

THE SENDERO FILE

Issue No. 1 July 1992

A monthly bulletin chronicling and assessing the ongoing struggle between the Government of Peru and Sendero Luminoso (SL or Shining Path).

Established by former atomic scientists in 1945, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) is a non-profit civic organization concerned with issues of science and society, and international security issues. The Project on Peru seeks greater understanding of Sendero Luminoso's threat to Peru and other countries. FAS President Jeremy J. Stone directs the FAS Fund's Project on Peru. Michael L. Smith edits The Sendero File.

EDITORIAL:

Focusing on Sendero

Although many serious problems bedevil the State and society of Peru, none is more serious than the threat of Sendero Luminoso. Sendero openly strives to destroy the state and its institutions as part of its revolution. Indeed, it requires for its revolution that the Peruvian people shed rivers of blood.

Were Sendero's revolution, led by Chairman Gonzalo, a.k.a. Abimael Guzmán, to succeed in overthrowing the Government, the resulting pariah-hermit state would have to meet demands for food, health, shelter and employment that, in the modern age, cannot be met in such isolation. As a consequence, millions more could die and others become refugees with enormous suffering over an extended period. We have already seen, in Cambodia, from 1975 to 1978, what chaos results when an extremely radical Maoist group, steeped in ideology but inexperienced in government, somehow finds itself in power.

Whether one focuses, as various existing groups do, on maintaining democracy in the hemisphere, or on human rights, or on stemming the flow of cocaine into U.S. cities, Sendero's onslaught threatens to make difficult problems insoluble while raising human and economic costs. **The Sendero File** will help to focus on the impact and implications of Sendero in all these areas and others.

The Sendero File will provide and put into perspective a regular flow of information and analysis about the situation in Peru, gleaned from news reports, Peruvian publications, concerned organizations, independent research, and in-country reporting. As a node in an incipient, growing network, it will link up resources and contacts which are scattered and not easily accessible.

The Sendero File represents one aspect of an evolving "Project on Peru" of the Federation of American Scientists Fund. The first action was to send a delegation to Peru in mid-May to find out first hand how the Sendero was advancing. A full account will be issued in the _F.A.S. Public Interest Report_ soon. Shortly, the Project on Peru will initiate **The Sendero**

Dossier, a series of research briefs to give timely, in-depth investigations of key issues, strategy and tactics, and underlying causes of political violence in Peru. **The Sendero File** aims to stimulate a public discussion concerning the threat to Peru posed by Sendero and to support and encourage those institutions and individuals inside and outside Peru that share our concern. **The Sendero File** invites all interested parties to send relevant information and ideas under any conditions of confidentiality.

JJS & MLS.

SENDERO'S URBAN FRONT:

Bombs Provide Cover for Urban Offensive

Sendero's urban offensive scored advances in the first half of 1992, reflecting the importance which Chairman Gonzalo has assigned to Lima and other urban areas since 1988. Sendero has intensified its use of car bombs in residential areas of Lima. More than 600 kilograms of dynamite, the largest charge so far, went off on June 5 outside a Lima TV broadcasting studio, killing three people and knocking the channel off the air. In April, four car bombs went off and May brought another six. In the past, SL had used smaller charges which knocked out windows, but caused little structural damage. The political message to Lima residents is that the streets, whether in a shanty town or a middle-class shopping district, are no longer safe.

"Security is now the number one problem for everyone," says Isabel Coral, a grass roots organizer with experience in Lima shantytowns and Ayacucho. "The state of war makes the [economic and political] crisis even worse, and people understand that." Interior Minister Army General Juan Briones hinted that the latest car bombs might come from a new terrorist organization, perhaps, an arm of an opposition party like the center-left APRA (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) or the mainstream left parties, striking back at Fujimori.

Behind the bombings' shockwaves, SL has stepped up its political work in Lima's poor neighborhoods. It has focused on street vendors and micro-businesses, newcomers from the Sierra — where drought, poor farm prices and violence has set loose another wave of migrants to Lima — control of shanty town organizations, and recruitment of experienced militants from other parties.

Sendero Gaining Control: Sendero has targeted its grassroots work at gaining control of communal soup kitchens, school milk programs and community health posts. This step is a striking reversal of Sendero's previous stand because it opposed all food assistance programs as an imperialist ploy to dampen revolutionary fervor in Peru. Today, one Peruvian out of four receives food assistance from international donors, like U.S. AID and the EEC.

Analysts say that this shift is due to several factors: Sendero wants to infiltrate and control grassroots survival organizations to keep them from

coalescing into an opposition block against it, and it has to resolve the logistical problem of feeding an increased number of militants in Lima. The life-support system mounted by international organizations to soften the blows of the economic adjustment program may end up feeding Chairman Gonzalo's cadres.

In the most dramatic advance, Sendero gained control over the three pillar organizations of Villa El Salvador on the southern outskirts of Lima — the women's federation, the micro-business association and the assembly of community delegates (CUAVES). In February, SL assassinated a respected community leader, Maria Elena Moyano, who had been opposing SL's encroachment into urban organizations. Her murder paralyzed many other leaders, fearful that the police and army would not be able to protect them.

Five years ago, left wing politicians cited Villa El Salvador as a model of grassroots democracy and resistance to SL's appeal and proposed exporting the model to other Lima shanty towns. Now, SL has shown that these defense schemes need to be reevaluated [**Quehacer** 76, 34-55]. "Sendero strikes against symbols and Villa El Salvador is a paradigm of popular politics," says David Montoya, a social analyst at the DESCO research center.

Sendero's purpose at this stage is to make a dramatic leap in manpower as it shifts into guerrilla warfare's middle phase of strategic parity with the armed forces. With the breakdown of the political parties and social organizations due to Peru's economic and administrative crisis, it sees the field ripe to enlist more people into the People's Guerrilla Army. Sendero needs these reinforcements especially because of reverses in the Central Sierra.

"The urban strategy is a solution for its rural strategy getting bogged down in the countryside," says Carlos Basombrio at the Institute for Legal Defense (IDL), which follows political violence.

SENDERO'S RURAL FRONT:

Peasant Committees Gain on SL

Sendero has suffered major setbacks in the Central Sierra, a bloodied theater of operations which has been pivotal in SL's strategy to dominate the countryside militarily. In the departments of Junin, Huancavelica, Ayacucho and Apurimac, a pragmatic coalition between the Peruvian army and peasant civil defense committees has taken away Sendero's initiative in the region for the first time in five years.

"Sendero is starting to lose the peasantry," says Enrique Obando, a Lima military analyst at the Peruvian Center for International Studies.

Because of a ruthless offensive in the Central Sierra beginning in late 1988, the bloodshed set loose an unprecedented dynamic. At first through the army's initiative and later beyond its control, peasant communities began organizing self-defense committees. Between 1988 and 1992, their numbers soared from 100 to 1400. There are now 100,000 peasants

organized and armed with 12,000 weapons, mostly shotguns, according to a counterinsurgency specialist Carlos Tapia.

The Central Sierra civil defense committees were originally started in 1984 by the army, but failed repeatedly because they engaged in "seasonal pillaging" and vengeance against rival communities. This time, however, the committees have gained independence and are becoming democratic. However, not all are convinced that self-defense groups are the solution to the problem. Human rights advocates point out that the self-defense committees just increase lawlessness in the region because all parties — Sendero, the military and the civilian population — feel free to use force to achieve their ends, and any abuse can be blamed on others.

However, there are other self-defense organizations in Peru. In the Northern Sierra near the Ecuadorian border, the rondas campesinas started as a community-organized defense against cattle thieves roaming Cajamarca and Piura. There are currently 3,500 rondas campesinas operating. Their presence has kept northernmost Andes free of insurgency activity, except in urban areas.

A mounted SL column attacked the U.S.-owned Northern Peru Mining Company on May 2, killing the mine's superintendent and chief engineer. The mine is located in Quiruvilca, about 25 miles east of Trujillo, in the northern Andes. Mining sources say that NorPeru's security measures were woefully inadequate, given the high risk to foreign companies. Sendero has been active in the remote sierra further to the east since 1984.

Sources in the southern department of Puno say that Sendero has concentrated forces in a 90-man column, which can muster up to 200 combatants for an attack. Since 1984, Puno has been a strategic area for SL to compete its pan-Andean corridor. It provides easy access to Bolivia where SL can purchase contraband weapons and provide a secure site for R&R and guerrilla hospitals.

Organizations that follow events outside of Lima say that there is a marked drop in information from the provinces. It is not clear whether it is due to a decline in subversive activity or difficulties in getting information to Lima.

COUNTERINSURGENCY:

Military Strike at Sendero Strongholds

Police SWAT teams, backed up by army troops, retook control of two cellblocks at the Canto Grande maximum security prison after 80 hours resistance on May 9. Sendero inmates had turned their quarters into a kind of graduate school for cadres and built up defensive positions. The inmates had connected the men and women's cellblocks by tunneling through reinforced concrete so they could put up a unified defense. Numbering 660, they fought back with firearms, rudimentary bombs, crossbows, spears and knives. The inmates opposed the prison authorities' demands that they submit to being transferred to other penitentiaries.

The incident cost the lives of 47 inmates and two policemen. Peruvian human rights organizations and the independent press have reports that some inmates were killed after they had surrendered. Authorities transferred the inmates to prisons which offer far less security. SL has threatened to "annihilate ten [people] for each prisoner of war assassinated." [**Caretas**, May 11 and 19.]

In 1986, the repression of coordinated SL mutinies at three Lima prisons led to 256 deaths. More than 120 inmates were killed after they had surrendered.

Human rights lawyer Carlos Chipoco told the FAS Fund mission, "Canto Grande is nothing compared to what is coming." He warned that the next six months will see a major showdown between Sendero and the military.

Security forces have deprived Sendero of using national university campuses as sanctuary and recruiting ground by stationing troops there permanently. They also closed down the SL clandestine newspaper, **El Diario**.

President Fujimori has reiterated his promise that "the country will have peace by 1995." Independent sources doubt that he will be able to deliver on this vow because of the deep roots of insurgent groups and drug trafficking, the dire straits of the economy, and the incapacity of security forces and the government to meet the threat. However, it may increase the appeal of fighting a "dirty war."

The National Direction against Terrorism captured the main leader of the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), Victor Polay, in a Lima residential neighborhood in early June. Two years ago, Polay and 46 MRTA inmates staged a spectacular escape from the Canto Grande prison. An MRTA team tunneled into the prison. Polay's capture hits MRTA at a crucial time when internal feuding has divided the guerrilla group. Its only stronghold is coca-growing San Martin department in northern Peru and scattered support in urban areas.

The prefect of Lima, Augusto Vega, has launched an initiative to set up security brigades as part of an urban civil defense system [**El Peruano**, June 15] A few shanty town mayors have suggested joining the issues of pacification and development together, to win more genuine backing from the population.

Military authorities have instituted a vehicle curfew which restricts transit between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m., except for public transport and autos with special permits.

In May, there were 128 incidents of political violence, taking the lives of 304 people. The five-month totals for 1992 come to 1,342 killed in 711 incidents [**Ideále**, June 1992].

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS:

Fujimori set new election dates

The highly polarized confrontation between President Alberto Fujimori's government and the political parties is holding back the search for political consensus on key issues, among them, counterinsurgency policy. President Fujimori's pledge to hold elections for a Democratic Constituent Congress by October 18 conflicted with a Peruvian religious festivity. Fujimori set the elections back to November 22. Municipal and regional elections which should have taken place on November 8, were postponed to March 1993. Fujimori's continual changing of the schedule for a return to full constitution rule since he dissolved Congress on April 5 has made political parties and other governments wary of his plans.

The Democratic Constituent Congress is to draft a new constitution as well as to have the power to legislate and monitor the Executive and the Judiciary. Sources close to political parties say that the opposition will probably participate in the elections, reversing a stand that required Fujimori to step down. It is yet not clear if the opposition will join in a single block or compete separately.

Reports from Lima to the **The Sendero File** indicate that some hard-line military commanders are disgruntled at Fujimori's concessions on elections and see the OAS supervisory role as an intervention in national sovereignty. This group of army generals thinks that no elections should be held until Sendero has been defeated. Another group of officers wants to return to democratic rule as soon as possible because of the political risk of having the Peruvian armed forces committed to a de facto regime. Retired army colonel Jose Bailetti of the Institute for National Defense Studies told FAS, "The situation is more difficult and complicated after the coup, and the armed forces are now politically engaged, whether they like it or not."

Former President Alan Garcia took political asylum in the Colombian Embassy in Lima in early June. Since the April 5 presidential coup, Garcia had been in hiding. The Fujimori government accused him of illegally holding weapons in his house and planned to reopen charges of corruption, which had been dismissed by the Supreme Court after Congress removed his presidential immunity.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS:

U.S. government gives lead to OAS

Following the presidential coup, the U.S. government has given the international lead to the Organization of American States (OAS) in dealing with President Fujimori as its hands have been tied by commitments to policies, like the Andean strategy on cocaine trafficking, and the U.S. Congress's concerns about the Fujimori government's respect for human rights and democratic institutions.

To complicate bilateral relations even more, in late May, Peruvian Air Force fighter jets intercepted and fired upon a U.S. C-130 cargo plane off the Peruvian coast. The U.S. plane had flown out of Panama as a DEA overflight to monitor cocaine trafficking. A passenger was killed and two others were

wounded. The incident is currently under investigation to determine its causes and responsibility.

In June, U.S. President George Bush signed into law spending cuts of \$39.9 million on military assistance and training for Peru for fiscal year 1992 as part of larger cuts to Department of Defense budget allocations. The military assistance for Peru was part of the Bush Administration's Andean anti-drug strategy. In addition, the legislation prohibits future military assistance to Peru. About \$14 million in military assistance to Peru remains to be spent from FY '91 allocations. The Executive has requested \$34.7 million for FY 93, but this future spending remains doubtful as long as the Fujimori government does not meet Congressional requirements for human rights, a viable anti-drug policy, and the restoration of democratically elected government.

The U.S. government suspended all assistance to Peru except for humanitarian aid after the presidential coup. Alvin Adams, currently the U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, has been designated to replace Ambassador Anthony Quainton, who has been serving in Peru since 1989. His nomination is expected to go before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this fall. In another staff change, Steven McFarland is to become the chief of the political section. After serving in El Salvador and Bolivia, McFarland is returning to Peru where he earned high marks from human rights groups and politicians in the mid-1980s.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS:

Financial noose eases with election promise

The need to underwrite major investments in public infrastructure for Peruvian development got a recent boost when the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) disbursed a first \$21 million from a \$210 million loan to rebuild Peru's highway infrastructure. Only 15 percent of the country's 15,700 kilometers of highways are in good shape. Following the presidential coup, multilateral lenders and the membercountry governments of the Support Group, which pulled Peru back from economic collapse, signaled their reservations about the presidential coup and suspended their backing [El Peruano, June 11]. The IDB, however, does not have authority to put Peru's borrowing on hold, but its president, Enrique Iglesias, stretched the rules to keep Peru in financial limbo until the Fujimori government gave commitments of a return to a constitutional regime.

According to a continuing study by Prisma, a non-governmental organization working on health issues in Lima, nutrition among Lima shanty town children fell to its worst level in five years. The field work was carried out in San Juan de Lurigancho district by community health workers.

SENDERO ABROAD:

European radicals flock to SL banners

The Partido Comunista del Peru (PCP), as Sendero Luminoso calls itself, has maintained international links through a scattering of support committees in

the United States and Europe and an ongoing relationship with the Revolutionary International Movement (RIM), a grouping of Maoist parties and factions around the world. RIM publishes a glossy magazine, called **A World to Win**, in London.

In the U.S., SL has been associated with the Revolutionary Communist Party, headed by Bob Avakian. Its most visible collaboration has been the sale of pro-Sendero literature at its 10-city bookstore chain, Revolution Books. Sympathizers also painted walls in these cities and elsewhere.

In Europe, Sendero has developed contacts with other Maoist groups, especially those with ties to migrant workers. It also plays off a lingering romanticism over heroic guerrillas in third world countries, at a time when most insurgent groups are entering into mainstream politics. Sendero has an international edition of **El Diario** in Spanish, English and French. The paper is edited by Luis Arce, the former editor of the Lima edition, who fled Peru in 1989 and now resides in Brussels, Belgium. Bill Tupman, a British expert on China and international terrorism, says, "Sendero Luminoso is quite right. The young revolutionary has only one place to run to. Maoism gives people something to do... I see it coming back in a big way. Maoism has all the bits of popular appeal: a step-by-step guide to action, a sophisticated model for the study of revolutionary struggle in your own country." [Simon Strong, "Where the Shining Path Leads," **The New York Times Magazine**, May 24, 1991 and other reports]

RESEARCHER'S CORNER

New Books and Articles: The Shining Path of Peru (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), edited by David Scott Palmer, contains 13 essays written by scholars, journalists and development consultants who have followed Sendero's steps over the past 25 years. In his introduction, Palmer writes, "Should SL beat the odds and succeed after all, it will do so by running against the grain of theories of revolution once again. That is to say, a Sendero victory would probably not result from the collapse of the Peruvian government or society or from the upsurge of popular support. Rather it would come about primarily through Shining Path's superior strategy and tactics for waging revolution." [p. 13-14]

From the Sierra to the Cities: The Urban Campaign of the Shining Path (Rand Corporation, 1992) is the latest analysis by Gordon McCormick. It focuses on Sendero's shift towards operating in Lima: "This strategy would not end with Sendero 'taking Lima,' which the magnitude of the problem and its own relative weakness would be unlikely to permit it to do, but with the creation of the conditions of political disintegration." [p. vii]

Carlos E. Paredes and Jeffrey D. Sachs, eds., **Peru's Path to Recovery: A Plan for Economic Stabilization and Growth** (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991) maps out the economic dilemmas facing Peru and proposes policy options. The editors note the dramatic shrinkage of the Peruvian state by writing, "Present levels of per capita government spending have declined by 83 percent from a peak of \$1,059 per person in 1975 to \$178 in 1990 (in 1990 dollars)." [p. 2]

Gustavo Gorriti was interviewed extensively in the June 25 issue of **The New York Review of Books**. "The Shining Path has acted with a combination of what could be called tactical simplicity and strategic sophistication. Since the war began in 1980 it has had long-range goals, and has taken immediate, specific action, all carefully, centrally planned by Guzman and the politiburo he dominates." [p. 20] Gorriti also narrates his experience of being detained by military intelligence during the Fujimori coup in **The New Republic**, May 4.

Spanish: **Peru Hoy: En el oscuro sendero de la guerra** (Lima: Instituto de Defensa Legal, 1992) is the latest edition of an annual series which summarizes events, trends and analysis on political violence in Peru over a 12-month period. It is a useful reference in Spanish. Referring to SL's claim to have reached a "strategic parity" with government forces, the authors state, "In effect, Sendero Luminoso believes it is able to continue consolidating its military, political and administrative authority in this stage while ungovernability, economic crisis, militarization of political power, extreme poverty, corruption, institutional crisis take hold in the country. The 'new power' will arise as the 'old order' continues to crumble." [p.67]

Previous yearly editions were **Peru 1989: en la espiral de la violencia**, and **Peru 1990: la oportunidad perdida**. The Instituto also brings out a monthly magazine, *Ide,le*, which focuses on political violence and the response of the government and society. Contact: IDL, Toribio Polo 248, Lima 18, Peru.

Seminars, Past and Future: The North-South Center held a seminar, "The Peruvian Crisis: International Response and Internal Reaction," on May 28-29 at the University of Miami in Florida. The conference drew prominent Peruvian politicians, academics and journalists who discussed the roles to be played by political parties, civilian institutions and the armed forces in the transition back to a fully democratic government, following the Fujimori coup. (Attended by the FAS Project on Peru.)

The U.S. Army War College held a one-day roundtable discussion on "Strategy For Peru: A Political-Military Dialogue" in June. The focus was on recent political events and the response of the U.S. government. (Attended by the FAS Project on Peru.)

The U.S. Institute of Peace will hold a conference, called "Dialogues on Conflict Resolution: Bridging Theory and Practice," in Washington, D.C. on July 13-15. Peru will be one of five case studies with workshops and plenary discussions.

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EDITORIAL:

Peru's Simultaneous Crises

When Sendero struck Lima with car bombs and wholesale intimidation in July, the government of President Alberto Fujimori was already confronting six crises which peaked separately last month.

Drought: The worst in Peru's history has seared the countryside, both on the Coast and in the Sierra, compounding its urban impact with a shortage of electrical power and drinking water.

Farming: The absence of a viable agricultural policy, the drought and no working capital have forced thousands of peasants and agro-businesses to stop planting.

Industrial: Policy-induced recession has taken its toll, first on workers whose earning power has plummeted, second on corporations' working capital, and now, three years into the hole, there is no respite in sight.

Financial: A panic run on the state banking system has hit when the government has no resources to bail out its subsidiaries. Insufficient revenues are choking the state.

Structural: Beyond these short-term, inter-connected management questions, there are enduring structural crises: political legitimacy, ethnic conflict, the competence of Peru's state apparatus, the challenge of matching viable, long-term economic development with a growing population, narco-trafficking, and the breakdown of an ethical system.

Sendero: Today it represents the ultimate crisis of political violence and has shown an uncanny knack to strike when the country and the government are tottering off balance. It feeds off the preceding welter of crises and conflicts, and then stokes the fires with its own actions.

On April 5, President Fujimori made a highly risky gambit: eliminate an obstructionist Congress and discredit political class to concentrate power in the Executive. However, this gamble merely induced an economic boycott and introduced a new major obstacle: the question of how to regain the necessary support of the international community by reestablishing democracy through free elections. Sendero's July onslaught, though not yet its rendition of a Tet offensive, has stunned the government when it should

be taking concerted emergency measures to address both the short-term crises and Peru's viability as a nation and a society.

With its car bombs and shrewd sense of timing, Sendero is more in control of events than its adversaries. It remains the only organized force in Peru with a clear medium-term vision of where it is headed. Unfortunately, this vision is one of the state of Peru destroyed.

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SENDERO'S URBAN FRONT

Bomb Shockwaves Shake Fractured Political Bedrock

Sendero's July offensive, the worst episode of urban sabotage and terrorism in Peru's history, showed that it was prepared to go for the jugular, leaving no safe haven in the country. It blasted Lima's fashionable residential districts and climaxed with an "armed strike," which immobilized President Alberto Fujimori's government, despite its having put subversion high on the agenda. "It's a make-or-break year for the government against Sendero, and it's a lot less prepared than before," says a seasoned Western diplomat.

In the most desolating incident on July 16, two car bombs, loaded with at least 1,000 kilograms of explosives, rocked the busy, upscale shopping district of Miraflores at 9:15 pm when many people were still on the streets. The bombs' impact killed 24 people, wounded nearly 200, of whom 90 had to be hospitalized. Flying glass caused most of the injuries because explosions shattered windows in a 15-block radius. An estimated 300 families were left homeless. Damages totalled \$50 million.

On the same night or the next morning, car bombings occurred in the shantytowns of Villa El Salvador and Comas, and in the port city of Callao. Sendero blacked out the city by sabotaging the power grid and made sniper and bombing attacks on four police stations, in some cases deploying up to 50 attackers, equipped with machine guns and get-away cars.

Opening Salvo: Those attacks kicked off a steady, pounding week of bombings, assaults, and killings, in which SL maintained the pressure on Peru's government and political leadership. For the civilian population, tension wore through its already thread-bare reserves of emotional strength. This spree counters optimistic estimates that counter-terrorism police had weakened SL so much that the guerrillas could not carry out city-wide, coordinated attacks. Only the day before the Miraflores bombing, Fujimori had told reporters that his government had gained ground in its fight against SL.

Over the past four months, at least 22 car and truck bombs have resulted in 52 people killed, 1000 injuries and \$250 million in damages. The size of the explosives and targeting has escalated as SL has perfected its methods. [Estimates from UPI, July 18, 1992, with additional news agency updates.]

Police bomb squads detected about a dozen additional vehicles loaded with explosives and disarmed them. Sendero combines dynamite with anfo, a home-made mixture of ammonia nitrate (a commercial fertilizer) and petroleum residue, to stretch its supply of dynamite. Frequently, the anfo fails to ignite. In June, the government imposed a vehicle curfew between 10:00 pm and 5:00 am, but it has failed to control the bombing spree.

To confound city residents further, SL launched a well-coordinated campaign of "white terrorism." Anonymous callers phoned radio and television stations to give false reports of bombings, attacks and casualties.

Sendero has been intensifying its urban operations for almost two years, and this latest assault has been in the works for months, timed to hit at Fujimori after the initial euphoria of the April 5 coup had washed away. SL has brought 1,000 hardened guerrilla fighters from the Central Sierra and from the Upper Huallaga valley to beef up its urban cell network. By concentrating forces for coordinated attacks, Sendero magnifies its impact on the public. According to some Lima sources, Sendero has started talking about entering a phase of "total war."

This injection of ruthless veterans shows up in Sendero's bombing tactics. It no longer makes any effort to minimize the loss of civilian lives. Several bombs went off indiscriminately near or at schools, gas stations, and shopping districts. In a clear provocation of the Peruvian Army, a cart with 22 kilograms of explosives was targeted at a school where Army officers send their children in Chorillos.

To cap off the offensive, SL called for a city-wide "armed strike" on July 22-23. SL harassed public transport, the key to bringing productive activity to a halt in Lima. Even though the government promised to reimburse private bus owners for any damages, few of the 7,000 privately owned buses dared to venture onto the streets. Only state-owned buses made their routes.

In one incident, a SL picket stopped a taxi driver and ordered him out of his vehicle. When he refused (probably knowing that the terrorists would destroy his car), a Senderista shot him, covered his body with gasoline and then burned him alive with his car. Sendero also burned mini-vans and buses. According to independent estimates, traffic was about one third of its normal level.

Despite the harassment, thousands of people took any means possible to get to their jobs, in part out of necessity because few can afford to lose two days or more of income. People walked or grabbed rides on the backs of trucks to reach their workplaces. Terrorist activities and the tension seemed to ebb on the second day. During the two days, 17 people lost their lives and another 40 were injured. The previous armed strike had been on February 13.

The Great Repression: The chief of the joint staffs, Army General Nicolás De Bari Hermoza, said that SL is trying to provoke the government and the military into a massive response of indiscriminate arrests, torture and killings in reprisal for the SL attacks.

"Sendero is doing in Lima now what it did in Ayacucho in the early 1980s," says human rights advocate Carlos Chipoco. When the armed forces took control of the emergency zone, they engaged in wholesale repression, disappearances, summary executions and other abuses, hoping for a quick knockout punch against Sendero. Today, the most enlightened Peruvian military acknowledge that this body-count approach served SL's goals because it turned the armed forces into an army of occupation.

Now, SL aims to repeat the formula in Lima, a city with 7 million inhabitants and a much higher concentration of security forces. It taunts the military to strike out at its shadowy presence in the shantytowns. For the past two years, it has been "staking out claims" on shantytowns, painting walls with graffiti, raising red flags and staging marches or even military patrols. Besides intimidating the population, it gives the impression that it holds sway over the residents.

In another shift in tactics, Sendero has stopped using its most virulent language in its pamphlets and begun demanding attention for the basic needs of the communities, like jobs, water and electricity. It is also unveiling a new crop of cadres, who are appearing in assemblies to debate openly against traditional community leaders.

SL has stepped up selective assassinations in Lima's shantytowns and working class neighborhoods. Prime targets are school directors, teachers, police and military personnel, many of latter live in the poor neighborhoods because of their low salaries. Because Sendero needs to keep its cell networks secure, it is trying to force out all potential intelligence leaks about its presence.

However, SL has backed off on its direct attacks on community leaders and non-governmental organizations working in the shantytowns, at least at this juncture, as counterproductive to its overall strategy.

Political Watershed: Even though the bombings seemed indiscriminate, they had a precise political objective: bring the war to the doorsteps of Lima's wealthy and middle class so that they would press for more repression and the political parties would keep out of the picture.

"Twenty-five thousand deaths in the Sierra and the shantytowns were not enough to make people aware that the war affected them," says Peruvian political analyst Mirko Lauer. "With the 24 deaths in Miraflores and the continuing insecurity, the message has come home with a vengeance."

The bombings have created a huge demand for pane glass, which was scarce even before the spree because of the shortage of electrical power for manufacturing. Lima's gloom is not only psychological but physical as office towers, apartment buildings and homes are being boarded up.

For many, the random attacks have broken their will to resist: the public outcry for harsher repression, like capital punishment, dominates the media, while those who can afford ready their bags for moving abroad. The impact of the bombing wave has hit hard at Peru's wobbling economy. Many business people are giving up all hope of making a profit in the recessive

market. The bombs have frightened off the few foreign investors not already wary after the presidential coup. In these circumstances, any remaining concerns for compliance with human rights in counter-insurgency may end up being another casualty of the bombing spree.

The government has seemingly been caught flat-footed by the ruthlessness and breadth of the offensive. "Either they came to believe their own propaganda or they completely miscalculated Sendero's strength," says an experienced Peruvian observer. Fujimori remained huddled with his cabinet, advisors and military commanders, with little contact with the public.

SL also succeeded in defining politics on its terms. "Sendero wants to keep Fujimori's crisis from ending in a democratic outcome," says Lauer. The political dialogue between the Fujimori government and the party opposition has been knocked off the agenda, putting in doubt the November 22 elections for a constituent congress. The elections, or at least firm movement in that direction, are essential to breaking the international freeze on development funding and other cooperation.

On July 20, a powerful explosive went off in front of the Miraflores office of the Institution of Liberty and Democracy (ILD). The blast killed three people and injured 16. More than just causing more civilian casualties, SL was trying to silence Hernando de Soto, the ILD founder and an advocate of free markets and reduced state interference in the economy. Since the coup, De Soto, a former advisor to President Fujimori, has been a vocal spokesman for political reforms and even after the attack still spoke calmly: "What we have to do is to prove that our reality is worth saving." [AP, July 23]

- On July 20, a three-man death squad walked into the office of Jorge Cartagena, the defense lawyer for SL leader Osmín Morote, and opened fire with machine guns. Cartagena, who belongs to the Association of Democratic Lawyers, a SL front organization, survived the attack.
- At the end of June, the death tally passed the 24,000 mark, according to the estimates of former Senator Enrique Bernales. Since many incidents in the provinces go under-reported, however, the real count is more likely to be 26,000.
- A SL sabotage team damages the "Infernillo" bridge on the central railroad to the Sierra in July. It will take two months to put it back in operations, and it will mean a drop in mining exports and disrupted food distribution.
- Police captured Oscar Ramirez Durand, allegedly the Number 3 man in the SL organization, on July 5 in the northern working class district of San Martín de

- Porrás, according to Lima press reports [*Expreso*, July 10]
- The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), the classic Castro-ite guerrilla movement, staged the seizure of the town of Jaén in the northern jungle on July 8 for eight hours. The takeover aimed to show that the capture of the MRTA's top commander, Victor Polay, last month had not hurt the organization. Jaén has 40,000 inhabitants. MRTA continues to be caught between SL moving up from the Huallaga valley seeking new coca-growing areas and the Peruvian army, which has been more adept at fighting MRTA than Sendero.

COUNTERINSURGENCY:

The Government Instates Capital Punishment and Military Courts for Terrorists

President Alberto Fujimori made an nationally telecast speech about government counter-measures on July 25. He called the latest urban offensive a sign of desperation because Sendero has been losing popular support: "Unable to harm the state with the people's support as they had planned, Sendero Luminoso has resorted to genocide to incite [security] forces into undertaking a major, indiscriminate escalation of repression. . . Obviously feeling it is being hit in its former strongholds, it is forced to resort to methods that unmask its weaknesses."

Fujimori announced that military tribunals would try cases of terrorism and also bring charges of treason against those accused of causing loss of life. According to Peruvian law and the constitution, treason is the only crime which bears capital punishment. Earlier this year, the government instituted life imprisonment for many crimes of terrorism or subversive activity.

"Military courts offer us the advantage of convicting terrorists rapidly in a summary proceeding and allowing for a timely sanction in direct relationship to the graveness of the act committed, thus serving as a warning to the population," he said.

Fujimori also announced that the sale and distribution of ammonia nitrate would be strictly controlled. SL has used this widely available fertilizer to increase the explosive power of its bombs.

Meanwhile, security forces began carrying out house-by-house searches in Lima shanty towns and other areas that showed signs of Senderista infiltration.

Fujimori invoked his compatriots to not give up: "The best homage we can pay to the victims of this barbaric, monstrous terrorism is to stand up and continue fighting for Peru, not as a feasible option, but as a set of values, history and national pride. Peace, unfortunately, will be built on the ashes of our dead."

SENDERO ABROAD:

Sendero Works with Bolivia's Marxists

According to Peruvian intelligence sources, there are at least three Sendero cadres serving with a radical organization called the EGTK (Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army), and the Peruvian Army has found several Bolivians in Senderista columns in Cusco, indicating an active exchange of personnel.

Consequently, when Sendero launched its July offensive in Lima and bombed the Bolivian Embassy, the Bolivian authorities ordered a tightening of controls at its Peruvian border and a clamp-down on their own crew of radicals. Rather than reacting to events in Lima, Bolivian authorities were more concerned about an effective SL presence in their own territory working with fledgling terrorist organizations.

For the past three years, Bolivia has had a spat of bombings, sabotage and kidnappings which comes from the Tupac Katari movement, a rabidly racist, Indianist movement with strong Trotskyite influence. About 1986, after a frustrating decade trying to make headway in the legitimate political system, the movement went underground. However, there were internal divisions about how to start a revolt. Eyes turned to Peru for role models. One band, which went by the name of the National Liberation Army Reborn (ELN-R) copied the techniques of the Guevarist guerrilla Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, including kidnapping. The ELN-R was quickly swept up by the police.

The other Katarista splinter group, the EGTK, studied Sendero's methods and even made contacts. It has a tightly-knit, six-person cell network, uses bombings against public infrastructure as a means of training and propaganda, and has developed contacts with coca-growers associations (and, perhaps, traffickers) in the Chapare region. The first contacts may go back to 1988. In December that year, a SL hit squad gunned down the naval attaché, Captain Juan Vega Llona, at the Peruvian Embassy in La Paz. After commanding the Peruvian Marine unit which suppressed the prison mutiny on El Frontón Island in June 1986, SL tracked him down in La Paz and then assigned three full cells, about 22 people to the task of mounting the infrastructure and preparing the attack in La Paz. The hit squad came out of the University of San Andrés campus, shot and killed him on his way to the embassy and then returned coolly to the campus.

The Kataristas and the Senderistas share the same turf on the radicalized university campus and in the La Paz neighborhood of El Alto, a rough, poor neighborhood. However, Sendero's dogmatic Maoism and the EGTK's strong Trotskyism do not mix easily. SL respects and wants to learn from the EGTK's strong indigenous roots, but says that the Bolivians have to be

"saved from their revisionism," meaning their attachment to an incorrect political line (Trotskyism).

Bolivia has all the ingredients for trouble: a sputtering economy that a severe, eight-year austerity program has weakened, high unemployment, a decaying political system that is losing public support, the corrosive influence of the drug trade, and a simmering racial hatred against the privileged white Creoles of La Paz.

Although Bolivia is the next logical international step for SL expansion, it is far more useful now as a safe haven. For the past five years, it has employed Bolivia as a R&R site, where it treats its seriously wounded and where the hardcore vanguard cool off their trails when counter-terrorist police get to close. Bolivia is a center for the regional clandestine arms trade, and SL can also purchase medical supplies and other material easily.

It is also secure transit point to the outside world. Getting across the border requires only an I.D. card, and wide stretches of the frontier are open. Last year, a 13-man SL column ran into Bolivian border guards, alerting Bolivian military to the danger. In addition, Bolivian passports are among the most readily available in the black market and La Paz's international airport has slack controls.

There are no signs yet that SL had done any political work on its own to gain its own foothold in Bolivia. Rather, it has served as the strategic rearguard for the guerrilla front in Puno, just across the border.

RESEARCHER'S CORNER:

In the Beginning...

Gustavo Gorriti, **Sendero: Historia de la guerra milenaria en el Perú** (Sendero: History of the Millenarian War in Peru), vol. 1. Lima: Apoyo, 1990.

Gustavo Gorriti has focused on the period from Guzmán's capture and release in January, 1979 until the government of President Fernando Belaúnde sent the armed forces into the Ayacucho emergency zone in December 1982. There are three lines of investigation: ideology and party documents (saving future researchers the toil of wading through SL's densely written documents), the flawed preparations of Peru's security and political forces (including the bureaucratic turf battles and corrupting influence of narco-trafficking) and the war itself in its initial phases when the threat seemed as trivial as the first incidents of "banditry."

The book's main virtue is that it addresses the question of how an insurrection makes the transition from initial conspiracy to a full-blown military operation without falling into the traps of other failed guerrilla movements. For historians, these early moments become either forgotten in defeat or covered by the triumphant rhetoric of victory, making it hard to discern what really happened.

Gorriti assesses the early stages of the revolt in the impoverished region of Ayacucho, the sorcerer's laboratory for a new revolutionary alchemy and

finds a seeming contradiction between Guzmán's party and its meager means:

"Sendero was an organization much larger and more disciplined than any one supposed then or later; distributed territorially, with a basic, but functional system of communication, which guaranteed a unified control of the party apparatus at all times. . . Sendero's preparation in military techniques was extremely poor. Its strategic conception was solid, but, on the level of technical application, its ignorance was generalized. It was an organization with competent generals, committed but unseasoned recruits and no trained field commanders." [p. 140]

To overcome these shortcomings, Guzmán became the most ardent radical within his own party. He pushed the organization beyond what seemed advisable for such a makeshift army. This crash course in revolutionary strategy and tactics was distilled into a metaphor which was almost mystical if it were not so mercilessly applied: the "quota of blood" which required:

". . . converting the war into the central preoccupation of Peruvians through the radical increment of violence; elevating the stakes of war, making the blood not just drip but gush. To achieve this, it was necessary to convince Senderista militants of two things: the need to kill systematically and in a depersonalized way to apply the accorded strategy; and, as a necessary premise of the above, the willingness, even more, the expectation of giving up one's own life." [p. 158]

However, in this escalation of systematic violence and its glorification, SL never lost sight of its political goals: "For Guzmán, militarizing Sendero did not mean converting it into an army. . . The insurrectional strategies, plans and campaigns were made in accordance with the party's political objectives and, consequently, were political actions with military expression." [p. 352]

Sendero's rapid learning curve eventually forced the government's hands into sending the armed forces into Ayacucho which tried heavy-handed tactics to deliver a knockout blow to Sendero for two years. Today, analysts say that the indiscriminate repression, which created new SL sympathizers with each death, was one of the reasons that SL was able to survive and even expand its operations during this period.

The drawback to the 390-page book is that its narrow chronological focus passes over broader, crucial questions, such as what social and political forces brought together Guzmán and Ayacucho and why the combination clicked so well. Gorriti plans to write two other volumes, a pre-insurgency account of the origins and development of Sendero in Ayacucho and an account of the millenarian war from 1983 to the present.

A word from Chairman Gonzalo...

Apocalypse Peru

In April 1980, Abimael Guzmán spoke to the first graduating class of Sendero's military school. In two weeks of intense debate, Guzmán had purged the party of any ideological doubts about the start of the armed insurrection the following month. He then delivered a speech worthy of Torquemada, working his listeners with the crescendo of his sentences and

his announced Armageddon. Extracts from the "We are the Initiators" speech:

"The vortex is nearing; the revolution's invincible flames will grow, becoming lead, steel, and from the heat of the battles with their inextinguishable fire will come the light; from the darkness, luminosity and there will be a new world. The old order of the reactionaries will creak, their old ship will leak, it will sink desperately; but, comrades, no one can expect them to retire benignly, Marx warned us: even drowning, they are capable of flaying their arms, desperate claw swipes, to see if we might go down too. That is impossible. The hyena's blood dreams shake their shadowy dreams; their heart plots sinister hecatombs; they arm themselves to the teeth, but they will not prevail; their destiny is heavy and mute. The time for settling scores has come...

"To the men of today, to those men who breath, struggle, [and] fight, the most luminous and magnificent mission ever assigned to a generation falls to them to sweep the reaction- aries from the face of the earth. The world revolution has entered a strategic offensive, nothing can prevail against it...

"The trumpets are commencing to sound, the roar of the crowd grows. . .It brings us to a powerful vortex, with one note: we will be protagonists of history, conscious, organized, armed and that will be the great rupture and we will be the makers of the definitive dawn."

This ideology has prevailed for 12 years and leaves no room for the mediation, settlement or moderating influence that casual observers sometimes suggest.

THE SENDERO FILE

Issue No. 3 September 1992

A monthly bulletin chronicling and assessing the ongoing struggle between the Government of Peru and Sendero Luminoso (SL or Shining Path).

Established by former atomic scientists in 1945, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) is a non-profit civic organization concerned with issues of science and society, and international security issues. The Project on Peru seeks greater understanding of Sendero Luminoso's threat to Peru and other countries. FAS President Jeremy J. Stone directs the FAS Fund's Project on Peru. Michael L. Smith edits The Sendero File.

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Democracy and Human Rights

Fujimori Outflanks Political Parties

President Alberto Fujimori outmanoeuvred the political parties in negotiations on the ground rules for November 22 elections to install a legislative body and draft a new constitution. Like a political streetfighter, Fujimori kept his opponents punching at shadow targets while he hammered at his main goal, ceding a minimal framework of government to release Peru from international sanctions without yielding his hold on power.

Sendero may stand to gain the most from this situation because it is quickly casting itself as the sole alternative to power, and has distributed leaflets announcing an October offensive to block the elections. "Fujimori is playing with fire," says a U.S. government political analyst. "By bashing Congress, the parties and politicians, he is legitimizing Sendero's message about the corruption of the system."

With the showdown between Fujimori and the parties now past, momentum now shifts towards the campaign. "Nobody wants to be cut out of the game at this stage," says a Lima businessman. "The united front of politicians is disintegrating rapidly." In addition to 17 parties eligible to present candidate slates, at least four independent groups have started collecting the required 100,000 signatures of eligible voters to qualify for the elections.

The government and the parties have been engaged in a contentious, on-again-off-again dialogue. Prime Minister Oscar de la Puente met individually with the parties, and then began full conversations in mid- August, though about half the parties withdrew before talks were over.

On August 22, the government issued a 147-article decree setting the rules of the elections and the new legislative body. The outpouring of criticism against the measure was overwhelming, and within 48 hours the government corrected the most glaring errors, leaving the main body of the text unchanged. The backtracking, however, did allow the government to portray itself as accomodating opposition demands.

Debating Chamber: The Constituent Congress is to be a one-chamber body, with 80 members elected nationally. Their term will be until July 28, 1995 when Fujimori is to step down as president. The Congress will write a new constitution, which is to be submitted to a national referendum, and also pass laws and exercise oversight of the Executive. However, it will not control its own budget. Those who serve in the Congress will be ineligible to run for public office for five years.

In late July, the government made a first grudging concession to the parties, moving up municipal elections to January 29 from February 7. Opposition leaders suspected that Fujimori was refusing to stage municipal elections simultaneously with Constituent Congress elections because he could not field sufficient candidates for mayor and councilmen in the 1900 races at the provincial and district levels. The government countered that mixing elections for a Constituent Congress and town hall would confuse the campaign.

Senators Alberto Borea and Javier Diez Canseco flew to Washington to make a last-minute appeal to the Organization of American States (OAS) Permanent Council on August 28. The council decided to leave a final decision to Secretary General Joao Baena Soares, in consultation with Uruguayan foreign minister Hector Gros Espiell (head of the OAS task force on Peru), about sending observer teams to oversee elections.

Shopping for a Coup: While the government and parties were haggling, the elder statesman of the opposition block, two-time president Fernando Belaúnde, was actively courting military dissidents to stage a coup when Fujimori appeared weak after the July SL offensive. In early August, rumors were so thick that General José Valdivia, the army chief of staff, published full-page ads stating his allegiance to Fujimori. Changes in regional commanders soon took place to shore up Fujimori's support. According to some reports, the national intelligence service is putting more resources to tracking suspected coup plotters than following SL.

However, opinion polls of the Lima public show that Fujimori still holds a commanding lead over the traditional political parties. He has an approval rating of 62 percent, according to the APOYO public opinion agency. In the same poll, the opposition block mustered only 23 percent approval. They would have little political leverage if it were not for international pressure to keep an election process open to participation. Underneath this disenchantment lies a severe breakdown in Peru's political organizations.

Former U.N. Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuellar said, "We are facing an electoral process and an electoral law which unfortunately has many gaps and which is not the result of dialogue with all the political parties." [Reuters, 8/28/92]. The parties have been pressuring Perez de Cuellar to mediate the dispute.

Sendero's Urban Strategy

SL Adds Land Seizures for Squatters to Its Armed Repertoire

On July 28, 1990 Peru's Independence Day and the inauguration of President Alberto Fujimori, 300 people seized a small piece of privately owned, but idle land in Ate-Vitarte. When police tried to dislodge the squatters, two people died in the fray. The settlement took the name of one of the martyrs, Félix Raucana.

What seemed a routine event in Lima's teeming shantytowns was, however, a new variant in Sendero's multi-faceted urban strategy. Sendero had organized the land seizure from the start, charging the 100 founding families \$10 each for the right to a plot.

SL pioneered its penetration methods over a six-year period, from 1983 to 1990, in the working class district of Ate-Vitarte. It was a strategic area, part of the "iron belt" (in Guzmán's words) of the shantytowns surrounding Lima, with a high concentration of workers and migrants from the Central Sierra.

Land seizures are a long-established practice to resolve the scarcity of cheap housing. Most of Lima's working-class districts began as squatters' settlements, huts made out of reed mats and cardboard. Squatters have a precarious hold on their land until they get property titles, either through a government-decreed amnesty for seizures on public land or purchase for those on private land. A practice among squatters was to organize defense committees, using pickets and barricades, to prevent police evictions and fend off other squatters or thieves. Sendero latched onto this quasi-military trait of popular culture as part of its methods, and added its armed force to assist in claiming to land.

Not new to the neighborhood: Three years before, SL had concentrated its central core of veteran cadres in eight communities near the Ate-Vitarte business district. The Raucana land was located in the middle of this archipelago of cadre cells. SL soon placed its stamp on the settlement. Rather than take the traditional design of a town square (or small park) surrounded by market, church, schools and other services and with open access, Raucana was a walled compound, with two gateways, in effect, a fortified settlement. Squatters generally put their scarce funds in shelter rather than brick parapets. Round-the-clock sentries monitored visitors.

Inside the compound, SL organized all aspects of daily life, including production by setting up vegetable gardens and orchards. It provided community health service. SL carried out daily indoctrination classes and military training. Access to land, services and organization flowed through the party. The idea that SL only operates through terror and intimidation is oversimplified. When it controls goods and services, it distributes them zealously according to its political goals.

However, even when SL lures people in need of housing or services, it is aiming towards military goals. To provoke repression from the government

and security forces, it needs to raise false targets, like turning Raucana into a "red zone," without compromising its central apparatus.

Springing the Trap: In August 1991, after a year-long trial during which both the land owner and the judge received death threats, the judge issued an eviction order. An estimated 2,000 protesters, many of whom probably thought they were supporting neighbors' claims to shelter, not backing a Senderista manoeuvre, marched to the Ate-Vitarte business district. SL set up pickets organized in military formation. For three hours, they confronted police until the army was called out to control the situation. That same evening, SL set off a car bomb outside a textile plant belonging to landowner. The next day, the owner asked the judge to withdraw the eviction order.

Because SL staged the protest outside Raucana, it guaranteed exposure to a broader community along the central highway and maximum news coverage in the Lima media. It also ensured that protest was not isolated and snuffed out quickly. Sendero was in a no-lose situation: if it provoked repression on Raucana, it created another pantheon of revolutionary martyrs; but if it forced the landowner and the government to back down, it had delivered concrete goods to its supporters, mainly due its use of armed force and intimidation.

Before the showdown, SL moved its veteran cadres, weapons and other materials out of the zone, leaving behind only a rearguard network.

In September 1991, after another provocation, the army set up a small post inside Raucana, touted as a "hearts and minds" strategy because the troops first distributed food among the residents. However, tension simmered close to the boiling point. In late April 1992, residents confronted the garrison over the arrest of two community leaders. Two people died and another 14 were wounded. [Caretas, 5/4/92]

SL Housing Development: Sendero has proposed to stage further land seizures. A second settlement, named Maria Parado Bellido, is located two kilometers away, and has 870 families. [Caretas, 7/20/92] A local report on the Central Highway cites a waiting list of 5,000 families willing to accept SL control for a share in a large track of land near Raucana. However, close military surveillance inside the area has complicated Sendero's designs.

There are also reports that SL has organized land seizures in Lima's northern cone. These SL enclaves tend to be located near strategic sites, like barracks or training schools of security forces, transportation centers and generating plants.

The Raucana enclave is one variant on an overall strategy which SL's decision-makers can activate according to opportunity and resources. It offers total control of a community by founding and organizing it from the ground up and, in effect, holding each family hostage. However, it requires an enormous investment of time and resources that might not yield immediate military benefits. Over the past year, SL has had a field-day in existing shantytowns as local organizations weaken or break down, which had made it less attractive to concentrate its efforts in isolated enclaves.

After the July offensive, SL has scaled back on its major operations. It staged an average three assassinations a day against community leaders, police, school teachers and bus and taxi drivers who did not obey the banned strike of July 22-23.

On August 26, security forces captured the head of the SL metropolitan committee's hit squad, Gilberto Iparraguirre. This was the first major capture in months. Most recent arrests have been low-level cadres or sympathizers.

What's in a Name?

Sendero or the Communist Party of Peru

Although known as Sendero to Peruvians and the world, the organization and its members do not accept that name. They are always the Communist Party of Peru (PCP). This exclusive title allows Abimael Guzmán and friends to trace their bloodline back to the marxist trunk and claim to be the only remaining pure strand of communism left.

Peru's marxist left underwent scores of splits and divisions in the 1960s and 1970s, resulting in an alphabet soup of acronyms. To distinguish Guzmán's faction from other groups claiming to be the PCP, its adversaries in Ayacucho began calling it Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), which came from the tagline which appeared on the party's bulletin for university students — "Along the Shining Path of Jos, Carlos Mariátegui." An eclectic Marxist thinker and writer, Mariátegui was the founder of Peru's Socialist and Communist parties and is now a Peruvian icon.

International Affairs

Sendero Poses New Challenge for Washington's Response to Peru

In addition to the international policy limbo caused by the Fujimori "autocoup," the response to the Peruvian situation has been dampened by the dynamics of a U.S. election year when new initiatives are put on hold, except for major emergencies. Even still, the U.S. Department of State and Congress are keeping an eye on developments. "There is no more sensitive issue today in the State Department," says a veteran foreign policy watcher.

When and if a concerted response is forthcoming, it will be shaped by U.S. foreign policy experience in hot spots around the developing world over the past two decades: the aftermath of the Indochina war, Central America's civil wars, the emergence of human rights as a potent public issue, Latin America's return to democratically elected governments, the 1980s' cocaine epidemic in the U.S. and the Bush Administration's "War on Drugs," and the collapse of communism as a world security threat.

The six Washington schools of thought about U.S. policy towards Peru, which are by no means exclusive but competing within the policy-making process, appear to be as follows:

ECONOMIC REINSERTION: It is essential to Peru's survival that it reinsert itself within the world financial community which requires a correct balance of policy reforms and tight economic management.

The World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), in concert with the governments of the United States, Japan and other countries, made extraordinary efforts to design a mechanism and provide resources to make Peru eligible for funding. This effort was due not so much to the size of Peru's foreign debt (about US\$22 billion) as the amount of debt payment arrearage which severely hampered their resource flexibility and credit-worthiness.

This approach did not take into account the security threat from Sendero or the breakdown of a host of social institutions. It assumed that a return to full engagement in the international community and appropriate policy would gradually nurse the Peruvian state back to full health.

WAR ON DRUGS: By aiding Peru to eliminate coca crops in the Amazon foothills and to cut the flow of cocaine to the U.S., the U.S. government fulfills its main national interest in Peru.

The Bush Administration's Andean Initiative and the Narcotics Control Policy stemmed from a decade-long domestic concern for the flood of cocaine coming into the country. It was the only U.S. political issue to muster sizeable resources for assistance to Peru. Because it spans the whole administration, it imposes an effective institutional weight and a kind of double yardstick to measure Peru's performance: for each unit in State, Defense, Justice and other agencies involved with Peru, there is an institutional parallel unit focusing exclusively on counternarcotics. This process accentuates a sense of frustration about Peru because the U.S. investment of human and financial resources has never been matched by Peru.

U.S. drug policy never explicitly addressed the problem of Sendero because of congressional restrictions on using assistance against insurgencies. U.S. policy makers had to draw a clear theoretical line between fighting drug traffickers and fighting guerrillas.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: The Peruvian government and society have a poor human rights record. The key to turning the tide against Sendero is guaranteeing, through international pressure, that the Peruvian government operates with a framework of democratic institutions and respect for human rights.

The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Americas Watch, Amnesty International and other organizations have long struggled against the Latin American military whether as authoritarian regimes or counterinsurgency forces. The human rights community has widespread constituencies both in the United States and internationally, mainly among the church

organizations and groups concerned about the Third World, and with human rights groups and political parties in Peru.

Human rights groups, which have recently started working on U.S. drug policy in source countries, have joined with the War on Drug congressmen to put strict, measurable conditions in legislation which Peru must meet to be eligible for U.S. foreign assistance. By controlling the pursestrings of Peruvian policy, they have direct input into policy execution.

MERCANTILIST STRANGLEHOLD: The single most important action that a Peruvian government can take is to break Peru's mercantilist economy and bureaucracy which would unleash creative forces, among other things, to defeat Sendero.

Hernando de Soto and his Institute for Liberty and Democracy have had a distinct influence on thinking in Washington. His book, *The Other Path*, by the choice of title and its content, has cast itself as a response to Sendero. His high profile and access in Washington has defined how many Washingtonians, Republicans and Democrats, see Peru's problems and failings.

TOO LATE, TOO REMOTE OR TOO DANGEROUS: The situation in Peru is beyond the point where U.S. action could have an impact on the outcome and, in any case, the United States has limited strategic interests in Peru.

Gordon McCormick of the Rand Corporation, in his latest study on Sendero, *From the Sierra to the Cities: The Urban Campaign of the Shining Path*, and his congressional testimony, states that, if the Peruvian military and government have not defeated SL by now, they have little chance of defeating it in the future.

An assertion of plimited interestp is supported by Gen. William Odom at the Hudson Institute. Another variation on the opposition to involvement lies in a group of people in Congress and the media who see Peru as a ghost of Vietnam, a Third World conflict which U.S. policy makers do not understand. They fear any attempt to meddle there would lead the U.S. government in a quagmire which would require ever increasing investment of resources and commitment.

SENDERO ALERT: Sendero represents an unavoidable clear and present danger to the survival of Peru and to regional stability and, indeed, could set in play revolutionary methods to which other Third World states might succumb, and all feasible efforts should be directed to preventing Sendero's success, lest Peru become another Cambodia.

Assistant Secretary of State Bernard Aronson's statement before Congress leads this school of thought within the Executive. His initiative grew out of a growing awareness within the State Department, Congress and elsewhere that the narrow focus of both economic reinsertion and the Andean Initiative were inadequate, given Sendero's spread and the dimension of the crisis in Peru. It was seconded by a community of specialists in low-intensity conflicts in the Defense Department, the armed services, the intelligence community and think tanks see Peru as a test case of a new kind of

insurgency in which narcotrafficking and hybrid ideologies combine to create virulent conflicts. And it was welcomed by a corps of old Peru hands, academics, foreign service and military staff, and journalists who served or covered Peru realized how impossible it would be, in fact, to "write off" Peru, as well as by veterans of the effort to prevent the return of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.

Peru Requires New Options for International Response

Senator Claiborne Pell (D-Rhode Island), chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, inserted an article [Save Peru From Sendero, by Jeremy Stone, The Washington Post, July 28, 1992] into the Congressional Record [August 6, 1992, S11760-1] and said:

"...[It] is incumbent upon international organizations, the Department of State, and other relevant organizations to begin thinking now about just such potential disasters, and calls for international help, from Peru and others.

"Obviously, the United Nations has limited resources, and limited appetite, for intervening in the affairs of troubled countries, even if invited. Yet, there may well be ways that do not require large investments of money or military force in which these countries can be assisted, for interim periods at least, to administer themselves more efficiently while they pull themselves together, hold elections and organize constitutions."

Researcher's Corner

Bleak Assessment:

Americas Watch has issued its latest report, **Peru: Civilian Society and Democracy Under Fire**, Vol. IV, No. 6 (August 1992), an even-handed, but critical account of events since July 1991. It deals with human rights concerns after the Fujimori coup, as well as human rights violations by security forces, SL and the MRTA. On Sendero's abuses, Americas Watch writes: "According to the Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos in Lima, a highly respected umbrella organization of human rights groups, the Shining Path was responsible for 842 political assassinations in 1991 alone, and 217 in the first four months of 1992. In the past three years, the Coordinadora states, Shining Path has carried out 3,600 assassinations; eighty percent of its victims have been civilians. . . The objective of these murders, by the logic of the Shining Path, is to sweep away all democratic and independent organizations, leaving the population with only two alternatives: Shining Path or the army." [p.2]

Americas Watch has maintained a high standard in its reports on Peru over the past nine years. The most recent ones are **Into the Quagmire: Human Rights and U.S. Policy in Peru** (September, 1991; \$5.00), and **In Desperate Straits: Human Rights in Peru after a Decade of Democracy and Insurgency** (August 1990; \$10.00). Newsletters cost \$3.00 each. Contact: Americas Watch, 485 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10017-6104 or 1522 K St. Suite 910, Washington, DC 20005-1202.

Development and Violence: Michael L. Smith's study, **Rural Development in the Crossfire: The Role of Grassroots Support Organizations in Situation of Political Violence in Peru**, looks at how grassroots organizations and development agencies in rural areas have dealt with political violence over the past decade. The book contains two case studies, one in Ayacucho and the other in Puno, and closes with proposals for development work in Peru. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, May 1992 (IDRC- MR297e). Cost is \$11.95, no charge for postage. Contact: Mr. Roger Saborurin, Publications, IDRC, P.O. Box 8500, Ottawa, Canada K1G 3H9. In Peru, the book is available in Spanish as **Entre Dos Fuegos: ONG, desarrollo rural y violencia política** (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1992).

The Catholic Church and Sendero: Miguel Esperanza, "Terrorism in Peru," **America**, June 27, 1992, 537-540. Esperanza, the pseudonym of a Jesuit priest, writes about a new facet of the conflict between Sendero and the Catholic church: ¶For the Shining Path, the church is clearly just ...a competitor... [Until recently, it] was not politically convenient for the Shining Path to attack the church. But this situation has changed dramatically in the last year. The Shining Path believes that a new phase of the battle has begun.. . In this new phase all opposition whatsoever must simply be liquidated, and that includes the church. Between September 1990 and the present moment, the Shining Path has assassinated five pastoral agents, two religious women and three priests. The number may be small, but politically and socially their deaths clearly signified an important new step in the violent career of the Shining Path. [p. 539]

Peru Peace Network (PPN): Started in 1991, this organization is a network of individuals, religious communities, solidarity groups and human rights agencies, all focusing on Peru. It has published 75-page booklet, **Peru: Caught in the Crossfire** by Jo-Marie Burt and Aldo Panfichi. It surveys the historical background and the complex issues bearing down on present-day society. Contact: PPN, P.O. Box 551, Jefferson City, MO 65102. The book costs \$6.00, plus \$2.00 postage (\$3.00 outside the U.S.)

In addition, PPN sponsors a conference on Peru on Peacenet, an international computer network. The conference, which is addressed REG.PERU or PPN.PERU, carries recent Spanish and English material from Inter Press Service (IPS), human rights groups and Peruvian organizations, as well as contributions by concerned individuals. Users must subscribe to the Peacenet network to access the conference. Contact: Institute for Global Communications, 3228 Sacramento St., San Francisco, CA 94115. Phone: (415) 923-0900.

THE SENDERO FILE

Issue No. 4 October 1992

**A monthly bulletin chronicling and assessing the ongoing struggle between the Government of Peru and Sendero Luminoso (SL or Shining Path).
Published by the Federation of American Scientists Fund's Project on Peru**

Established by former atomic scientists in 1945, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) is a non-profit civic organization concerned with issues of science and society, and international security issues. The Project on Peru seeks greater understanding of Sendero Luminoso's threat to Peru and other countries. FAS President Jeremy J. Stone directs the FAS Fund's Project on Peru. Michael L. Smith edits The Sendero File.

SPECIAL ISSUE

Abimael Guzmán's Capture: A Turning Point in the War?

COUNTERINSURGENCY I

Guerrilla Chief's Arrest Shifts Tide of Conflict and Evokes Relief

On September 12, an elite unit of the National Directorate Against Terrorism (DINCOTE) raided a residence in the middle-class neighborhood of Surco, suspecting that the residence operating as a dance studio was really a SL safehouse. On the second floor, policemen found a bearded, casually dressed man with a distinct air of a university professor. It was Abimael Guzmán, 57, Sendero's supreme leader and the most wanted man in Peru for more than a decade.

In addition, DINCOTE captured nine people at the safehouse, including two well-known activists: Laura Zambrano, a prominent metropolitan Lima leader, and Elena Iparraguire, Guzmán's companion. DINCOTE units also fell on two other safehouses, arresting 30 more people. The raids obtained a cache of documents, notes and computer disks. In the following days, police units swept up the national coordinator responsible for liaisons with the regional committees and the coordinator of the northern Lima zone.

To guarantee the secrecy of the operation, not even President Fujimori was notified. Credit was due to DINCOTE, the most consistently effective counter-terrorist unit and its commander, General Antonio Vidal. Human rights activist Pablo Rojas said, "DINCOTE's performance was a sterling example of nuts-and-bolts intelligence and surveillance work, police professionalism, and respect for human rights."

Taking the initiative: The immediate impact of the capture was to strike a psychological blow against SL when the Peruvian government and civilian society desperately need it. In contrast to the entrenched pessimism following the July bombing offensive, Lima's middle and upper classes

erupted into displays of euphoria and relief. "The psychological bubble was burst," said political scientist Cynthia McClintock.

The more far-reaching consequence was to force SL to roll back its urban network and plans for challenging the government on its own terrain. Over the past two years, Sendero has concentrated huge resources and veteran cadres in Lima and exposed its local organizations in increasingly brazen shows of strength. The current retreat will set back SL's timetable substantially.

Security forces moved to take advantage of this opening. From 1 a.m. to 6 a.m., almost daily operations employing more than 1,000 army and police troops combed SL hotbeds in Lima's shantytowns, like Huaycán and Pachacamac (a new section of Villa El Salvador), though most arrests were of people not carrying identification documents. During the late morning hours, security forces carried out civic action programs, providing breakfasts, primary health care and even haircuts. Shantytown residents also used the police presence to reap a dividend for neighborhood safety by turning in thugs and drug addicts. There were also reports of residents identifying local SL cadres.

The public enthusiasm about Guzmán's capture, so vocal and widespread in middle and upper class districts is, however, more muted and cautious in the shantytowns. There were also signs that SL had made an orderly withdrawal. Raids did not find caches of arms or explosives. Fresh graffiti saying "Save the life of Chairman Gonzalo" and "Long Live the People's War" appeared on slum walls. Fresh killings of police and community leaders have since occurred, with a scattering of small bombs. In Ayacucho, SL staged an armed strike on September 24.

The government has also tried to exploit the psychological blow by portraying Guzmán as a crazed psychopath and common criminal. The government is hoping that Guzmán's capture will result in massive desertions. It has promised that those SL rank and file who turn themselves in will get lenient treatment, including a period of special military service and then a return to civilian life. The Roman Catholic church has offered to serve as an intermediary. Police sources said that about 150 people have so far come forward.

Day in Court: Guzmán is facing a military tribunal which has until October 27 to try him. According to recently passed legislation, a two-week investigative period after arrest then switches to a summary trial not to last longer than 30 days. Following sentencing, an appeal may take no more than 20 days. The maximum sentence is life imprisonment, though Fujimori has stated that he would prefer capital punishment. On September 27, the Peruvian Navy took over Guzmán's custody and placed him on San Lorenzo Island submarine base, offshore from the port of Callao.

Guzmán is being represented by Alfredo Crespo, a lawyer belonging to the Asociación de Abogados Democráticos (Democratic Lawyers Association - AAD), a SL front organization. Crespo said that Guzmán considers himself a "prisoner of war."

Currently, about 42 percent of national territory and 47 percent of Peru's 22.6 million inhabitants are under emergency military control.

COUNTERINSURGENCY II

Guzmán's Legacy Makes Sendero an Enduring Threat

The capture of Abimael Guzmán raises as many questions about Sendero Luminoso's 12-year insurgency and the future of Peru as it provides answers about the short-term viability of the Lima government. Resolving these key questions are limited by many factors, among which are the lack of information about how many other national leaders the Peruvian security forces swept up and how seriously and for how long SL operations will be compromised. In addition, the lack of reliable, up-to-date information from Peru's interior makes it difficult to judge how the war is going in areas where SL has been working for years.

Nevertheless, Guzmán's capture is a huge setback for SL and comes when the organization was planning an unprecedented offensive to demonstrate the government's vulnerability. Guzmán himself has been laying the groundwork over the past eight years for SL to make a dramatic leap in striking power that was to be revealed in full in October this year.

For nearly 30 years, Guzmán has been the founder, ideologue and supreme strategist of Sendero Luminoso. He has shaped the party, its military apparatus and its organizational satellites in his image. He was the instigator of a personality cult and the arbitrator of internal disputes, playing a role which no other party member could fill. However, Guzmán was not a typical Latin American caudillo, a revolutionary adventurer like Ché Guevara or even a Mao Zedong, SL's paradigm for revolution.

The capture compromises Sendero's whole organization from the top down. Although Sendero cadres, especially national and regional leaders, will quickly change identities and erase their trails, its mere existence in government hands sets back Sendero's timetable and requires the party to reorganize completely under even stricter security requirements.

Guzmán's Legacy: Even so, with or without Guzmán, Sendero Luminoso is far removed from the tightly knit group that started its insurgency in Ayacucho in 1980, or the battle-hardened, but still isolated organization of 1986 or even the guerrilla force which began to expand into urban areas in 1990. In order to understand what remains of Sendero Luminoso in a post-Guzmán era, this organizational buildup and institutionalization must be taken into account.

* Guzmán has endowed the party with a systematic codification of its ideology (in the Guzmán interview, the party congress discussion documents and other materials published in *El Diario*, the SL mouthpiece). More than a philosophical dissertation meant to compete with other systems of thought, SL ideology is a compact, coherent piece of circular logic which can appeal in a fragmented, dysfunctional society. Guzmán does not have to be physically present to reproduce his thinking, though its application may open up dissent within the organization.

Because Senderistas are not made overnight, Guzmán has emphasized the need to forge "new prototype" men and women, and has invested huge resources in creating a "revolutionary pedagogy" that reaches the common man as well as intellectuals. This ideological message is packaged in easily digestible capsules which activists spread through SL recruitment, its "people's schools" and even the public education system. For instance, a team of human rights educators recently went to Puno to give a course at the state-run Pedagogical Institute. The educators found their audience, "from the director down to the pupils," shouting SL slogans.

* Guzmán has made the party, with its People's Guerrilla Army and satellite organizations, into a nationwide network with a decentralized command structure, tactical initiative and defined objectives. Guzmán oversaw the expansion of a guerrilla force which is aiming to put a standing army in the field to demonstrate what the party claims as "strategic parity" against government forces. Estimates of its fighting force range from 5,000 to 10,000. SL retains its military apparatus intact and operative. Perhaps, as many as 50,000 militants provide logistical support.

From Piura on the Ecuadorian border to Puno on the Bolivian border, SL holds the high ground in geopolitical and strategic terms. Though its urban activities have distracted public attention from its rural presence, it has not sacrificed its strongholds in the countryside. It has solid bases of operation in the northern Sierra above Trujillo (from Santiago de Chuco, La Libertad to Cajabamba, Cajamarca); a central Andean core which includes the Sierra of Ancash and the Huallaga valley; the traditional axis of Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Junin; a staging area in the remote provinces of Abancay; and a southern bridgehead in Puno. More than mere shadow government, SL is the only authority in these areas. It is impossible to surround, isolate and destroy these guerrilla strongholds in a single stroke.

* Guzmán laid out a broad, multi-faceted and multifront strategy strikingly matched with an organization to carry it out. In a country where few organizations work efficiently, Sendero does, and this fact gives it appeal. Although its terrorist attacks and guerrilla tactics have grabbed headlines, SL has marshalled far more resources for other lines of action: propaganda; recruitment and training; education; infiltration, neutralization and seizure of competing organizations; logistical support and communication for its clandestine network, its operating units and its command structure; intelligence gathering and processing; and strategic planning at a national, regional and local level.

* The party has a reliable source of funding through its connections with the cocaine trade in the Huallaga valley and elsewhere along the eastern slopes of the Andes. Though this connection could compromise the integrity of its regional commands through corruption, it will provide resources for the foreseeable future. Simultaneously, SL can still prevent the Peruvian economy from working (through power blackouts, knocking out bridges, car bombings and other acts of sabotage which frighten off Peruvian and foreign investors), thus depriving the State of revenue.

* Guzmán oversaw a Senderista penetration in urban areas, a risky transition for any guerrilla movement, but a prerequisite for taking power. Although the outcome of this shift is still uncertain, SL today is engaged in urban activities which were unimaginable five years ago.

The Bottom Line: In other words, Guzmán has left his organization tangible assets that makes Sendero resilient and resistant. Indeed, as the organization has grown and diversified, Guzmán was becoming more of a

chairman of the board than a hands-on field general, and had to rely on competent subordinates with tactical autonomy and command authority.

The Government's Status: The Peruvian government does not have the manpower, logistics or funds to exploit this windfall of intelligence and psychological initiative. The intelligence haul at the safehouses and any additional information that can be obtained from those captured is of a transitory nature, tactically speaking, but will have great usefulness in piecing together an understanding of how SL functioned. It will give the government the most comprehensive view of Sendero and its modus operandi þ a vision from inside the organization þ that it has ever had.

Perhaps, as much as 70 percent of the national territory lies outside the permanent reach of the State, and it will take years to reassert state authority there.

The Fujimori government is trying to exploit the psychological blow by ridiculing Guzmán and the party and planting seeds of doubt about the organization's invincibility and motives. Reports from Lima indicate a discernible risk in the tendency to equate Guzmán with all Sendero's destructive capacity and wiles, and downplaying Sendero's capacity to absorb the blow and continue its rebellion. The state of euphoria and relief among Peru's national elites and middle class, mainly confined to Lima, may lead to missing another golden opportunity to regain the initiative.

For the government, the crucial question is how to turn this SL setback into a tide change. It must put in place medium-term policies and programs that will extend the state's presence and legitimacy, rebuild durable social and political institutions, and jump start a limping economy. This effort requires a viable counterinsurgency strategy that goes beyond the last-ditch defenses, which the Fujimori government has mounted, based on military force, intelligence, self- defense committees pressed into service from the general population, and short-circuiting the legal defense of suspected terrorists, including Guzmán.

The underlying causes of the insurgency and the setting of social and political decay have not changed with Guzmán's capture. The historical motherlode of ethnic and class hatred is still there to be mined. The economic recession is still grinding up scores of companies and spewing out massive unemployment. Narco- trafficking and corruption are undermining institutions already weakened by the impact of 15 years of crisis. The government has failed to provide minimum public services, especially in the areas of health, education and justice. The political system is fragmented and in upheaval, facing a crisis which predates the April 5 coup and will continue for the foreseeable future.

SENDERO'S FUTURE

The Big Question Mark

"For an organization which has planned each step to the last detail, it is unimaginable that it has not planned for the possibility of Guzmán's capture," says Pablo Rojas, a Peruvian human rights leader. Since Guzmán

could also have been incapacitated by illness, he himself probably drew up the contingency plans. However, the sudden, deep blow to SL's command structure makes smooth implementation of any plan extremely difficult.

Most analysts agree that SL will first take dramatic action to restore the "shield of fear" which protects its cadres from being fingered. SL can choose from many options: hostage taking, car bombs, massive sabotage or a spectacular attack. "We're telling our clients to act as if the capture had never taken place β error on the side of caution," says a Lima security company executive.

Second, the party will have to regroup and weigh how much effort it wants to invest in keeping Guzmán alive (or even rescuing him), and how important it is to stay as close to the time line for revolution. Guzmán himself has already told the party to proceed with current plans.

Beyond these short-term priorities, Sendero will have to fill the void in national leadership and unified command. The guerrilla expert Gustavo Gorriti believes that the remaining apparatus will seek a collective leadership, in part because Guzmán never designated a successor. The SL central committee has 18-22 members, and the heads of the six regional committees (Metropolitan Lima, Primary or Ayacucho, North, South, East and Central) are automatically members. Though the Lima and national leadership has been hard hit, regional and military commands have, for the most part, been unscathed.

A more thorough leadership shake-out will take place over the next 3-36 months and even longer if Guzmán remains alive. There will be a host of competing factions within the party, each trying to get the upper hand and playing out its position in both internal debate and armed actions. A first fault line will run through the regional committees: the Ayacucho regional committee which has historical preeminence within the party; the Huallaga command which controls the party's purse strings; and the Lima metropolitan committee which will have to take the blame for Guzmán's capture.

Other potential fissures are the strain between party politicians and guerrilla army; those who demand Maoist ideology purity (applying the universal laws of history) and those who emphasize the indigenous nature of the revolt; those who endorse stepping up the pace of the revolt by penetrating Lima and those who back a prolonged struggle in the countryside; Guzmán's favorites versus outsiders and ambitious middle-tier leaders ready to fill vacancies at the top.

Over the years, Guzmán has overseen internal tensions, instigated debates and channeled the friction into almost ritualistic purges of the upper tiers of the party, without permitting the organization to spin out of control. Without his firm hand and fiat, this power struggle may divide and weaken the party and its organizations. On the other hand, both the conditions of Guzmán's confinement and the remote chance of his freedom will serve to string out the conflicts.

Sendero will also be undergoing the strains of an institution passing from the founder's direct control to an institution in the hands of second and third-generation militants. As Gorriti points out, Maoist guerrilla groups have generally fizzled after the loss of their founder, but fundamentalist movements, with which Sendero has strong similarities, have weathered the transition better ["Fortune Favors the Unworthy," **Los Angeles Times**, 9/18/92].

However, a Sendero Luminoso without Guzmán to dictate an ideological hardline does not guarantee the group's demise. SL might become more politically flexible and reach out to those who support the violent overthrow of the government but have been unwilling to accept its goals or methods. Grassroots leaders frequently say that a constraint on Sendero's appeal has been its rigid ideological stance and dogmatic refusal to enter into political alliances.

Nor does an eventual SL decline necessarily mean a reduction of violence in Peru. Peruvian society has been brutalized by Sendero, abusive security forces, government incompetence, the economic adjustment program, and crime. During the past decade, SL has claimed a monopoly on violence and kept other competitors off its turf. Instead of having political violence wielded by SL with almost surgical precision, Peru may degenerate into a slaughterhouse filled with scores of amateur butchers, as other equally violent, but less savvy, groups occupy both the political and social scenes. These could be SL factions, other insurgent groups, narco-traffickers, bandits, mafia-like organizations, rogue bands of police and military, and even the self-defense committees now being encouraged by the Fujimori government.

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Fujimori Capitalizes on Political Windfall of SL Defeat

Riding on the back of popular relief about Guzmán's capture, President Fujimori is turning to the election campaign that will elect 80 members to a new Constituent Congress on November 22. According to a September 17 opinion poll by APOYO S.A. in the metropolitan Lima area, Fujimori's approval rating has shot up to 72 percent, an 18-point leap from his previous mark. Also, his disapproval rating also dropped from 30 percent to 15 percent.

"Fujimori has skillfully shifted public debate to a `with me or with Sendero' polarity and there is precious little habitable middle ground for more sophisticated discussion," says a veteran Peruvian analyst.

Fujimori has the luxury of backing two candidate lists, his own Cambio 90 (Change 90) party and a slate of independent candidates headed by the former minister of energy and mines, Jaime Yoshiyama, who resigned from his post in late August.

In September, Fujimori gave assurances that those elected to the Constituent Congress would have parliamentary immunity and that the

Congress would have the autonomy to pass laws and review legislation approved by the Executive since the April 5 presidential coup.

In addition, the National Elections Board stiffened requirements for previously registered parties by dissolving electoral alliances from the 1990 general elections. This ruling hits especially hard at the left wing coalitions of Izquierda Unida (IU - United Left) and Izquierda Socialista (IS - Socialist Left) because the coalition members do not meet the minimum requirement of 5 percent of the general vote in 1990 balloting to retain their status as national parties. They join 100 groups scrambling to get 100,000 signatures from voting-age citizens by October 8.

Three political parties, former president Fernando Belaúnde's Acción Popular, Mario Vargas Llosa's Libertad movement and former president Alan García's APRA (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance), have already announced that they will not participate in the elections. However, APRA has purged an anti-García group, marking the worst dissent in a decade while other election hold-outs are also facing desertions.

The U.S. House Committee on Appropriations has been holding up \$7 million in allocations to fund the Organization of American States (OAS) and its observer teams which are to monitor November elections in Peru.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS

International Funding Starts Anew

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and Peru signed a loan agreement for \$222 million for the restructuring of Peru's financial system. The loan had been on hold since the April 5 presidential coup. This move does not reduce the international community's leverage on the Peruvian government because Fujimori still needs a steady inflow of resources to meet International Monetary Fund (IMF) economic targets by the end of the year, a milestone for the complex debt work-out, and to qualify for further lending.

Peru and the United States agreed to a refinancing of nearly one billion dollars in late August as part of the Paris Club agreement signed last year for bilateral debt. This measure will remove Brook-Alexander (debt arrearages) sanctions against Peru and make it eligible for non-counternarcotics economic assistance again. However, there are still congressional sanctions attributable to the Fujimori coup.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

U.S. Congress Cautioned Against Premature Optimism about Peru

Four expert witnesses warned a Congressional hearing that the political violence undermining Peruvian government and civilian society will not end with the capture of Sendero's top leaders. A majority of the panelists called for a more assertive approach by the international community, including setting up an international group to assist Peru on counterinsurgency.

The House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, chaired by Robert Torricelli (D-New Jersey), heard from four witnesses on the impact of Guzmán's capture and the implications for U.S. foreign policy: Gen. William Odom, former director of the National Security Council and author of a recent study on Peru for the U.S. Agency for International Development; Gustavo Gorriti, a Peruvian journalist and a leading authority on Sendero Luminoso; Cynthia McClintock, a professor of political science at George Washington University; and Jeremy J. Stone, FAS president.

Among the panelists, Odom took the harshest line towards Peru, saying, "There are no very promising strategies, but any that is to succeed must prevent the Peruvian government from regaining access to foreign credits before it has built a strong state, collects about 20 percent of its GDP in taxes, has privatized most of the 240 state companies, has given peasants clear titles of their land, and has brought the informal sectors into the formal legal system, disallowing the use of formal laws as a way of protecting privileged business circles and excluding the rest of society... We did not create their predicament, and I see no moral reason why we should spend one nickel in their rescue."

In short, according to cynical observer, only when Peru becomes a South American Switzerland, should the U.S. and other donors consider assistance to the government -- by which time Peru would probably not need it. Odom based his testimony on research on U.S. policy towards "client states" (El Salvador, Guatemala, and the Philippines).

McClintock proposed "the creation of an `international political community' to provide more professional, ongoing monitoring of key components of democracy þ human rights, fair electoral rules, honest balloting, and the like." She said economic aid should be resumed, though military assistance should remain suspended due to the "dictatorial manner in which Fujimori established the regulations for the November elections."

Gorriti stated that it was premature to call Guzmán's capture a deathblow. "In this kind of war you can only measure substantial progress by the number of people and amount of territory that has been brought back to a viable democratic life." Gorriti recommended providing full assistance for national rebuilding while keeping steady pressure on the institutional process, but warned that road back from near-defeat "is not going to be a blitzkrieg."

In presenting his proposal for a Counterinsurgency Support Group, Stone pointed out that previous witnesses at the Subcommittee's March 11-12

hearing had made comments suggesting they would support his proposal either by calling on Peru to learn the "lessons" from other similar insurgencies (Davidson College Professor Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano) or by referring to the need for a "serious counterinsurgency strategy" (Assistant Secretary of State Bernard Aronson).

Congressman Stephen Solarz, in his last appearance on the Subcommittee dias, called the proposal constructive, though not a "panacea," and commended Stone for presenting it. In further consultations, Professor David Scott Palmer (Boston University) said he was "very enthusiastic" about it.

SPOTLIGHT

Pooling Resources and Expertise For A Counterinsurgency Support Group

Before the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, FAS president Jeremy J. Stone proposed that the Peruvian government consider inviting the creation of a counterinsurgency support group (CSG) composed of experts experienced at dealing with similar insurgencies.

This group could help "devise a strategy sustainable for periods longer than the short-term tenure of military commanders or even the five-year term of Peruvian presidents." Besides formulating plans and suggesting ideas, they would monitor the contest, and the plan's implementation, and give advice to President Fujimori and his successors.

"For the international community, the CSG could be helpful in its deliberations over whether or not to provide more or less intelligence assistance, military training, economic aid, loans, or technical advice relevant to the defeat of Sendero," Stone added.

The Peruvian government might be willing to accept this initiative, Stone said, if it felt that the international community considered it to be an important signal of the Peruvian government's readiness to maintain an internationally acceptable counterinsurgency campaign.

SENDERO ABROAD

SL Opens New Frontier Corridor Through Ecuador

Sendero has begun political work in Ecuador, opening up a second international corridor to back up its toehold in Bolivia (See Sendero File No. 2). A Peruvian source says that Ayabaca, an impoverished mountainous province of Piura on the Ecuadorian border, has become the primary exit point for SL activists because the other corridor, in Bolivia, has become more strictly controlled, and anti-terrorist police are tracking their cadres.

After a concerted effort to build a strong base of operation in Piura, Sendero has quietly penetrated the rondas campesinas, community defense organizations long established in the region to prevent cattle-rustling. SL,

however, failed repeatedly to gain a foothold in the lowland communities and urban areas of Piura. Sendero has found it hard to break into the northern Sierra. Its influence has stopped about 150 miles south in the sierra above Trujillo. The rondas themselves have kept SL activists out of the region.

On the Ecuador side of the border, SL has set up reception bases for incoming cadres to support them in changing identities, planning and travel. In addition, SL has begun open political work around Quito, distributing pamphlets and organizing. Ecuadorian authorities, while concerned, have not taken action: "Our peasants will never revolt," one is reported to have said, almost the exact words 12 years ago from Peruvians about an obscure uprising in Ayacucho.

* In Bolivia, the collaboration between Sendero and the Tupac Katari movement has led Tupac Katari rank and file to shift their loyalties directly to SL, leaving the Bolivian leaders stranded.

* The Peruvian government has begun an international campaign against pro-SL organizations abroad. The reaction was sparked by a British 40-minute documentary, "The People of Shining Path," shown on Channel 4's Dispatches program in August. The producers had SL's cooperation in filming sequences in guerrilla-controlled areas. The Peruvian foreign affairs ministry has distributed a list of pro-SL groups and individuals. However, the list contains errors, falsely identifying at least four Peruvians in Germany as SL sympathizers.

RESEARCHER'S CORNER

On Body Counts and News Clippings

DESCO (the Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo) is a Lima-based non-governmental organization which has studied and promoted urban and rural development for nearly three decades. It earned a niche in the study of Sendero's expansion almost by accident. The bimonthly **Quehacer** journal (\$45 a year six-issue international subscription), the research center's flagship publication, found an untapped readership when it published its first feature article on Ayacucho in early 1982. It soon built a reputation on feature-length articles on Sendero, especially thanks to the reporting of sociologist-journalist Raúl Gonzalez, writer Jos, María Salcedo and others.

As SL's activities grew, DESCO's weekly news summary **Resumen Semanal** (international subscription, \$80 for six months, \$140 a year), drawn from Lima newspaper and magazine reports, became clogged with incidents of political violence. The material was eventually made into a database. In 1989, DESCO brought out a complete systematization of this material, *Violencia Política en el Perú 1980-1988* (two volumes, 1989). It provides a detailed recounting of the first nine years of the conflict.

However, the drawback of the DESCO approach is that it considers only printed news accounts. By using the Lima press, the DESCO database incorporates a series of distortions. First, Lima publications only report the

most flagrant incidents in rural areas while counting every dynamite stick in Lima and other major cities. Second, provincial correspondents tend to misinform about, misinterpret or even invent incidents to fill their news quotas. A Cusco-based researcher investigating the DESCO database found that only one out of three reports were correctly reported. Third, most incident reports are devoid of the context within which the attacks took place. Finally, as SL grew and the military widened its area of authority, large sections of the country were no longer open for independent journalists to investigate.

A new series of **Reportes Especiales** (international subscription \$150 for six months, \$250 for a year), a monthly report which focuses on political violence, counterinsurgency and the response of government and society, seeks to correct these distortions by including more systematic analysis of trends, the breakdown of statistics into graphs and tables, and SL documents. For instance, the July issue (No. 15) focuses on the SL urban offensive and armed strike in Lima. This publication has "restricted circulation" while *Resumen Semanal* remains a timely, thorough way to keep abreast of Peruvian political affairs.

Contact: DESCO, Leon de la Fuente No. 110, Lima 17, PERU (Phone: 61-0984; fax: 61-7309).

Leaving War to the Generals: Philip Mauceri, "Military Politics and Counter-Insurgency in Peru," **Journal of Interamerican and World Affairs** 33, 4 (Winter 1991), 83-109. In a rare spotlight on the Peruvian military as an institution, political scientist Philip Mauceri follows its development over the past three decades and sees current tensions within the armed service and between the military and civilians as an outgrowth of past failures when the military ruled the country (1968-80) and a lack of definition of their role under a democratic regime besieged by insurgents.

Mauceri sums up Peru's approach as an abdication of civilian oversight of counterinsurgency policy: "Under the previous two elected governments and the current Fujimori administration, the military institution has largely designed and implemented counterinsurgency strategy, leaving civilian policy makers aside in the decision-making process. What is more important, military officials have remained largely unaccountable for their decisions due to the lack of any civilian oversight capacity or alternative strategies." [p. 83]

Double Vision: "Fatal Attraction: Peru's Shining Path," is the feature section in **NACLA Report on the Americas** of January 1991 (Vol. XXIV, No. 4). The Peruvian anthropologist Carlos Iván Degregori explains Sendero's thinking and why it has taken a radical course. U.S. sociologist Carol Andrea writes sympathetically about Sendero's appeal to women and why they play leading roles in the organization. Peruvian historian Nelson Manrique examines the Senderista offensive in the Central Sierra. Peruvian historian José Luis Renique narrates an encounter with an old friend incarcerated as a SL leader in Canto Grande prison. There is also an interview with Luis Arce Borja, the director of **El Diario**, the SL mouthpiece.

A previous special issue on Peru, "García's Peru: One Last Chance," came out in June, 1986. Back issues cost \$4.00, plus \$1.00 handling. Contact: NACLA, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, NY 10015.

A WORD FROM CHAIRMAN GONZALO...

Guzmán's Chinese Master

In Guzmán's **El Diario** interview, he explained his exposure to Maoist military tactics, "In China, I had the possibility... to be in a school where politics was taught, starting from international affairs to Marxist philosophy. They were masterly lessons given by proven and highly competent revolutionaries, great teachers. Among them, I remember the teacher who taught us open and secret work, a man who devoted all his life to the party for many years, a living example, an extraordinary maestro..."

Guzmán went to China during the Cultural Revolution and met many of the battle-hardened cadres who fought against Japan and the Kuomintang. From their pragmatic lessons and from reading Mao's writings, he acquired the foundations of military thinking.

However, as Gabriel Marcella of the U.S. Army War College points out, there was another influence on Guzmán, Sun Tzu and his monumental text **The Art of War** (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith). Sun Tzu, though he probably wrote more than 2,000 years ago, is on a par with the German strategist Clausewitz. Mao frequently paraphrased Sun Tzu in his writing and his instructions to his subordinates.

Guzmán has shows this influence in several ways. His disciples spent two decades studying the military tactics and strategies used in the Andes for four centuries, from the Incas to the civil wars of the early 1920s, just as Mao studied Chinese peasant revolts and classic texts on war. Although it made for poor Peruvian historiography, it provided the detailed knowledge of what was needed to win on the chosen terrain.

The real evidence lies in SL's practices, its reliance on intelligence gathering, assessing the enemy's strengths and weaknesses, studying and choosing adequate terrain and climate and exploiting the unexpected and deception. Even the latest urban tact comes out of Sun Tzu: "Thus, those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battle. They capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations."

THE SENDERO FILE

Issue No. 5 November 1992

A monthly bulletin chronicling and assessing the ongoing struggle between the Government of Peru and Sendero Luminoso (SL or Shining Path).

Published by the Federation of American Scientists Fund's Project on Peru

Established by former atomic scientists in 1945, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) is a non-profit civic organization concerned with issues of science and society, and international security issues. The Project on Peru seeks greater understanding of Sendero Luminoso's threat to Peru and other countries. FAS President Jeremy J. Stone directs the FAS Fund's Project on Peru. Michael L. Smith edits The Sendero File.

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: Congressional Elections Raise Questions about Peru's Future

The nationwide elections for a Constituent Congress on November 22 will come as a relief to most Peruvians. The reason is not that the elections restore a skeleton of democratic procedures to the government of President Alberto Fujimori. Rather, the lackluster, slipshod campaign has not dealt with the real-life hardships of most voters, and an already predictable Fujimori victory was guaranteed from the outset by his outwitting the political opposition and the capture of Sendero chieftain Abimael Guzmán.

Beyond the tedium of the campaign, however, the elections mark a sea change in Peruvian politics and society. In the wake of SL offensives and economic austerity, Peru is a radically different country with new challenges for rebuilding viable government and thwarting the dynamics of political violence. The old assumptions about how the society works have been destroyed.

Under international pressure from the Organization of American States (OAS), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the U.S. Department of State following the April 5 presidential coup, which dissolved Congress and reorganized the judiciary, Fujimori convoked a national election to select a new congress with powers to rewrite the 1979 constitution. At the time, the elections were seen as a means of breaking the deadlock between Fujimori and the traditional political parties, reopen political dialogue and provide an autonomous legislature with oversight powers of the executive and judiciary branches.

Instead, the cramped elections timetable, changing procedural requirements and scarce funding for elections apparatus and candidates have turned the whole process into a mad scramble to voting day. "The slogan of the campaign should be 'Improvisation to Power'," says Lima pollster Manuel Torrado. The OAS has sent a team of 200 observers to monitor the elections, and the State Department has also encouraged other observers to go to Peru.

Because Fujimori holds the political initiative, broad powers to set the playing rules and popular backing, he has cast the elections in his own terms. "Fujimori will do anything in his power to win these elections," says a

Lima business executive. The main opposition parties — former president Fernando Belaunde's Popular Action (Acción Popular), novelist Mario Vargas Llosa's Libertad movement and former president Alán García's APRA (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance), as well as the Marxist parties that retain the umbrella of United Left (Izquierda Unida-IU) — have refused to participate. They either foresaw a humiliating loss or thought the Congress would be a Fujimori-controlled rubber stamp.

Referendum on Chaos: The Fujimori government aims to turn the balloting into a referendum on the president's initiatives since the military-backed coup: "Are you with the Chinaman (as Fujimori is popularly known) or against him? Do you want to return to pre-coup chaos and corruption?" Fujimori and allies have saturated the airwaves with advertising that emphasizes all the worst of the pre-coup situation. Fujimori has also actively barnstormed shantytowns and rural communities, giving away computers, trucks, sewing machines and even cash. There have also been accusations that Fujimori's hand-picked lead candidate, Jaime Yoshiyama, 45, has benefitted from using government facilities in his campaign.

In early November, Fujimori stated that he would again disband congress in the case of an unresolved conflict. He has also insisted on future referendums to determine the reinstatement of capital punishment and for lifting the ban on presidential reelection.

Upstart politicians: Among the 18 slates with 80 candidates each, there are no more than a handful of well-known political figures, practically no national organization and an absence of platform, programs and constitutional issues. Aside from New Majority/Change 90, no party or movement has the financial backing, manpower or national organization to challenge Fujimori.

According to the latest nationwide surveys by APOYO and CPI public opinion agencies in early November, the pro-Fujimori alliance has 36-40% of the vote, enough to guarantee a majority in Congress. The closest competitor, the Renovation movement, has 5.5-7.5%. Only six other political movements manage to make a statistically significant showing, but not enough to break out of the pack, much less form a credible opposition movement. The category "void and blank votes," which probably lumps together the vehemently anti-Fujimori block, gets 13-14%.

The other leading category is "undecided or don't know," which hits about 20%. In provinces, beyond the reach of the media, these tendencies are even more accentuated, with up to 40% of the electorate undecided. For the majority of the 10-million-strong electorate, there is no clear idea of why elections have to be held in the first place. Political participation has become a luxury which few people can afford, even Peru's business interests which has underwritten campaigns for decades.

Even though there is little interest in the elections, voters will still go to the polls because they are required by law to vote. An unstamped electoral identification card carries a heavy fine, as well as days of hassle and possible trouble with the police.

Much of the Peruvian public, as well as most foreign governments and international institutions concerned about Peru, have been asking themselves the question "What alternative is there to Fujimori?" and coming up with a negative.

Beyond the context of these elections, Peru has been undergoing major changes since 1988. What seemed to be temporary reversals of fortune due to economic crisis have become permanent scars. These changes undermine many of the fundamental assumptions about economic development, social context and political organization. It was precisely during this period that Sendero expanded its scope and thrust of operations, feeding off the debris of upheaval.

"I have never seen anything like this in my life," says a former diplomat who has followed political developments in Latin America for three decades.

The Inconsequence of Government: For the Peruvian public, the State has become irrelevant, withering to a minimal expression. The Fujimori administration has had to concentrate on macroeconomic policy, tax collection and security, while salvaging what remains of state enterprises for auction to foreign investors. "The country is basically running itself," says former Central Reserve Bank president Richard Webb.

Five years ago, it was inconceivable that Peru could be governed without the backing of a political party to provide the managerial skills, manpower and policy making capacity. Today, the Peruvian state is run by a handful of people, starting with President Alberto Fujimori, his brother and closest collaborator, Santiago. The Finance Minister, Carlos Boloña, has a small support team, less than a dozen people, working with him. On security, the shadowy advisor Vlademiro Montesinos provides intelligence support and the Peruvian army gives the muscle to maintain public order. The rest of public administration is run by third-class administrators. FONCODES, the social compensation program which has a top-priority on paper, was unable to spend more than 10% of its budget during the first half of 1992.

Over the past five years, the Peruvian state found itself caught in a pincer movement. A collapse of government revenue meant that it could not cover its basic operating costs, much less make the necessary investments in infrastructure and expanding public services. Today, based on government spending (the Central Reserve Bank), the Peruvian state is 28% of what it was in 1980. On the other flank, Sendero harassed government representatives in the more remote regions, forcing authorities to leave or strike a bargain to coexist with the guerrillas, and destroyed independent organizations in setting up the scaffolding for its People's Republic of New Democracy.

Former senator Enrique Bernales recently listed the toll of political violence between 1980 and 1992: 24,732 deaths; 2,728 missing persons; \$21 billion in economic losses; 21,304 attacks; 1,475 power pylons knocked down; 50,000 war orphans; 300,000 displaced persons; 6,561,334 "war children" born under the pale of the crisis; 334,000 Peruvians who traveled abroad

and did not return; 10,653,311 Peruvians and 26% of national territory under "state of emergency" provisions which truncate human rights.

Fujimori is presiding over a dramatic transformation of the Peruvian State, gutting it of its managerial capacity and policy initiative. While Fujimori's open-market economic strategy is close to making Peru credit worthy for international funding again, it has been accomplished with huge sacrifices, and there seems to be no short-term pay-off. The latest economic figures show that the economy has dipped into another recession, dropping 4.4% this year. The government promises that 1993 will be different.

A New Social Landscape: Beyond the destruction of the Peruvian state, the vast economic changes have altered society profoundly. "People are consumed by the struggle of daily survival," says Jaime Joseph who works with municipal governments and grassroots organizations in Lima's northern neighborhoods.

The Peruvian middle and working classes have been practically wiped out by the crisis. State employees, once the backbone of the middle class and numbering 800,000 strong, earn 15% of what they did in 1988. Only 15% of Lima's workforce is adequately employed, compared to 60% in 1987. In July, private sector employment plummeted 12% from the year before, according to Ministry of Labor figures.

Because of a shrinking job market, Peruvian youth have little chance of building a future. According to a survey carried out by CEDRO in 1991, one out of four Peruvians between the ages of 14 and 24 (representing four million) justified armed insurrection. In rural areas, that figure went up to 32%.

Just as the economic crisis has savaged individuals and households, it has decimated grassroots organizations, like neighborhood, trade union and peasant organizations, which grew over three decades and are dependent on time and resources donated by their members. Most organizations have become life-support systems to distribute food donations. In Lima, there are 7,300 soup kitchens distributing 1.5 million rations a day, according to the latest estimates. This change means that there are few forums for democratic discussion and few effective means of building consensus beyond the local community.

Preliminary reports show that Peru is undergoing a major upheaval of population, with massive migration from the countryside to provincial towns, major cities and Lima, spurred by draught, famine, collapsing Andean agriculture, violence and the withdrawal of public services from marginal areas. This shift throws an additional burden on the already overstretched public services, non-profit services and job markets. There has been a rise in crime and disorder. Bands of highway robbers and thugs roam large parts of the countryside where SL does not prevail and urban crime is on the rise. Reported crimes have doubled in the past 10 years, even though most people no longer bother to inform the police of most incidents.

This process of disarticulating political organization continues as security risks and cost deter travel within the country and isolate Lima from the provinces. Regions like Cusco are more inward-looking while frontier regions, like Tumbes-Piura (Ecuador), Puno (Bolivia) and Tacna-Moquegua (Chile) become more integrated into the dynamics of their neighboring countries. "Centuries, not miles, seem to separate Lima from provinces," says a grassroots organizer.

"We have to rebuild Peruvian society from the ground up," says Joseph. Most people are far more interested in the January 29 municipal elections than in the November congressional vote, because they see them as having a real impact on their lives, as well as being one of the few democratic forums remaining in the country.

The Debacle of the Political Class: For the past 15 years, a political rule of thumb was that the Peruvian electorate was divided in four equal parts: one quarter associated with the middle and upper classes aligned with mainstream parties (PPC, AP and others); one quarter cornered by APRA as Social Democrats with an authoritarian streak; one quarter represented by the Marxist-dominated left with links to trade unions, peasants and intellectuals; and a remaining quarter as a swing group of uncommitted voters. Each of the three options were characterized by a recognizable leadership, clear ideological underpinnings, programs and track records.

Fujimori's 1990 presidential victory and the groundswell of support for the coup was made possible by the disenchantment with national political leadership, the loss of faith in ideologies, the breakdown of effective links between rank and file and their representatives, and an entrenched cynicism about the whole political process. There were three distinct flash points which broke the leaders' capacity to form broader consensus on where Peru should be headed.

First, the Marxist left emerged in the mid-1970s as a major player in politics, both in the national legislature, local governments and in grassroots organizations because it opened up to formerly disenfranchised citizenry. In fact, what came to be called the "popular movement" was a defining trait of modern Peru. In 1988-89, the IU coalition opened its ranks and registered more than 100,000 in the movement. A national convention with 3,000 elected delegates, however, clashed with the contradictions of Marxist-Leninist parties, caudillos with personal ambitions, overheated rhetoric and stunted participation. The sympathizers who had backed IU as an agent of change abandoned IU when its leaders showed themselves cast in the same mold as mainstream politicians. This failure was doubly painful because it hit an entire generation of activists who had come of age politically — and belatedly — under democracy and frustrated a new breed of organizations.

Second, though APRA still remains the strongest (perhaps, only) nationally organized political movement in Peru, it has retreated into isolation after Garcia's five-year fiasco in government, blowing the last chance of avoiding social and economic disaster. During the closing phases of the Garcia administration, "we saw the Apristas steal even the hinges off the doorframes of local offices," said a Puno grassroots leader. Today, 70% of

the Lima public believe that García used illicit means to enrich himself while in office, according to a Datum opinion poll.

Third, the Vargas Llosa presidential campaign, which brought together AP, PPC and Liberty movements as well as other political groups, engaged many more middle- and upper-class people in the political process than ever before. These political novices came into close contact with their political stand-ins in the coalition parties and found them wanting. Another unspoken conclusion among Lima's predominantly white, creole classes was that they would never again mount a political movement capable of winning the backing of the cholo (mixed blood) majority. Today, 90% of businessmen side with Fujimori, rather than one of the traditional parties, according to a recent poll.

ELECTIONS 92: A Political Scorecard

In Peru's scrambled political history, the temptation of founding a new political movement has always been present, but with Fujimori having already proven how far an independent can go and traditional parties boycotting participation in the national elections for the Democratic Constituent Congress, it has never made the bet more tempting. By early November, 18 groups had qualified, though that might change because new rulings of the National Election Board or groups pulling out at the last minute. The following list includes only those that have a chance of winning seats because of past performance or showing in voter surveys.

New Majority/Change 90 (Mayoría Nueva/Cambio 90): Former Energy and Mines Minister Jaime Yoshiyama heads the candidate slate of the pro-government coalition. The two groups joined to bolster Fujimori's chances of scoring big in the elections.

Popular Christian Party (Partido Popular Cristiano - PPC): This Social Christian-type party has reserved 60 of its 80-candidate slate for provincial candidates, led by former senator Lourdes Flores Nano, to reverse its image as a Lima-based group and to inject fresh blood into the party.

Solidarity and Democracy (Solidaridad y Democracia - SODE): More a movement of technocrats and opinion makers than a party, SODE has picked up leading moderate left wing activists, like former senator and constitutionalist Enrique Bernaldes.

Renovation Movement (Movimiento Renovación): As leader of a break-off movement from Vargas Llosa's Libertad, Rafael Rey Rey, a former Lima deputy and Opus Dei member, has tried to steer the course of giving critical support to Fujimori, but remaining politically independent.

Democratic Coordinator (Coordinadora Democrática): Former senator José Barba, an Aprista gadfly and anti-García leader, may get uncommitted Aprista voters.

Independent Moralizer Front (Frente Independiente Moralizador - FIM): Former Lima deputy Fernando Olivera has played off his erratic charisma and popular advocacy to keep in the headlines.

National Workers and Peasants Front (Frente Nacional de Trabajadores y Campesinos - Frenatraca): Based on the Cáceres family's power in Puno and Arequipa, the party has a small, but firm following. Former senator Roger Cáceres is what might be called a compulsive legislator, churning out hundreds of motions and bills.

Democratic Left Movement (Movimiento Democrático de Izquierda - MDI): Former education minister Gloria Helfer heads the candidate slate of what left Peru's progressive movement after breaking with Marxist allies in IU.

SENDERO'S URBAN STRATEGY: Urban Cell Network is Reeling on the Election Campaign Trail

Since Sendero's first act of insurrection attacking the balloting place in Chuschi, Ayacucho in 1980, it has concentrated its fire on elections. Government is at its most vulnerable then, with security stretched thin and thousands of election authorities, candidates and campaign workers as potential targets. This tactic aims primarily at urban areas where most voters reside. Bombings or assassination ripple through the political system.

In response to SL's tactics, security forces have found that the most effective means of countering SL's intimidation is to hit at subversive networks weeks and months before the elections so that SL's plans are disrupted. With these elections, the government's counterinsurgency command received a maximum bonus in Guzmán's capture. With SL deprived of its strategic thinker and leader and forced to redraft organization and plans, what remains of the party leadership will be hardpressed to stage a major counterattack.

On voting day, security forces have concentrated on providing protection for 68,000 "voting tables" nation-wide, located mainly in urban schools, community centers, and other public buildings that can provide a security umbrella. SL bands have mainly preyed on those citizens who live away from rural areas and have to travel hours — even days — to cast their ballots.

Although Sendero may not recover in time for the Constituent Congress elections, the municipal elections on January 29 offer an even more tempting target. With more than two thousand provincial and district races for mayor and councilmen in the works, the security problem becomes even more complicated.

The National Directorate Against Terrorism (DINCOTE), the National Intelligence Service (SIN) and army intelligence, each in its own way, have rushed to capitalize on Guzmán's capture. "Vidal has been gradually pulling in the string from his intelligence cache," says Manuel Piqueras, a Peruvian analyst.

DINCOTE scored another major blow by capturing Marta Huatay, a prominent SL leader, in Lima in October. A close Guzmán protegé, Huatay played a high-profile public role in the late 1980s as president of the Association of Democratic Lawyers (Asociación de Abogado Democráticos - AAD), a SL front organization which provided legal defense to SL militants

and sympathizers. Since 1989, she went underground because of death threats and assumed responsibility for People's Aid (Socorro Popular), the SL logistical network for supporting the organization.

"Vidal has his hands full," says Lima journalist Mirko Lauer. "With 90-120 SL operatives captured, he does not even know what he has. He is piecing together the puzzle." DINCOTE has hauled in at least nine other major SL leaders, either members of the central committee or regional commanders.

In the shantytowns ringing Lima, Sendero has had to pull back sharply from its most exposed positions. Along the Central Highway, one of SL's main stomping grounds in Lima and where its cadres used to swagger openly through markets, "the ringleaders have disappeared," says a local leader, "and the pointmen in soup kitchens and neighborhood organizations are completely isolated from the population."

Several of these captures have taken place in the provinces. "Many of SL's cadres have never really had any opposition and were caught off guard," says a grassroots organizer.

DINCOTE has also paid a price for its lead role. SL hit squads have killed two officers since the Guzmán capture, including Colonel Manuel Tumba, who participated in the Guzmán raid, but had been transferred to administrative duties recently. The assassinations show that SL hit squads still have the intelligence information to identify prime targets, conduct surveillance, plan and carry out the hit.

On the other hand, in the Central Sierra, there is increased fear that the army is resorting to indiscriminate repression and summary executions. Thirty students have disappeared from the National University of the Center in Huancayo since August. About 17 of them have been found dead, each shot in the head and showing signs of torture, including acid burns and electrocution. According to military sources, the killings were vendettas between Sendero and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). Human rights groups say that eyewitness accounts report the students being picked up by security forces in vehicles typically used by the army.

In another disturbing move, intelligence sources released a list of 190 community leaders and activists as suspected Sendero sympathizers, but many turned out to be front-line SL opponents.

SENDERO'S RURAL STRATEGY: Back to Basics in Guerrillas' Game Plan for Power

According to Carlos Tapia, one of the most knowledgeable sources on Sendero's practices, post-Guzmán Sendero may return to "what it does best" — the rural guerrilla activities which provide the platform to attack the Peruvian state. There were signs in October that Sendero was slipping back into the 1986-88 mode of actions, asserting their dominion over remote strategic areas for their operations, striking at outnumbered security posts and intimidating the population.

In early October, a Sendero guerrilla band, numbering about 100 men, swept down on the community of Huayllao in La Mar province, Ayacucho, 200 miles southeast of Lima. At least 48 people were killed, including nineteen women and seven children.

This was the single bloodiest mass killing in Ayacucho since a SL massacre against the peasant community of Lucanamarca (Ayacucho) for siding with the army in 1983.

The harsh SL action against Huayllao was revenge against the community's support the government's strategy of setting up poorly armed civil militia as a pickets against guerrilla columns. The community had been a militia stronghold and had given refuge to civil defense members fleeing from a coca-growing militia stronghold of the Apurimac valley, which SL had hit in July. Sendero also staged other attacks against the community of Rumi-Rumi and an armed strike in Ayacucho in October. An army convoy was ambushed on the Abancay-Ica highway, killing 11 soldiers and policemen.

Sendero also kept busy in the Huallaga valley, attacking army convoys and settling scores with trafficking organizations which did not pay their "war taxes."

In Huaraz, 310 kilometers northeast of Lima, a SL band killed an Italian lay missionary, Giuglio Rocca, in October. The Benedictine order, which supported his work, withdrew all staff from the region. The column carried out other killings and terrorized the zone.

The government says that 1,400 guerrillas have turned themselves in under new repentance provisions. However, most of these individuals belonged to the MRTA which is in an advanced state of decomposition. The army struck at the MRTA base camp in San Martin department in northern Peru in mid-November.

COUNTERINSURGENCY: Retreat from Human Rights Accord Isolating Peru in International Arena

In mid-October, President Fujimori announced that Peru would start procedures to withdraw from the San Jos, agreement, a regional treaty on human rights. The treaty, signed in 1969 and ratified in the 1979 Peruvian Constitution, binds Peru not to broaden the application of capital punishment applied to crimes which were not already legislated. In Peru's case, it currently applies only to high treason during war with an foreign power.

However, the Peruvian government has not issued a decree to start the proceedings, notified the Organization of American States or done anything practical towards implementing the decision. According to one Lima source, OAS general secretary Joao Baena Soares phoned Fujimori to threaten the withdrawal of the OAS election monitoring teams if Fujimori proceeded with the idea of holding a referendum on capital elections in the November elections.

Fujimori backed down, instead proposing that the referendum be held during the January 29 municipal elections.

"Fujimori is trying to ride on a popular issue to boost the chances of New Majority/Cambio 90," says Lima journalist Mirko Lauer.

If Peru proceeds with this initiative, it ventures into unknown territory because no nation has ever withdrawn from an OAS treaty, much less a human rights agreement. Peru must give a year's notice before the withdrawal can take effect. The proposed withdrawal from the San Jos, agreement also breaks a long-standing Peruvian international policy position of supporting international conflict resolution and recourse.

The withdrawal would actually put Peru in the same status as the United States, which signed the agreement but did not accept the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Peru would still be subject to periodic monitoring from human rights organizations under the OAS and United Nations.

"There would be a political cost because it would isolate Peru from other governments and throw it against the incoming Clinton administration," says a diplomat in Washington.

The debate about instating capital punishment has been smoldering in Peru for a decade. Each time Sendero stepped up bombing activities, assassinations or other harassing actions, the president — whether Belaúnde, García or Fujimori — raised the possibility of applying the death penalty, only to let it fizzle in congressional committees. There is public support (about 50% or more) for capital punishment because there is little faith that the hard-core members can be rehabilitated and hatred of SL's tactics.

However, critics question whether capital punishment is a deterrent to a terrorist organization whose members have already shown themselves prepared to give up their lives for the cause.

JUDICIAL SHORTCUTS QUESTIONED: Guzmán's Speedy Conviction Sends Harsh Message to Followers

On October 4, Abimael Guzmán was convicted of terrorism and high treason by a court martial. Within a week, his defense had exhausted all appeals, with the Supreme Court of Military Justice confirming the ruling. The court martial sentenced him to life imprisonment and payment of damages totalling \$25 billion. Along with Guzmán, the tribunal convicted the SL national coordinator Zenon Vargas and Elena Iparraguire. Two other military courts in the Andean cities of Puno and Arequipa simultaneously sentenced eight more Senderista leaders to life prison terms and \$20 million fines each.

The trial and appeal were shrouded in secrecy. The military tribunal and the appeals court have three members each. The Supreme Council of Military Justice is made of six judges from the three armed services. All judges and prosecutors wore ski masks and signed with numbers instead of names

during the hearing to protect their identities, military sources said. However, in the past, Sendero has taken revenge by targeting high-profile figures of institutions, so shielding specific individuals does not prevent SL's intimidation tactics.

No press or outside observers were allowed to witness the trial. The only eyewitness accounts came from defense lawyers. Guzmán's lawyer, Alfredo Crespo, said that he was not given access to prosecution evidence and affidavits and that he only saw his client for a few brief sessions to prepare his defense. Notification of court rulings gave little time, sometimes only hours, to present appeals. During Guzmán's trial, an international group of lawyers led by Heriberto Ocasio, the head of the U.S. Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru (CSR), arrived in Lima. Peter Erliner (president-elect of the U.S. National Lawyers Guild, but acting on his own initiative), Leonard Weinglass, Martin Heiming of Germany and Anne-Marie Blanchet of France formed the group. However, the government did not permit them to participate in the trial, in part because they were not registered with the Lima bar association.

Guzmán started serving his term on the San Lorenzo Island naval base off the port of Callao. According to new prison regulations, inmates convicted of terrorism must serve the first year of their term in solitary confinement, with two 30-minute family visits per month. They must do forced labor to pay for damages caused by their actions. Other Sendero inmates are held at prisons in Puno and Arequipa.

International reaction: Amnesty International sent a letter to President Fujimori saying it was concerned that the conditions and procedures under which Abimael Guzmán was being tried "fell short of international standards for fair trial" because he was not being tried by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, he had only limited access to his lawyer, and his lawyer was obstructed when attempting to gain access to case records and specific charges faced by his client. Americas Watch also sent a letter to President Fujimori stating its reservations about the court proceedings. In a separate press release, Americas Watch called the trial "a mockery of justice."

In Peru, the government and much of the public reacted indignantly to the international concern for Guzmán's legal rights. *Expreso* newspaper called international human rights groups' actions an "intrusion in domestic affairs."

The Guzmán trial has also led international human rights advocates to voice their reservations about the sweeping decrees that the Fujimori government has passed since the coup. "Faceless judges" (hidden identity), military tribunals, abbreviated trials and appeals, stiff sentencing which breaks the juridical principle of proportionality (punishment in accordance to the crime) lend themselves to abuses and errors, critics say.

RESEARCHER'S CORNER: Bonfires of Ayacucho's Memory

In 1983-84, Peruvian security forces turned Ayacucho into an occupied city and hunted down suspected Sendero sympathizers in house-to-house searches. Almost anything could be incriminating evidence, from a field

compass and blue jeans (to the suspicious eye, obvious guerrilla fittings) to red-jacketed cookbooks, and discovery of the "evidence" could mean two weeks detention, torture and possible death. Ayacucho residents glanced at their small private libraries and boxes of old mimeographed tracts painstakingly accumulated over the previous two decades. In self-preservation, many dumped the material in bonfires or the river gorge nearby. In a sense, they were destroying their collective memory of their own involvement, no matter how secondary, in the rise of Sendero out of Ayacucho's hothouse environment of radicalized politics.

Carlos Iván Degregori, an anthropologist who lived there and taught at the university during the 1970s, has rescued a small, but crucial part of this regional history in his book **El Surgimiento de Sendero Luminoso: Ayacucho 1969-1979** (The Rise of Sendero Luminoso: Ayacucho) published by the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos in 1990.

Degregori actually focuses on a single, pivotal event in regional history, a student revolt in Huanta and Ayacucho against the military government's move to eliminate free public education for those who did not maintain passing grades in 1969. Peasant protests against the measure became a ground swell of opposition and cost at least 14 lives when the Lima government sent riot police to squash the unrest. Drawing on a set of monographs, pamphlets and other materials, he shows how the events shaped SL's approach to radicalism, local conflicts, antagonism between the region and Lima, even though Guzmán and his followers played minor roles, due to their arrests before the revolt gained momentum.

Two decades later and with Guzmán once again jailed, this book reminds the reader that misunderstanding – even ignoring – the social and historical context of violence can lead to continued upheaval and even worsen the conditions for solution.

The book, with an updated introduction, will appear in English in autumn 1993 published by the University of North Carolina Press.

Meddling Civilians: For nearly six years, the Peruvian Senate's Comisión Especial de Investigación y Estudio sobre la Violencia y Alternativas de Pacificación (Special Committee for the Investigation and Study of Violence and Pacification Alternatives) was the only government institution that tried to combine rigorous statistical analysis, open dialogue with civilian and military institutions, and the drafting of viable policy options to address the issue of internal defense. Its first publication was *Violencia y Pacificación* (Lima, Peru: DESCO and Comisión Andina de Juristas, 1989) was followed by two other reports covering 1990 and 1991, published by the Peruvian Senate.

Though the Committee's effort was multi-partisan, it was frequently called the Bernales Commission after its chairman, Senator Enrique Bernales. With the Fujimori coup in April and the disbanding of Congress, Bernales and his staff were deprived of their research material and support. He has set up a research center, *Constitución y Sociedad*, which is publishing a monthly

newsletter, PeruPaz, to continue tracking political violence, pacification efforts and related issues.

In the premiere July issue, a statistical analysis highlighted the significant leap in the average killings per day between 5.44 in 1988 to 8.76 in 1989: "From then on, the [average] stays the same p in other words, that though [the government] adopted measures and put in place strategies that should have reversed the tendencies, the statistics demonstrate that the results were nil, since the same tendency prevails in July 1992 as three years ago." In 1990, an election year, an average 9.46 killings per day took place, in 1991, 8.71 killings; and 8.48 in the first seven months of 1992. Contact: Constitución y Sociedad, Los Ibis 138, San Isidro, Lima 27, PERU (phone: 42-1872). An annual 12-issue subscriptions costs \$220 in Peru, \$260 abroad.

Policy Questions: Donald E. Schulz and Gabriel Marcella, **Strategy for Peru: A Political-Military Dialogue** (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992). A one-day seminar held in June this year following the April 5 presidential coup brought together a diverse group of policy-makers from the State and Defense departments, country experts, and the staff of the Strategic Studies Institute.

The rapporteurs summarized the proceedings – "Perhaps more interesting than the participants' points of view were their disagreements" – and identified several voids in U.S. policy making: the apparent conflict between counterinsurgency and counternarcotics objectives, between democracy and counterinsurgency, between goals and available resources-capabilities. The debate reflected the difficulty of formulating policy towards Peru: a low standing on the national strategic agenda, congressional constraints and the poor rapport with the Peruvian government.

Contact: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050, phone: (717) 245-3001. Costs: No charge.

Free Chairman Gonzalo!: In the September 27 issue of **Revolutionary Worker**, the mouthpiece of the Maoist Revolutionary Communist Party, the Revolutionary International Movement, the coordinating group of Maoist organizations allied with SL sounds the alarm: "We must fight for the recognition of Chairman Gonzalo's stature as the leader of the newly emerging state of the Peruvian people. We must demand that the international conventions concerning the treatment of prisoners of war and political prisoners be respected. We must help all of the oppressed and exploited, all who oppose imperialism and reaction, to understand the stakes of this battle, and we must arm them with the truth." Revolutionary Worker also announced a special issue on the "People's War in Peru" (no. 675). Contact: RCP Publications, Box 3486, Merchandise Mart, Chicago, IL 60654, phone: (312) 227-4066, fax: 227- 4497. The International Emergency Committee to Defend the Life of Abimael Guzmán may be reached at CSRP P.O. Box 1246, Berkeley, CA 94701, phone: (410) 644-4170. In London, its address is BCM World to Win, 27 Old Cloucester Street, London WC1N 3XX, United Kingdom, phone-fax: (44-71) 482-0853.

GUERRILLAS AND DRUGS: A Peruvian Military Perspective

Rarely do the Peruvian armed forces permit active officers to write publicly about the Senderista war. Adm. Jorge Hesse is an exception, both in the detail and clarity with which he addresses the issue. His essay, "The Peruvian Naval Forces in the Struggle Against Subversion and Drug Trafficking in the Amazonian Region of the Ucayali" in **TVI Report**, Vol. 10, No. 3), belies the stereotyping of the Peruvian military as incapable of generating sophisticated, flexible schemes for counterinsurgency. Hesse was head of naval intelligence and helped redraft the navy's strategy after an inauspicious start in the Ayacucho province of Huanta, where first efforts led to massive human rights abuses.

Hesse emphasizes the need for civilian military cooperation in the struggle against Sendero: The Navy's "doctrine in the battle against subversion and narco-terrorism has been developed with full awareness of the integral nature of this struggle, and the predominance of the political, economic and social domains in all military operations which are carried out. While military forces may not intervene as agents in these primarily civilian areas, they are nevertheless conscious that their support in providing security and collaborating with these activities is vital. Perhaps it is in the political realm of the communities that the most caution must be employed, in order not to infringe upon their rights to the emergence of local leaders. These must be the ones to represent their aspirations and fundamental needs before democratically elected government levels."

Also contained in this issue are five other articles: U.S. State Department analyst Timothy Stater, "Sendero Luminoso's Relentless War;" U.S. journalist Sharon Stevenson, "With Impunity and Injustice for All: The Heart of Peru's Human Rights Problems;" Peruvian political scientist Jose Lizarraga, "Sendero Luminoso: Struggle for Utopia;" Peruvian journalist Gustavo Gorriti, "Latin America's Internal Wars;" and U.S. journalist Michael L. Smith, "Taking the High Ground: Shining Path and the Andes." Contact: TVI Report, P.O. Box 1055, Beverly Hills, CA 90213-9940. (Annual subscriptions \$80, \$105 overseas, but the issue under review is available for \$10).