninka

Within “liberated zones” it became evident that the PCP-SL intended to eradicate all ethnocultural differences between those under their authority (Corntassel & Holder, 2008). This distaste for diversity was particularly evident in the extermination campaign waged against the Asháninka, who

were culturally distinct from both the *mestizo* leaders and Quechua foot soldiers. The Asháninka populated a forested region of the Peruvian Amazonas, near the Apurímac and Ene River Valleys (VRAE). They had remained particularly closed to outsiders, spoke no Spanish, and violently resisted all efforts by the PCP-SL to control them (Fitz-Simmons, 1993). Their very existence seemed to contradict the paternalistic ideology of the *mestizo* and *mestizo*-educated militants, triggering an especially hostile and brutal backlash.

This violence was further fueled by the existence of prior inter-indigenous hostilities. Antagonism between the Quechua and Asháninka communities had originated years before when Quechua settlers, in attempts to gain the parcels of land they had been denied in their homelands, encroached on Asháninka land (Gagnon, 1993; Norholt, 2008). In consequence, the guerilla activity in the VRAE sparked intense violence against an estimated 44 Asháninka communities (10,000 people) through assassinations, slavery, and kidnapping (Strong, 1992). Approximately 5,000 members of the tribe were forced to live in inhuman living conditions, or die of hunger and disease in internment camps run by the guerrillas. Moreover, as a part of this violence, pregnant women were massacred or forced to abort, girls were used as sex-slaves, people were forced to kill their own family members or friends under the penalty of death, and many Asháninka children were forcibly recruited to be soldiers in armed *Sendero* operations (CVR, 2003; Strong, 1992).

A Shift in Understanding

Although the *Comité Central* had acquired a fundamental knowledge of Quechua culture, they underestimated its patterns of simultaneous resistance and adaptation, skepticism and hope, and rejection and acceptance (Allen, 1981; Ossio, 2002). Furthermore, *Senderistas* failed to follow the Maoist doctrine of winning hearts and minds. They systematically attacked the indigenous communal government,

religion, and culture. In consequence, the guerrillas alienated a significant portion of their support base and contributed to the eventual decline of their own movement (Fitz-Simmons, 1993; Loveman & Davies, 1997). The movement's leaders had overestimated the power of their *mestizo* worldview and remained unaware of the profound adaptability and resilience of the contemporary Quechua worldview (Izaguirre, 1996). Many militants also did not comprehend the unspoken norms associated with the Quechua traditions of reciprocal exchange, time-space orientation, and mutability (Folke, Frabricius, Cundill, & Schultz 2005). As a result, by the end of the 1980's, most indigenous communities perceived the guerillas as nothing more than new oppressors, and any remaining support for the guerillas was often superficial and based mostly on a fear achieved through the use of terror tactics (Getgen, 2008; Fitz-Simmons, 1993).

Reciprocal Exchange

The ethos of Quechua culture is perhaps best embodied by the ideal of *Ayni*, or delayed reciprocity and symmetrical exchange among equals. In *Ayni*, if a neighbor requests assistance, it is readily given, thereby obligating the giver to an appropriate future exchange. *Ayni* is also inherent in the Quechua sense of justice, wherein sanctions are assessed with the intent of restoring equilibrium and reincorporating an offender into the community (Albo, 1976; Drzewieniecki, 1995). In rare cases, the harshest penalties that a Quechua community might judge appropriate are those of exile and death. Accordingly, in some cases, the initial assassinations on the part of the PCP-SL garnered support and acceptance as a culturally normative application of a penalty. However, in traditional communal justice, it was unusual for the death penalty to be considered a suitable sanction. It was reserved almost exclusively for cattle rustlers who refused not only to cease their activities, but also refused to accept banishment from the village (Theidon, 2000). Furthermore, in these cases, significant discourse was

required in community assembly (Drzewieniecki, 1995).

The PCP-SL's failure to understand this aspect of *Ayni* was among their most grievous errors. For the Quechua, legitimacy is defined by a trust in the fair application of justice (Drzewieniecki, 1995). Penalties are not intended to be punitive, but rather remedial, educational, or in the interest of symmetry (Theidon, 2000). In consequence, the *Senderistas* use of disproportionate and unpredictable methods of social control undermined any perception of legitimacy that indigenous peasants might have attributed to the guerrillas. In addition, the execution of norm violators in place of the application of lesser and more reciprocal sanctions, such as fines, would have resulted in a sense of disequilibrium. This state would have been highly unpleasant for the Quechua, whose mores involve the pursuit of balance. Perceptions of symmetry were further distorted through the militants' application of sanctions for punitive purposes, rather than the intent of restoring balance (Drzewieniecki, 1995). Thus, while top *Sendero* leaders may have spoken Quechua, it became apparent to many that the movement was not truly grounded in an understanding of highland culture (Loveman & Davies, 1997).

Time-Space Orientation

The most well-known Andean deity is *Pachamama*, or Mother Earth. She is the source of life, and symbolizes a blend of nature, humanity, and spirituality. Inherent in her image is the spiritual integration of the supernatural, the sacred, and the natural which is characteristic of highland tradition (Smith, 1997). *Pacha* refers to both space and to time, two elements which are perceived as inseparable and divided into a dualism of proximal and distal (Ossio, 2002; Allen, 1981). When the Quechua become oriented to a location, they also enter into a personal relationship with that space. Moreover, the Quechua define community, or *ayllu*, in terms of space: Closeness implies community, while distance implies foreignness. Accordingly, for the Quechua, that which is familiar and safe is perceived to be a

part of the community, whereas the unfamiliar or dangerous is considered alien (Allen, 1981). By terrorizing indigenous communities and disrespecting traditional values, the PCP-SL grew to be perceived as an invading force and, thus, ‘foreign’. Those *Senderistas* who lived in the same community were understood to have ‘fallen out of humanity’ and no longer perceived as a part of the *ayllu* (Theidon, 2000). This critical shift may be further understood in terms of the mutability of Quechua beliefs.

Mutability

In contrast to the *mestizo* tradition of time as linear, rational, and absolute, the Quechua perceive all processes as cyclical and, thus, fluid, changeable, and even ambiguous (Ossio, 2002; Folke et al., 2005). The fluidity and adaptability of Quechua beliefs facilitated the dramatic shift in the indigenous understanding of the PCP-SL. As previously mentioned, the PCP-SL had initially benefited from the legend of the *Pishtaco*, which derogated and dehumanized the Peruvian security forces. Yet, much of the war was experienced by the indigenous as an attack (by both the Peruvian armed forces and the PCP-SL) against indigenous cultural practices and the essence of being a member of an indigenous community (Theidon, 2000). Thus, in accordance with the fluid notions of Andean culture, the same tradition which had framed the Peruvian security forces as evil grew to be associated with the PCP-SL (Getgen, 2008). For the Quechua, it also marked the transition to a perception of the guerrillas as dangerous outsiders, with white skin and light eyes (Santos-Granero, 1998; Stimpson, 2001). On the other hand, for urban-*mestizos* and western scholars, habituated to a more linear and absolute worldview, there remained a lasting perception of the PCP-SL as a movement that was rooted among the highland indigenous.

Resistance and Counter-Rebellion

Despite the Peruvian security forces deployment to ‘emergency zones’ for civilian protection and *Sendero*’s paternalistic appeals to the Quechua, the indigenous communities were the principal targets of

both *mestizo*-dominated military organizations. The security forces perceived the indigenous peoples as a threat to their superior ‘Western’ culture, while *Senderistas* perceived their cultural identity and traditions as an obstacle to the attainment of a Maoist state (CVR, 2003). Peasants grew infuriated by the PCP-SL’s arrogance and its executions of legitimate and highly respected local leaders, people’s trials, and abstract justice. Moreover, they resented the guerrillas’ tendency to steal local resources and to confiscate indigenous lands, harvests, and livestock herds (Fumerton, 2002). These actions were in direct violation of the moral values of *Ayni* and led to a rapid de-legitimization of the guerrilla movement in the ‘liberated areas.’ On the other hand, the security forces associated all indigenous peasants with the PCP-SL, and military actions took a heavy toll on highland communities (Fitz-Simmons, 1993; Loveman & Davies, 1997). Thus, caught between the guerilla movement and the Peruvian military, the indigenous peasantry became the primary target of indiscriminate violence and suffered horrendous atrocities (Fumerton, 2002).

The Iquichano, like many other indigenous peoples in the early 1980’s, initially willingly provided the PCP-SL with provisions, lodging, and moral support (Fumerton, 2001). However, the guerrillas’ cultural ignorance and terrorist tactics quickly undermined the peasants’ initial positive perception of *Sendero* and replaced it with a resentment that inspired the development of a self-defense militia. In January of 1983, when a column of eight PCP-SL guerrillas returned to an Iquichano community that they had previously visited, the villagers surrounded and slaughtered them (Fumerton, 2001). Most urban-*mestizos* were stunned by this initiation of a violent counter-rebellion because of their erroneous belief that the PCP-SL was an indigenous movement which enjoyed nearly unanimous support in the highlands. The government immediately praised the bravery and heroism of the small group of indigenous who had defied the militants (Fumerton, 2002). Yet, less than a week later, a group of *mestizo* journalists from Lima and their guide were mistaken for guerrillas and killed by an

indigenous militia just a few miles from the site of the earlier counter-rebellion. This tragedy quickly overshadowed the initiation of an indigenous armed counter-rebellion and detracted from images of indigenous heroism (Fumerton, 2001).

Around this time, the Peruvian military became more visible in the highlands and implemented a policy which required indigenous communities to establish their own self-defense militias. This government pressure, combined with waning support for the PCP-SL, motivated many indigenous communities to ‘rescue their image’ by forming a reluctant and often conflicted alliance with security forces (Theidon, 2000). The result was the creation of numerous indigenous militias, which collectively became known as *rondas campesinas* (Nuñez-Palomino, 1996; Fumerton, 2001). One of the first tasks of these *rondas* was often to kill the PCP-SL sympathizers within the community (Theidon, 2000). Thus, through the formation of a tenuous partnership with the Peruvian state, the communities not only resisted militant authority, but also eliminated guerrilla support systems within their own communities.

The guerillas met these endeavors with savage reprisals that the peasant communities were ill-prepared to handle. As such, the rural communities remained subject to periodic violence such as armed incursions, brutal retaliation, regular levies of supplies and recruits (including children), and increased deaths resulting from an execution of “traitors” at the hands of the PCP-SL (Getgen, 2008; Fumerton, 2002). Simultaneously, the Peruvian state continued to use the indigenous peasantry as a weapon to suppress guerilla activity, and shield the ‘less expendable’ military forces (Corntassel and Holder, 2008). Yet, in the cities, the *mestizo* elite were profoundly fearful of the prospect of armed bands of indigenous peasants. Consequently, for years, the *rondas* were left to arm themselves with only what they had at hand, often nothing more than farm equipment (Taylor, 1998). The indigenous peoples continued to be the primary target of hostility from both military forces. Entire villages vanished, either through

massacre or flight. For the Peruvian military, these ghost villages were viewed as beneficial because they left *Sendero* militants exposed, with nowhere to hide and no one to feed them (Strong, 1992).

At the end of the 1980's, the Peruvian government realized that it was unable to defeat the PCP-SL without the support of the local population. The state policy changed, and *rondas* were provided with training and low-grade armament (Taylor, 1998; Mancilla, 1999; Fumerton, 2001). This increased military support strengthened the peasant counter-rebellion, helping to expand it throughout Ayacucho, and into nearby regions. Yet, despite the government's efforts to control the indigenous patrols, they maintained a clearly rural-indigenous character and autonomy of action (Mancilla, 1999). In fact, in the face of a perceived *mestizo* threat from the PCP-SL, indigenous communities put aside personal grudges and cooperated in the counter-rebellion (Fumerton, 2002). Thus, these self-defense militias rapidly multiplied from 700 in 1989 to 1200 in 1991, and finally to 2400 in 1997 (Fumerton, 2001). It was through the efforts of the *rondas* that the rampant terror in the highlands was stalled and the PCP-SL was defeated in many rural areas (CVR, 2003).

Calming the Violence

For over 10 years the Peruvian government had minimal success in fighting the PCP-SL. The secretive structure of the PCP-SL, its controlled recruiting strategies, and a pervasive lack of trust from indigenous sectors made it difficult for the Peruvian state to obtain good intelligence. Moreover, the Peruvian security forces counter-insurgency tactics were poorly formulated, their intelligence operations unorganized, and their activity permeated by stereotypes and prejudice (Manwaring, 1995). Military aid from the United States in the coca-growing areas was predominantly punitive, directly contradicting indigenous notions of justice. Furthermore, the U.S. influenced attacks were directed at the primarily indigenous or *cholo* minor employees and coca growers, resulting in an increase of hostility toward and

distrust for the armed forces (Taylor, 1998). Instead of deterring the indigenous coca growers from their activities, these efforts instead facilitated an increase of support for the PCP-SL.

In the 1990's, after running on a platform that targeted *cholos* and indigenous peasants, Alberto Fujimori won the presidential election. He improved military intelligence by instituting an independent counter-terrorism unit (GEIN), which was better trained and had better resources than the police and military (Fitz-Simmons, 1993). Unlike his predecessors, the dictator did not view the indigenous peasants as 'backward,' but instead saw them as a potential resource to be exploited – once the communities were more amenable to state control (Crabtree, 2001). Thus, he aggressively pursued a policy of compulsory mobilization and arming of the indigenous *rondas*. Fujimori's tactics escalated even further and, in 1992, he suspended the constitution. Under these conditions the counter-insurgency forces carried out numerous human rights abuses, including holding anonymous military tribunals with a 97% conviction rate (CDI, 2002; Becker, 2006). These tribunals helped to collapse the support structures of the PCP-SL, but also imprisoned numerous innocent civilians (Becker, 2006). Then, on September 12, 1992, following a three month intelligence campaign, the newly founded counter-terrorism unit captured Abimael Guzmán and 19 other leaders of the PCP-SL movement and seized key organizational records (Fitz-Simmons, 1993; Becker, 2006). Guzmán was tried by hooded judges on October 7, 1992, and sentenced to life in prison (Strong, 1992). For many, this arrest is considered the beginning of the end for *Sendero Luminoso* (Becker, 2006).

Around this time, psychological operations directly impacted many of the remaining supporters of the PCP-SL, regardless of whether their support had been based on fear, financial considerations, or ideological conviction. One tactic was to portray the legendary "Chairman Gonzalo" as a buffoon. Guzmán was dressed in a striped convict suit, brought to his initial sentencing in an iron cage, and publically ridiculed. Additionally, unflattering pictures of him were widely distributed (Taylor, 1998).

These tactics severely tarnished his legendary image and his credibility as the Inka in a pre-destined movement. Guzmán's messianic image was further damaged in 1993, when the Peruvian state announced that he and several other imprisoned leaders had called for an end to the armed struggle and attempted to negotiate a peace agreement with the government (Becker, 2006). Concurrently, Fujimori's amnesty program encouraged the guerrillas to surrender their weapons and become informants, providing the less ideologically inclined an opportunity to safely lay down their arms and cease the active insurgency (Becker, 2006).

Lingering Violence

After Guzmán's call for peace, the PCP-SL movement split into two factions, both of which continue to operate in remote and lucrative coca-growing areas (Arnson, 2005). One faction was lead by Oscar Ramírez Durand ("Feliciano") until his arrest in 1999. Then, after his capture, Ronaldo Huamán Zúñiga ("Alipio") assumed leadership (Arnson, 2005; Allmendinger, 2009). This division operates primarily in the Apurímac and Ene River Valleys (VRAE) and professes no loyalty to Guzmán. However, the band has marshaled significant resources through illegal logging and the cocaine trade (Arnson, 2005). Estimates of armed militants operating in the VRAE have risen from 100-150 in 2004 to over 600 in 2009 (Arson, 2005; Husté, 2009). By 2007, the Peruvian government had instructed police and military forces to begin offensive maneuvers against the PCP-SL, particularly in this region.

José Flores León ("Artemio"), who is believed to be the last free member of Guzmán's inner circle and the highest ranking leader of the PCP-SL at large, leads the other faction. It operates primarily in the Upper Huallaga Valley, with an estimated 350 active militants, and maintains ties to ideological factions in Lima and other areas of the country (Arnson 2005; Husté, 2009; Allmendinger, 2009; MPP, 2009). Materials obtained in 2008 suggest that contact between Guzmán and Flores

continues (Allmendinger, 2009). Furthermore, in March of 2002, members of the well-known Colombian guerrilla organization, the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias de Colombia* (FARC), or the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia met with members of the Huallaga Valley faction of the PCP-SL, providing them with weaponry (Semana, 2009). More recent evidence suggests that the contact between the PCP-SL and the FARC has been sustained (AFP, 2008). Thus, this faction may maintain an alliance with the FARC (Allmendinger, 2009).

Regular reports of PCP-SL activity, both large and small scale insurgent attacks, have continued unabated since 2000. One example of a larger scale attack occurred in 2003 when PCP-SL militants attacked a gas pipeline and kidnapped approximately 71 employees (Becker, 2006; Pike, 2003). Another significant series of incidents occurred in late 2008, when the PCP-SL launched attacks that resulted in 33 deaths and 43 injuries to soldiers over the course of just a few months. The Peruvian state has responded to these actions by launching a full-scale military offensive with the intent of eradicating the PCP-SL (Keating & Dickinson, 2009; Taft-Morales, 2009). To date, this offensive has failed to make significant headway or even to kill any of the group's new generation of leaders (Keating & Dickinson, 2009). Furthermore, the movement may be gaining support among indigenous peasants who continue to feel neglected by the government (Gregory, 2009).

Possible Resurgence

At the time of his initial sentencing in 1992, Abimael Guzmán declared: "Some think this [arrest] is a great defeat for the party, but it is only a bend in the road. The road is long, but the people will win!" (Times News Service, 1992). Guzmán further proclaimed that the PCP-SL would continue to follow its plan of strategic development and would generate a sixth military plan for the "conquest of power" (Guzmán, 1992). The finalized plan included instructions to PCP-SL militants to surmount the peace

accord ‘hoax’ and to reorganize the party (MPP, 1998). Thus, the conviction that the ‘People’s War’ continues in accordance with the wishes of its leader (“Chairman Gonzalo”) is ingrained in the ideology of the guerrilla organization (MPP, 2003). While PCP-SL bands are generally considered too weak to launch an offensive against the Peruvian government, some indicators support a degree of legitimacy to “Artemio’s” 2006 declaration that “we are rising again, we are returning to grow, we work in secrecy and we work for the future” (Gregory, 2009).

Military strategists and informants estimate that the number of rebels has quadrupled to more than 900 armed militants in recent years (Allmendinger, 2009; Husté, 2009; Romero, 2009). Moreover, there appears to be a small, but ominous, possibility that narcotrafficking has funded a cross-national alliance of communist guerrilla organizations. In addition to weapons exchanges the FARC has consulted with and trained members of some Peruvian guerilla forces (Semana, 2009). Although the level of collaboration of between the PCP-SL and the FARC remains unclear, the commanding officer of the Peruvian Army, General Guibovich, has asserted his belief that the PCP-SL can depend on FARC support when needed (Begg, 2009). Regardless, the PCP-SL’s continued ties with many of Peru’s estimated 600,000 indigenous peasants who reside in coca growing regions has provided a strong base of power and financial support for continued resistance (McClintock, 2005). Of even greater concern are the re-emergence of ideological and political activity by unarmed *Sendero* activists and the spread of PCP-SL’s ideology within universities (McClintock, 2005).

Political Activity

At the end of 2009, Abimael Guzmán was able to reach out and strike fear into the heart of Peruvian authorities when lawyers smuggled his memoirs out of prison (Ross, 2009; Wade & Velez, 2009). In the published text, Guzmán defends the Maoist insurgency, calls for amnesty for both the

rebels and soldiers involved in the conflict, and urges current supporters of the PCP-SL to participate in future elections (Wade & Velez, 2009). President Alan García, who headed one of the two administrations which confronted the guerilla movement during the 1980's, quickly moved to prohibit sales of the book and to prosecute Guzmán's lawyers for their part in its publication (Wade & Velez, 2009). Yet, reports suggest the first edition of the book sold out almost immediately and, only a short while later, a second edition was placed under consideration (Guerra, 2009). Senior members of the movement have confirmed that PCP-SL supporters intend to heed this call and run for office in the upcoming local and regional elections during 2010 (LAHT, 2009). Additionally, several members of the guerilla organization, who have been released from prison, are slated to run on the ticket of the Communist Party of Peru in the national election during 2011. Peru's justice minister has confirmed that the political wing of the guerilla organization will be permitted to participate in these elections (LAHT, 2009).

Causes

While the PCP-SL may have served as the catalyst for the explosion of brutality at the end of the twentieth century, the roots of the vicious violence lie within a more complex framework of both structural and psychological causes. Among the structural causes of violence, there is a stratification of different sectors of society and a centralized authoritarian power structure. Typically, the most fundamental cause of ethnic conflict arises when leaders of a dominant ethnic group gain power within a region or a country and use governmental institutions to distribute benefits unequally across ethnicities (Richardson & Sen, 1996). In Peru, the ruling classes were composed of people of European ancestry, while the indigenous peasants were labeled as essentially inferior, even subhuman, in order to justify the preferential treatment afforded to those of European descent. Furthermore, during the time the PCP-SL

was organizing, political centralization and authoritarianism were evidenced in the military government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado. This fundamental stratification and authoritarianism was exacerbated by a pervasive sense of *machismo* (a “cult of masculinity” which presupposes male aggressiveness, power, and superiority) and attaches a strong significance to the maintenance of honor (Bolton, 1979; Mansilla, 1999). Thus, many of the impoverished *mestizos* and indigenous Peruvians involved in this conflict grew up in a strict and hierarchical military culture, surrounded by normalized violence resulting from high levels of oppression, poverty, and frustration (Mancilla, 1999).

Social Alienation

Psychologically, social alienation can be a key characteristic of people who perpetrate brutal acts of terror (Hudson, 1999). This sense of alienation is apparent among both PCP-SL militants and members of the Peruvian security forces. Some of the PCP-SL’s primary recruits were urban-*mestizos* who had relocated to the highlands and, caught between two worlds, felt marginalized and socially alienated (Primov, 1980). Moreover, the Peruvian military practices of drafting the most impoverished and disenfranchised segments of the urban-*mestizo* population and sending them to remote geographic and cultural regions encouraged feelings of social alienation. As a result, feelings of social alienation increased the tendency of the recruits to seek affiliation and approval from their respective organizations, as well as the tendency to displace their negative emotions into brutal acts of violence.

One the other hand, in spite of their poverty and marginalized status, indigenous peasants were generally embraced by their own communities and were thus able to prevent feelings of social alienation. However, two segments of the indigenous population were particularly susceptible to a sense of communal estrangement. Many indigenous youths, caught between their cultural upbringing and receipt of a *mestizo* education, felt isolated. Additionally, rural youths, who had migrated to the city to escape

the violence of the highlands, no longer had community support and, as a result, were more likely to feel disaffected. To exacerbate this problem, both the Peruvian security forces and the PCP-SL were involved in the kidnapping and use of indigenous child soldiers. These children were separated from their communities at a young age and had only soldiers or guerillas as their role models (Hudson, 1999).

Enemy-Image

When the political unrest in the highlands escalated, the government used force to quell the turbulence and sustain preferential treatment for the *mestizo* members of society. At the same time, members of the Peruvian security forces continued to risk their lives far from home, despite minimal reimbursement and maximal hardship. The discrepancy between their moral attitudes and the inhumanity of the atrocities in which they participated would have generated feelings of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1956; 1957). In an effort to cope psychologically, they reduced this tension and justified their individual actions by envisioning themselves as part of a cause greater than themselves. They also transformed their attitudes of disdain or apathy toward the local residents into a self-righteous and unforgiving hatred of the indigenous people. This process was evident in 1984, when the Commander in Chief of the army publically provided such a justification. He announced that the Peruvian troops were fighting for the greater cause of protecting their own ethnocultural group and that the “demented action of a group of [indigenous] subversives will never separate us from the Western and Christian culture in which we have been trained” (Strong, 1992, p. 134). Thus, he identified the guerillas as an alien and threatening group of people whose goal was the eradication of urban-*mestizo* ethnocultural traditions. Moreover, he justified the brutal efforts of the armed forces in the name of a Western and Christian ethos, while explicitly denying the legitimacy of indigenous customs and beliefs (Strong, 1992).

Dehumanization was another core psychological process that fostered the perpetration of

atrocities by both sides. The Peruvian armed forces believed that they were fighting on the front-lines of an ethnocultural conflict in which they were the victim. By stereotyping the indigenous peasant as innately violent and immoral, they justified their brutal actions as a means to preserve a more advanced culture from subhuman forces (CVR, 2003; Strong, 1992). On the other hand, PCP-SL militants promoted an enemy-image of indigenous peasants as ignorant creatures, who were easily manipulated by the armed forces into impeding progress toward a better regime. In consequence, rural inhabitants were often perceived as lower than animals, and the peasants were killed with methods considered too brutal for the slaughter of animals (Theidon, 2000).

To dehumanize the guerrillas in the eyes of the local population, the Peruvian state used a common counterinsurgency tactic which taps into the framing effect, occurring when different conclusions are drawn in accordance with how information is presented (Kahneman & Tversky, 1986). Thus, the Peruvian military distributed pamphlets throughout the countryside, warning of the dangers of the subversives. Some government pamphlets portrayed members of the PCP-SL as foreign criminals and subversives, intent on destroying the indigenous peasants (Theidon, 2000). These publications may have struck a chord for some of the highland indigenous because they played to traditional beliefs about space and time, and reinforced the associated perception of foreigners as threatening and perilous. It is a perception of ethnocultural differences which persists the most strongly in the minds of many indigenous peasants, with the image of the guerillas being conflated with that of the being foreign or 'gringo' (Theidon, 2000).

However, because many initial supporters of the PCP-SL were indigenous peasants, it was often inadequate for the armed forces to portray *Senderistas* as inferior due to racial difference or foreignness (Theidon, 2000). Thus, other pamphlets portrayed the PCP-SL as an evil and otherworldly monster. In one depiction, indigenous peasants were pictured as cowering and running from an enormous creature

with sharp claws flying overhead. Behind the beast appeared a Peruvian soldier, hurrying to rescue the peasants (Caretas, no 7373, 1983 as cited by Theidon, 2000). In the process of purging their communities of PCP-SL supporters, many residents used similar techniques to frame *Senderistas* as having ‘fallen out of humanity’ (Theidon, 2000). In consequence, the guerillas were often described as not fully human and grew to be associated with images of the *pishtaco* (Strong, 1992; Stimpson, 2001). Others believed that it was possible to distinguish between *Senderistas* and humans through a mark (of evil) on the arms of those who supported the PCP-SL. Other accounts described guerrillas as being physiologically different (i.e. possessing three bellybuttons and genitals in an unusual place on the body) (Theidon, 2000). In this way, peasants were able to dehumanize and slaughter members of their own communities.

Consequences

In addition to the nearly 70,000 deaths, 4,000 disappeared, and countless people who were tortured, raped, or forced into combat, more than 600,000 people left their communities and migrated from rural to urban areas as a direct result of the armed conflict (Fumerton, 2002). During the 1980s and 1990s alone, approximately 52% of the population of the region of Ayacucho emigrated. Of the estimated 156,575 internal refugees from this region, only twenty percent returned home at the end of the violence (CVR, 2003). This taxed the psychological and physical well-being of the people, as well as cities’ resources. The decades of strife also weakened the structures of civil society in the poorest and most indigenous regions of the country (Huancavelica, Ayacucho, Apurímac, and Huánuco), where inclusion and expansion of citizenship was most needed (CVR, 2003). The effects of violence still permeate both rural and urban society, creating pervasive hostility, distrust and hopelessness (Alarcón & Trujillo, 1997.)

The immediate victims of the brutality, and their families, remain haunted. As recently as 2003, an estimated 4,644 burial sites remained across the country, with less than half having been investigated in any way (CVR, 2003). Thus, even decades after the violence declined, families have not yet had the chance to bury their dead. Exhumations of mass graves continue. For example, it wasn't until the summer of 2008 that the remains of more than 100 men, women, and children, who died at the hands of the Peruvian military in 1984, were disinterred (US DOS 2009).

Victims of torture and terror continue to suffer from the physical and psychological health effects of their ordeals. Women are often among those most affected by the violence. Coastal and *mestizo* military recruits deployed to combat the PCP-SL used the indigenous women of the war zone in any way they chose (Goolsby, 1994). In fact, one of the most common methods of torture used during the height of the conflict were acts of sexual violence, of which more than 80 percent were committed by government forces (Remón 2003; Becker, 2006). Some accounts suggest that thousands of indigenous women were raped on military and police bases during the time of the conflict (LAHT, 2008). Then, in the 1990's, Alberto Fujimori spearheaded a birth control program which sterilized approximately over 200,000 impoverished and indigenous women, often involuntarily or under pressure, threats, or deceit (Getgen, 2008). Related accounts of state-sponsored violence against indigenous women have remained nearly completely unaddressed, even by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Getgen, 2008).

Few people have studied how the physical and psychological trauma, much of which has gone untreated, has affected the youth from these regions. During the conflict, few children under the age of 18 escaped the impact of violence (CVR, 2003). Estimates suggest that over 1,000 children were forced into the roles of child soldiers for the PCP-SL alone, and untold number were recruited the Peruvian armed forces (Comas-Diaz et al. 1998). Furthermore, as many as 1,000 children may have been assassinated, another 250 'disappeared', and at least 7% of all torture victims were under the age of 18

(Comas-Diaz et al. 1998; Aprobeh, 2004). Roughly 50,000 children are estimated to have had parents who either disappeared or were assassinated. Finally, the 200,000 to 500,000 youths who fled to Lima or other coastal cities, were victims of malnutrition, chronic disease, and severe psychological traumas (Herrera Abad, 1994; Comas-Diaz et al. 1998). Economic marginalization, racism, and ongoing random violence have further threatened the normal development of children affected by the violence (Comas-Diaz et al. 1998). Furthermore, in many indigenous communities, there is a common belief that the trauma of the conflict may be passed from mother to child (Venturoli, 2009).

Possible Resolutions

Finding a way to reject violence and to promote peaceful co-existence among the members of a society is essential to the successful resolution of a conflict (Bickford, 2004). To date, the *Comisión de la Verdad y la Reconciliación* (CVR), or Truth and Reconciliation Commission, has been the principal tool used in an attempt to re-build peace and resolve past conflicts in Peru. By investigating the root causes of the conflict, as well as its manifestations, the commission attempted to make informed recommendations which would bring about an enduring reconciliation between the conflicted parties. Among the primary facets of the conflict noted by the commission was the economic and social marginalization of indigenous peasants (CVR, 2003). Thus, through work of the commission, urban-*mestizo* awareness was called to the social and economic inequalities associated with inter-ethnic relations, social injustice, and the slaughter of indigenous peoples during the height of the conflict. Moreover, some members of the elite admitted that the tools used to address past and ongoing human rights abuses against the indigenous had been inadequate and uninformed (Corntassel & Holder, 2008). The truth process is perceived to be helpful because it provided both an awareness and acknowledgement of past events (Kaminer, 2001). Accordingly, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission achieved the

first step in the process of Peruvian conflict resolution, and made several recommendations of significant value. However, as with any truth council, or reconciliation commission, it had its limitations.

On the personal level, testifying at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission may not have been as helpful as projected. While it is assumed that exposing abuses to the public has a healing effect in the Truth and Reconciliation framework, there is not much evidence to confirm this. In fact, the impact on the victims of testifying before truth and reconciliation commission's has not been determined (Kaminer, 2001). There is even some research which suggests that the act of testifying is not necessarily helpful to the victims (Stein et. al., 2008). In fact, some women who testified in the Rwandan truth and reconciliation commission, the *gacaca*, felt insecure and threatened thereafter (Broneus, 2008). Thus, the efforts of the truth and reconciliation commission alone have been insufficient to promote full healing.

Indigenous Peace-Building

In spite of the harsh violence, discrimination, and overwhelming lack of a governmental support structure, many indigenous peasants have endeavored to achieve some measure of peace in their communities. These efforts included the voluntary creation of self-defense committees, migration, political mobilization of women (to find their family members and raise awareness of the ongoing atrocities), and micro-reconciliation processes with PCP-SL deserters who requested reintegration into the community (CVR, 2003). The creation of self-defense committees was the most well-known of these efforts and perhaps the most successful at bringing an end to the intensity of the highland conflict. However, the *rondas* also propagated the use of violence, by engaging in the killing of PCP-SL supporters and even residents of neighboring communities. Moreover, the actions of the *rondas campesinas* often attracted reprisals from the PCP-SL militants and furthered the perception of violence as an acceptable response among the children of the village. On the other hand, migration established a

certain peace for family members, but was often accompanied by isolation, discontent, and other hardships associated with relocation.

Numerous civic and social organizations engaged in significant efforts to promote human or victims' rights. These human rights groups chastised the Peruvian government for its behavior, and refused to provide legal assistance to militants or leaders of the PCP-SL. Later in the conflict, they also engaged in the pioneering work of encouraging human rights advocates to include subversive groups in their analyses (CVR, 2003). Through these efforts many organizations were able to successfully monitor the Peruvian security forces and may even have helped to control the occurrence of some of the most ruthless acts of the conflict (CVR, 2003). Of the victims' rights organizations that emerged, one of the most notable was the *Asociación Nacional de Familiares de Secuestrados, Detenidos y Desaparecidos del Perú* (ANFASEP), or Peruvian National Association of Families of the Abducted, Detained, and Disappeared. The members of ANFASEP were primarily impoverished, Quechua-speaking women, who resolutely worked to locate disappeared family members and to ensure justice was dispensed (CVR, 2003). However, unlike other countries that had dealt with similar levels of atrocity, there were few other organizations advocating victims' rights in Peru. The Peruvian ruling classes had subjugated the impoverished indigenous peasantry for so long they were isolated from access to any infrastructure in Peru which might have provided some assistance. Ethnocultural and geographic divisions had resulted in fragile networks linking the rural-indigenous and the urban-*mestizo* (CVR, 2003). Moreover, victims groups which campaigned to bring an awareness of the highland situation to the coastal centers of power were met with apathy from a *mestizo* population who had been largely unaffected by the violence (Yates, 2006). As a result, many of the perpetrators of brutal atrocities were mostly left unpunished (CVR, 2003).

Micro-Reconciliation Processes

While both the leadership of the PCP-SL and its militants were heavily influenced by urban-*mestizos*, many indigenous peasants (whether they volunteered, were ‘duped’, or coerced) also served as low-ranking guerillas. A similar situation existed within the ranks of the predominantly urban-*mestizo* security forces, where indigenous peasants had become intricately involved in the violence as members of the *rondas campesinas* (either voluntarily or compulsorily) or forcibly recruited child soldiers. Thus, the indigenous peasantry was intensely involved in the violence not only as victims, but also as perpetrators. In consequence, the fratricidal nature of the violence resulted in a landscape in which former guerrillas, current sympathizers, and those who fought in *rondas*, lived alongside others who were tortured, relocated, or lost family members (Theidon, 2000). As such, it is perhaps the micro-reconciliation processes that took place within the Quechua communities that were the most successful, noteworthy, and revealing of the various peace-building strategies.

In these instances, as in any successful process of reconciliation and healing, the cultural context in which the process occurred and the associated cultural beliefs must be understood. For the Quechua, reconciliation would be best translated as co-existence (Theidon, 2000). Accordingly, at the heart of these micro-reconciliation processes the goal was not to forgive, nor to forget, but rather to live together. This objective entailed the restoration of sufficient trust and sociability to allow for cooperation within the context of daily community life (Theidon, 2000). It is also necessary to note that while these micro-reconciliation processes took place at different times for different communities, they most likely began in the early 1980’s. Thus, the indigenous processes of reconciliation co-occurred with the conflict. The methods of micro-reconciliation that occurred within the Quechua communities are best interpreted within the framework of the cultural values associated with mutability, equilibrium, and sacred spaces.

For the Quechua, identity is constructed in relational terms: When time and social relations

change so does the way in which the person is defined (Theidon, 2000). In other words, for the Quechua, a person who had been identified as a guerrilla (or ‘having fallen out of humanity’) at one point in time, due to a primary social relationship with the PCP-SL, could later be identified as a community member because of the preeminence of their social relations with the community. Accordingly, for re-integration into the community to occur, former guerrillas had to engage in the process of ‘becoming human’ (Theidon, 2000). One way in which this process occurred is through a re-framing and revision of terminology. For example, among the Peruvian elite the term “*enganado*” (“or “fooled”) is often used as a derogative reference to the indigenous, implying that the Quechua are ignorant and foolish. Yet, many Quechua have adopted this phrase to explain how former guerrillas, who were reabsorbed into communities, had been ‘duped’ into supporting the activities of the PCP-SL (Fitz-Simmons, 1993). Thus, the mutability of the Quechua worldview greatly facilitated the process of re-integrating former guerillas into rural communities.

Furthermore, in accordance with Quechua norms of justice, for a former guerrilla to be re-integrated into a community, a sense of symmetry needed to be established. As such, the former PCP-SL militant would appear and make an appeal to be made a part of the community. This appeal was expected to come in the form of an explanation and a heartfelt apology, in which community leaders weighed the emotions of the former guerilla more heavily than the words (Theidon, 2000). Leaders would then decide if the person met the appropriate criteria and would forget that they had learned to kill. If the convert agreed that it was their intent to be peaceful and return to a normal community life, then they could be accepted (Theidon, 2000). It was only then that an appropriate sanction would be established and administered. Often this punishment would involve a public whipping and an admonition of the treatment that they would receive if they offered any support to the PCP-SL. However, these sanctions were not meant to be purely symmetrical, but rather remedial methods which allowed for

communal re-integration.

One of the primary ways in which social relations are defined in Quechua communities is through collaboration and cooperation in benefit of the community. It is through working alongside one another and establishing interdependence that positive valuation is attributed to each of the community members. Thus, the converted militants could demonstrate their loyalty to the communities by providing intelligence to the *rondas campesinas* (Theidon, 2000). By providing information on the operating strategies and weaknesses of *Sendero* cadres, a former guerrilla also established their value to the community. During some stages of the conflict, these individuals were so valuable to some communities that members would actively go out into the hills in order to try to find Quechua guerrillas, 'rescue' them, and convert them back to 'human beings' (Theidon, 2000). Working communal land, alongside community members, was another form of reparation and a component of the 'becoming human' process of former guerrillas.

In Quechua communities reparation is expressed through an alert stance and a reconsideration of what has gone before (González Holguín, 1989; Comas-Díaz et al. 1998). By being fully integrated into the communities rather than ostracized or isolated, former guerrillas would be watched night and day in order to see if they made any attempt to return to the guerrillas or to contact them. If they had truly repented and it became evident that their loyalties were now to the community in which they lived, then their acceptance within the community would increase. Thus, on a practical level, 'emplacement' strategies of land distribution and communal work, provided opportunities for community vigilance of the former guerrillas which were embedded in daily life (Theidon, 2000). However, on a cultural level, the former guerrillas also became rooted in a local context and associated with sacred spaces and, consequently, grew to be perceived as a part of the community itself. It was then that the 'mark of evil' believed to be evident on the guerrillas was believed to disappear from the former guerrillas and that they

were to be human again (Theidon, 2000).

Implications for Related Conflict

There are a number of cautionary lessons that the Peruvian conflict can teach the international community. First, it is essential to recognize the destructive nature of the structural violence of prejudice and social division. Strong cultural divisions within a country may rupture along the fault lines and inequality can be exploited for subversive purposes. In Peru, the social divide along ethnocultural lines bred discontent among the indigenous who occupied the lower social strata. Moreover, both urban-*mestizo* and rural indigenous incorporated the ethnocultural divide into their own identities, solidifying an “us” versus “them” mentality. Different political ideologies may have driven the initial conflict among urban-*mestizos* intellectuals, but the strategies that evolved from both sides directly tapped into perceived threats and real injustices. Harsh ethnocultural divisions facilitated dehumanization and perpetration of carnage on both sides.

Second, education and its sphere of influence is an important tool for building or relieving conflict. The guerrillas used education to their advantage. In an environment of social isolation, the gap between the goals of the state and the experiences of the educators was exploited and discontent easily spread throughout the educational system. Dissatisfied and socially alienated educators will not only dispute governmental failings, but may also propagate dissent among their students. Conversely, educators are also a powerful force which could be mobilized to lessen or prevent the exacerbation of conflict.

Third, global support systems are not only accessible to state governments, but also to subversive organizations. In spite of the PCP-SL tendency toward self-sufficiency, even at the height of the insurgency its primary leaders had been trained internationally and the movement’s most lucrative

financing was due to the international drug trade. Currently, if the degree of collaboration between two Latin American guerrilla movements, the PCP-SL and the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) is strong, it could signal one of the most substantial risks of the ongoing armed conflict with *Sendero* militants.

Fourth, repressive tactics may suppress or decrease immediate violence, but they will not provide a sustained peace. On the contrary, repressive tactics are often a root cause of ethnocultural conflict. In the 1990's, Fujimori's harsh and repressive tactics may have decreased the success of the rebellion. However, the rebellion continued and violent conflict has resurfaced in key regions. Thus, an ongoing implementation of similar tactics may increase the long-term potential of violence.

Suggestions for Policymakers

To create a lasting peace in Peru, the deep cultural gap between indigenous and non-indigenous, must be bridged. The psychological construction of an internal enemy in the minds of the Peruvian populace is rife with stereotyping and discrimination. Indigenous peasants, especially in the coca-growing regions where the activity of the PCP-SL remains the strongest, live in constant fear of losing their livelihood, being displaced, or being a casualty of the PCP-SL, narcotraffickers, the Peruvian security forces, or even foreign military forces waging a war on drugs. Secrecy surrounds the operations of the Peruvian security forces in the affected regions as they continue to carry out human rights violations regularly. The animosity continues between the indigenous peasantry located in the emergency zones and the armed security forces which operate there. Moreover, individuals who are bred to hate, from generation to generation, carry out brutal acts of terrorism (Hudson, 1999). Essentially, it seems that the lessons of the past have not altered Peru's pervasive culture of war and brutal violence may erupt once again. However, without an enemy, blind obedience, violent acts, or an

ignorance of critical information, there can be no war (Adams, 2005).

One solution is to set an unambiguous goal to replace the culture of war with a culture of peace. This culture of peace may be defined as a “set of values, attitudes, modes of behavior and ways of life that reject violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation among individuals, groups and nations” (UNESCO, 2009). To achieve the cultural change which can promote a lasting peace, the Peruvian government should collaborate with indigenous communities in a resolute effort to provide (1) sanctuary from human rights abuses (2) create a superordinate identity (3) achieve reconciliation and (4) educate the citizenry and the world.

Sanctuary from Human Rights Abuses

In the aftermath of the violence, and particularly in conflict-ridden ‘emergency zones,’ human rights abuses abound. An estimated 20,000 to 40,000 persons continue to work as forced laborers either as a consequence of slavery or debt bondage, and of those, approximately 160 Asháninka families in remote areas are compelled to grow crops and coca (CDI, 2005; CVR, 2003). Furthermore, roughly 5,000 children are thought to work as forced laborers in these same coca-growing regions (USDOS, 2009). Many indigenous persons who lack identity documents, especially those displaced during the height of the armed conflict, cannot exercise basic rights, including claiming their rightful eligibility for reparations, (USDOS, 2009; White, 2009). Finally, in 2008 alone, government forces were implicated in at least 6 unlawful killings, the disappearance of 2 minors, 17 cases of aggravated torture, and the use of “excessive force” on other occasions (USDOS, 2009). The victims of these abuses are hesitant to press charges due to a fear that the perpetrators of these acts will not be adequately prosecuted (USDOS, 2009). Thus, a culture of war remains strong in many regions of Peru. To bring about a culture of peace, a feeling of safety within these regions must be nurtured.

One way to tackle this critical issue is by creating zones of peace, or physical locations of sacred or cultural importance that are protected by the local community and officially sanctioned by the government (ZOPIF, 2009). These zones are communal, conflict-free sanctuaries in which weaponry, violence, and injustice are prohibited and peace is supported (Montiel, 2008). These are safe places for victims of human rights abuses where trained intermediaries offer necessary services, such as assistance in navigating government bureaucracy or accessing systems of social justice. Furthermore, forced laborers or victims of abuse at the hands of the security forces could live in a zone free of violence and retribution from their abusers.

Peru may be amenable to this type of peace-building effort for a number of reasons. A structure for the mobilization of the peasantry in the creation of a zone of peace is already in place in the form of the *rondas campesinas* (Montiel, 2008). Many *rondas* developed in response to external pressures, operated in accordance with community norms, and maintained autonomy from both militaries (Mancella, 1998). Although many *rondas* engaged in violent acts, these were efforts to protect the communities, and many later dedicated themselves to more development oriented projects (Montiel, 2008). Furthermore, in accordance with indigenous worldviews, space is naturally imbued with a sacred nature. Thus, once established, a zone of peace is likely to be respected by the local indigenous populations due to its sacred nature. Security forces will also respect this zone if it is upheld by governmental authority.

Reconciliation

The work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission made it clear that the racism and contemptuous attitudes toward the indigenous, along with social and economic inequalities and misunderstanding of the indigenous culture, allowed the tragic deaths of thousands of Quechua speakers

to go unnoticed (CVR, 2003). The TRC attempted to develop an adequate reparation plan that linked the damage to these causes, but has fallen short of true reparations. Critics say that the government confuses development with traditional reparation measures (LaPlante & Spears, 2008). In addition, Peru continues to face the same essential ethnocultural conditions that led to the growth of the PCP-SL guerrilla movement (Becker, 2006.) Racism is omnipresent, with little empathy and solidarity among groups (Portocarrero Maisch, Valentin, & Irigoyen, 1991). Quechua speakers remain marginalized and essentially powerless (Hornberger & Coronel-Molina, 2004). Moreover, through the activities of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission the victims of the armed conflict told their stories, but the perpetrators did not. Members of the security forces who were responsible for the atrocities were neither punished nor forgiven by the state. Victim testimony may have been cathartic, but did not result in concrete solutions (Theidon, 2000). Even the commission's allegedly ground-breaking recognition of discriminatory state practices, which led to the massacre of large portions of the indigenous population, did not force the government to reconsider its relationship with the indigenous communities (Corntassel & Holder, 2008).

While a simple accounting of what happened has proved to be insufficient, the micro-reconciliation processes which occurred among the Quechua may provide a roadmap for conflict resolution between the Peruvian state and the indigenous communities. The Quechua cultural value of symmetrical justice must be addressed. Moreover, the lines between perpetrator and victim are unclear. Many perpetrators feel guilt or regret for their actions (Stephan, 2008). Thus, reconciliation might be more successful if low-ranking members of the military could tell their story and express repentance for their atrocities. This process would create symmetry for indigenous victims and an opportunity for confession, atonement, and healing for the perpetrator. As suggested by the guidelines of the 2003 Truth

and Reconciliation process, there should be no amnesty, but justice could be administered through hours of community service and collaboration with the indigenous communities (including *ronderos* and even former guerrillas), perhaps in the creation or maintenance of zones of peace. The general sentiment among many Quechua peasants is that “If the soldiers want to reconcile with us, then let them come here and apologize and repent for what they did” (Theidon, 2000).

Such acts of reconciliation may also reduce prejudice. Intergroup contact reduces prejudice when four preconditions are met: Equal status, cooperative activity, personal interaction, and social norms (Allport, 1954). Teams with individuals from varied ethnocultural backgrounds could organize programs of different collaborative tasks, and be provided with ample free time to foster personal interaction. Furthermore, the Peruvian state could train project leaders to ensure the development of social norms that support positive contact and interactions among participants. These efforts are apt to be more beneficial to the construction of a lasting peace in Peru than fiscal reparations alone.

Superordinate Identity

Creating a superordinate identity, which encompasses both the *mestizo* and the indigenous, is another strategy to enhance conflict resolution in Peru. Furthermore, it may be considered a precondition for sustained peace. When disparate groups categorize themselves in terms of a common superordinate identity, stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination are decreased (Gomez, Dovidio, Huici, Samuel, Gaertner, & Cuadrado, 2008). However, no superordinate identity should diminish or defeat subgroup identity. In fact, one of the essential mistakes made by the PCP-SL was the imposition of a superordinate identity (class), which subsumed subgroup (indigenous) identity. In effect, a subgroup identity is compatible with a superordinate identity. In fact, it is the combination of the two, rather than a privileging of one of these identities, which decreases hostilities (Eggins, Haslam, & Reynolds, 2002).

Accordingly, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission recommended that Peruvians be taught to value the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity of their nation, and to simultaneously create a shared historical memory (CVR, 2003). In this way, people would be better able to acknowledge each other, recognize joint responsibilities, and foster the development of a superordinate identity that is compatible with that of a subgroup identity (CVR, 2003).

Education

This culture of war is broader and deeper than war itself. Overt force is not the only ingredient which perpetuates a cycle of violence. Violence is instilled in human thought patterns through secrecy, propaganda, and education (Adams, 2005). A culture of peace is also fashioned through long-term education which provides insight into ethnocultural issues. In ethnically diverse democracies, practices related to multicultural education and cross-cultural understanding have successfully reduced intergroup conflict (Stephan, 2008). Multicultural education provides the learner with a historical perspective on other ethnocultural groups and an awareness of the skills necessary for intergroup interactions. Practices related to cross-cultural understanding evoke the belief that conflict is a result of group differences. Accordingly, educational programs such as these endeavor to increase the learners understanding of and identification with their own and other ethnocultural groups (Stephan, 2008). In the case of Peru, urban-*mestizos* could learn about key aspects of Quechua culture such as mutability and the time-space relationship. Simultaneously, members of indigenous communities could learn about the contrasting *mestizo* norms of linear thinking and the separation of time and space. Exchanging ideas in a non-judgmental and accepting environment might facilitate empathic understanding and improve ethnocultural relations. Furthermore, empathy decreases the tendency to perpetrate acts of brutality, such as those performed during the height of the conflict (Mealy & Stephan, 2009). Thus, the educational

programs should include activities which encourage intergroup empathy.

Summary

The Peruvian conflict arose out of ethnocultural, geographic, and socioeconomic divisions which shaped a national atmosphere of hatred, distrust, and stereotyping of the 'other'. The PCP-SL capitalized on societal problems, fractures, and disagreements among socially alienated *mestizos* and indigenous youths. It gripped underdeveloped and highly conflicted areas by preying on and organizing populations that had been alienated from the process of social and political democratization. Simultaneously, the top echelons of the PCP-SL targeted the indigenous peasantry to obtain material support and bodies to augment the ranks of military combatants (Becker, 2006). Indigenous peasants and communities who did not support the PCP-SL faced ruthless retaliation.

As indigenous persons struggled for survival (both personal and cultural) and autonomy in the face of this harsh physical and psychological brutality, the urban elite reacted with indifference, ignorance, confusion, and political and economic exploitation. Furthermore, the police, armed forces, legislature, judicial system, media and others were as much a part of the problem as a part of the solution. At their worst, government institutions acted with racial hatred, perpetrating violence in the name of government order. At their best, they acted out of ignorance, neglecting their duties and standing by in the face of atrocities committed against indigenous citizens. Thus, the conflict demonstrated the horrifying effects of unchecked prejudice, discrimination, dehumanization, and implicit biases.

Repercussions include disappeared family members, unexamined mass graves, population shifts, disruptions in family structure and education, untreated psychological and physical trauma, and unfulfilled promises of reparation. The continued corruption and seeming impunity of members of the Peruvian security forces, maintenance of narcotrafficking activity, and the continuation of a culture of

violence and ethnic hostility have further compounded the problems. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru documented the violations of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, but fell short of creating a lasting resolution. Unfortunately, recent increases in PCP-SL activity may reflect support from other guerilla organizations, as well as the indigenous peasantry. To prevent future atrocities, state authority and presence must become strong enough to promote citizen participation and prevent subversion, while maintaining respect for local identities, social organizations, and cultural diversity. Furthermore, the state must act as a benefactor for these persecuted groups, and support both national and community institutions that provide a sanctuary from human rights abuses, promote superordinate identity, multicultural education, and, most importantly, culturally sensitive reconciliation processes. These processes must be effective not only in healing the wounds of the past, but in laying the groundwork for prevention of future conflict.

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